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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This study focuses on two principal actors of corporate governance, namely audit 
committees and external auditors (Cohen, Krishnamoorthy & Wright 2004). 
These corporate governance players have a common objective in ensuring 
financial reporting quality. In addition, audit committees are responsible for 
hiring and overseeing external auditors’ work (e.g. SOX 2002), which gives them 
great authority over audit quality. When these responsibilities are taken into 
consideration as a whole, audit quality can be considered to have an effect on the 
relationship between audit committee effectiveness and financial reporting 
quality. 
 
As pointed out by Ball (2008) financial reporting is an important economic 
activity. The demand for financial reporting arises from information asymmetry 
between the managers and owners of the company (Jensen & Meckling 1976; 
Healy & Palepu 2001). High quality of financial reporting is a prerequisite for an 
efficient allocation of capital (Healy et al. 2001). Thus financial reporting quality 
is of interest to those who use financial reports for decision-making. External 
financial statement users, including current and potential investors, creditors, and 
others need reliable financial information on which to base their resource 
allocation decisions. Auditees, including management, audit committees, and 
boards of directors have an interest in producing high quality financial reports, for 
example, to help to reduce the cost of capital and to attract potential investors. In 
addition, regulators and standard setters can increase the effectiveness of capital 
markets by promulgating rules and regulations that help ensure financial reporting 
quality (ISB 2000; Schipper & Vincent 2003). 
 
One of the objectives of a company’s corporate governance system is to ensure 
the quality of that company’s financial reporting (Abbott & Parker 2000; Abbott, 
Parker & Peters 2004; Klein 2003; McMullen & Raghunandan 1996; Stewart & 
Munro 2007). However, there have been concerns about corporate governance 
quality in the present environment, where severe corporate failures have come to 
light. It has been found that the perceived reliability of audited financial 
information has declined. By contrast, the perceived relevance of audited 
financial information has increased (Hodge 2003).  
 
Due to these concerns, the impact of corporate governance on a company’s 
financial reporting quality has attracted increasing emphasis among accounting 
researchers in recent years (Pomeroy & Thornton 2008). Prior research has 
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indicated that both audit committees and external auditors are able to decrease 
management discretion over accounting issues and therefore are able to enhance 
financial reporting quality (e.g. Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson & Lapides 2000; 
Frankel, Johnson & Nelson 2002; Geiger & Rama 2003; Abbott et al. 2004; 
Bédard, Chtourou & Courteau 2004; Larcker & Richardson 2004; Bradbury, Mak 
& Tan 2006). In addition, studies have shown that audit committees are associated 
with the demand for high quality audit (e.g. Abbott et al. 2000; Abbott, Parker, 
Peters & Raghunandan 2003a; Chen, Moroney & Houghton 2005).   
 
The objective of this study is to investigate the interplay between audit 
committees and external auditors in ensuring financial reporting quality. More 
specifically, as indicated by prior research, it is hypothesized that both audit 
committee effectiveness and audit quality contribute to financial reporting quality. 
In addition, audit committee effectiveness is expected to increase audit quality. 
Finally, these relationships are connected into a more comprehensive model 
which suggests that audit quality may mediate the relationship between audit 
committee effectiveness and financial reporting quality. The main contribution of 
the study arises from the development of the mediation model as well as from its 
empirical investigation. 
 
1.1 Research problem 
 
The role of external auditing in a company’s corporate governance function is a 
complex one since the auditor interacts with several other actors of the corporate 
governance function, such as the audit committee, the board of directors, the 
internal auditors and the management (Cohen et al. 2004). From amongst this 
complex net of interactions this study focuses on the relationship between audit 
committees and external auditors in ensuring financial reporting quality. Although 
earlier studies have recognized that audit committees and external auditors serve 
as important determinants of financial reporting quality, the relationship between 
these corporate governance actors has not been thoroughly explored. This is 
because much of this research has adopted a direct or main effect approach and 
less attention has been paid to the possibility of more complex effect types which 
would enable a more thorough analysis of the underlying mechanisms of the 
relationships. This approach enables research providing a more comprehensive 
description of companies’ corporate governance function and is thus of greater 
practical significance to interest groups in financial reporting. 
 
Accordingly, this research develops and tests a model that establishes 
relationships between: 1) audit committee effectiveness and financial reporting 
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quality, 2) audit committee effectiveness and audit quality, and 3) audit quality 
and financial reporting quality. In the model developed, audit quality is expected 
to have a mediating role in the relationship between audit committee effectiveness 
and financial reporting quality. The mediating role maintains that the effect of 
audit committee effectiveness on financial reporting quality goes through audit 
quality, at least partly. 
 
The model is summarized in Figure 1. The theoretical concepts of the model are 
illustrated at the top of the figure. These are audit committee effectiveness, audit 
quality and financial reporting quality. Audit committee effectiveness is modelled 
as the independent variable, audit quality as the mediator and financial reporting 
quality as the dependent variable in the model. Operational measures for the 
variables are illustrated at the bottom of Figure 1. Audit committee effectiveness 
is measured by three variables, namely audit committee size, audit committee 
meeting frequency, and audit committee expertise ratio. Audit quality is measured 
by audit fees paid to the incumbent auditor and financial reporting quality is 
measured by discretionary accruals. 
 
Audit committee effectiveness is the independent variable in the model and in the 
empirical analyses it is measured by three variables. More specifically, audit 
committee effectiveness is expected to increase along with audit committee size 
(ACSIZE), expertise ratio (ACEXP), and meeting frequency (ACMEET) (e.g. 
Bédard et al. 2004; Goodwin-Stewart & Kent 2006; Vafeas & Waegelein 2007). 
The model suggests that audit committee effectiveness improves financial 
reporting quality and increases the demand for audit quality. In addition, audit 
committee effectiveness is expected to have a mediated effect on financial 
reporting quality through audit quality. 
 
         Independent variable                                   Mediator                 Dependent variable  
Theoretical 
concepts 
 
 
 
Operational  
measures 
 
 
Audit committee 
effectiveness 
-Audit committee size 
-Audit committee 
meeting frequency 
-Audit committee 
expertise ratio 
-Audit fees -Discretionary accruals 
Audit quality Financial reporting 
quality 
 
Figure 1.  The mediating role of audit quality on the relationship between audit       
committee effectiveness and financial reporting quality. 
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Audit quality is the mediating variable in the model. Audit quality is measured by 
audit fees (AUDITFEE) paid to the incumbent auditor. High levels of audit fees 
are expected to indicate higher audit engagement effort and thus better audit 
quality (e.g. Carcello, Hermanson, Neal & Riley 2002; Abbott et al. 2003a; 
Srinidhi & Gul 2007) after controlling for other variables related to pricing of 
audit services. Thus, audit quality as determined by audit fees, is expected to 
improve financial reporting quality. In addition, audit quality is expected to 
mediate the relationship between audit committee effectiveness and financial 
reporting quality.  
 
Financial reporting quality is the dependent variable in the model. Following 
Watkins, Hillison and Morecroft (2004) financial reporting quality refers to how 
well financial statement information reflects the true economic circumstances of 
the company. Financial reporting quality is measured by discretionary accruals 
(ACC)1 estimated using a modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) model. It is 
proposed that a higher value of discretionary accruals indicates a greater level of 
earnings management and thus, lower financial reporting quality. 
 
Collectively, the model is used to test following hypotheses: 
 
H1: Audit committee effectiveness improves financial reporting quality. 
 
H2: Audit committee effectiveness increases the demand for audit quality. 
 
H3: Audit quality improves financial reporting quality. 
 
H4: Audit quality mediates the relationship between audit committee 
effectiveness and financial reporting quality. 
 
The model developed is tested with two complementary methods: the Causal 
Steps Method and the Sobel Test. The Causal Steps Method (see Baron and 
Kenny 1986) involves probing of four conditions which are analogous with the 
hypotheses of the study. Thus, the Causal Steps Method involves a multistage 
regression analysis which assesses following conditions for mediation: 1) the 
independent variable must have a significant effect on the dependent variable, 2) 
the independent variable must have a significant effect on the mediator, 3) the 
mediator must have a significant effect on the dependent variable, and 4) the 
independent variable should have no effect on the dependent variable when the 
mediator is held constant (full mediation) or the effect of independent variable 
                                                 
1
 Refers to accruals in which management has discretion over. 
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should become smaller when the mediator is held constant (partial mediation) 
(Baron et al. 1986). If all conditions of the Causal Steps Method are met the Sobel 
Test is also employed. In these situations the Sobel Test provides information 
regarding the significance of the mediated effect. 
 
The data for this study consists of a sample of S&P 1500 companies2. Data is 
obtained from several sources. Data related to audit committee effectiveness are 
obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). Audit fee data are 
obtained from the Audit Analytics Database. Finally, financial data is gathered 
from Thomson Financial Database. The procedures of the Causal Steps Method 
are carried through separately for the three measures of audit committee 
effectiveness. Thus, the following models are tested:  
 
1) ACSIZEAUDITFEEACC,  
 
2) ACEXPAUDITFEEACC, and  
 
3) ACMEETAUDITFEEACC.  
 
The results of the Causal Steps Method as well as the Sobel Test provided support 
for the last model, whereas the results concerning the first two models are 
inconclusive. In general, the results show that variables related to audit committee 
composition are not sufficient measures for audit committee effectiveness in the 
US regulatory environment, likely because the US regulations allow little 
variation in audit committee composition which results in companies setting up 
homogeneous audit committees in terms of their size and expertise ratio3. Thus, 
the relationships between audit committee composition measures and financial 
reporting quality measure as well as audit committee composition measures and 
audit quality measure cannot be observed with the data employed in the present 
study.  
 
However, the results show that audit committee meeting frequency can be used to 
differentiate audit committee effectiveness between companies. More specifically 
with regard to model ACMEETAUDITFEEACC the following results are 
found. Firstly, the results reveal that audit committee meeting frequency has a 
negative effect on discretionary accruals. This indicates that more active audit 
committees are better able to restrict management influence over discretionary 
                                                 
2
 Refers to the S&P (Standard & Poor’s) 1500 Composite Index which encompasses all stocks in 
the S&P 500, S&P 400, and S&P 600 indices. 
3
 See e.g. Hay, Knechel & Ling (2008) for more discussion on this issue. 
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accruals and thus ensure financial reporting quality more effectively. Secondly, 
audit committee meeting frequency is found to have a positive effect on audit 
fees. This result has several plausible explanations. Audit committee meetings 
may require more work by external auditors, which leads to higher audit fees. 
Alternatively more active audit committees may require greater audit quality and 
audit coverage, which leads to an increase in audit fees. Thirdly, audit fees are 
found to have a modest negative effect on discretionary accruals. This result 
implies that higher fees reflect greater audit effort, which leads to greater 
monitoring provided by auditors and thus, to better financial reporting quality. 
Finally, it was found that audit fees partially mediate the relationship between 
audit committee meeting frequency and discretionary accruals. The fact that only 
partial mediation was found indicates that there may be other control 
mechanisms, currently beyond the scope of the model developed, which can 
function as mediators in the relationship between audit committee effectiveness 
and financial reporting quality. These control mechanisms include, for example, 
internal auditing and the internal control mechanism of the company. 
 
1.2 Contribution 
 
This study adds to the existing knowledge regarding the interplay between audit 
committees and external auditors in ensuring financial reporting quality. More 
specifically this study develops a model in which audit quality mediates the 
relationship between audit committee effectiveness and financial reporting 
quality. This study contributes to the existing literature both theoretically as well 
as empirically.  
 
Firstly, the model developed can be placed in theoretical frameworks concerned 
with corporate governance (Cohen et al. 2004), audit committee effectiveness 
(DeZoort, Hermanson, Archambeault & Reed  2002) and audit quality (Watkins 
et al. 2004). This study contributes to these frameworks by providing empirical 
evidence for some of the specific aspects they address. Cohen et al. (2004) 
discuss the interrelationships between various corporate governance actors 
functioning inside and outside the company. This study focuses on the 
interrelationship of two corporate governance actors, namely audit committees 
and external auditors. The framework by DeZoort et al. (2002) addresses the 
determinants of audit committee effectiveness. According to the framework this is 
dependent upon composition, authority, resources and diligence of the audit 
committee. Consistently the operational measures of audit committee 
effectiveness employed in this study are related to composition and diligence 
components of audit committee effectiveness. Finally, Watkins’ et al. (2004) 
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framework models the drivers, components and products of audit quality. The 
framework maintains that there is a sequence from the drivers of audit quality to 
components of audit quality and further to products of audit quality. The model 
developed in the present study is analogous with this view: audit committee 
effectiveness is expected to lead to audit quality, which is further expected to 
result in financial reporting quality. 
 
Secondly, the effect of audit committee effectiveness and external audit quality on 
financial reporting quality is an area which has commanded considerable research 
interest in empirical studies. In summary, prior research has determined 
relationships between: 1) audit committee effectiveness and financial reporting 
quality (e.g. Beasley et al. 2000; Abbott et al. 2004; Bédard et al. 2004), 2) audit 
committee effectiveness and audit quality (e.g. Abbott & Parker 2001; Abbott et 
al. 2003a; Vafeas et al. 2007), and 3) audit quality and financial reporting quality 
(e.g. Nelson, Elliott & Tarpley 2002; Krishnan 2005; Srinidhi et al. 2007). This 
study contributes to prior research theoretically by placing these relationships into 
a more comprehensive model. The core of the model developed is the assumption 
that audit quality mediates the relationship between audit committee effectiveness 
and financial reporting quality.  
 
Thirdly, the results of the earlier studies regarding the relationships between audit 
committee effectiveness, audit quality and financial reporting quality have 
naturally been obtained in several countries and at different times using different 
sets of data. This study also contributes to earlier studies empirically by 
examining whether these relationships can be found using a single set of data of 
US companies from year 2006. If relationships can be found this study provides 
further support for prior studies and shows that their results have not been driven, 
for example, by special features in the data. Another empirical contribution of this 
study arises from the analysis of the mediated effect. Prior audit research has not 
addressed mediation models and thus, has not employed methods suitable to test 
mediated effects. This study adopts methods used in other fields of social sciences 
to test the mediation hypothesis.  
 
1.3 Structure of the study 
 
The overall structure of the study is presented in Figure 2. In general, the chapters 
of the study form four main phases which are as follows: 1) Introduction, 2) 
Theory and prior literature, 3) Methodology and results, and 4) Conclusions. The 
purpose of the first phase is to present the research problem area, the research 
problem as well as the contributions of the study. The second phase explains the 
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theoretical foundations of the study and therefore agency theory and relevant 
frameworks are discussed. This phase also provides definitions of key theoretical 
concepts as well as operational measures for these concepts employed by prior 
studies. Finally, the research model is derived from prior empirical research. The 
third phase explains the statistical methods employed as well as the adaptation of 
these methods. This phase also presents the results of this study. The fourth phase 
provides concluding remarks including a discussion linking the results of the 
present study with the existing literature. In addition, the implications of the 
results and future research opportunities are discussed. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Phases of the study. 
 
 
More specifically, this study consists of seven chapters organised in the following 
way. The first chapter introduces the research problem and discusses the 
contributions of the study. The second chapter introduces the theoretical 
perspectives underlying the research problem area. Thus, this chapter introduces 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research phases 
Phase 1: Introduction 1.Introduction -Introduce the research 
problem area                       
- Introduce the research 
problem                               
-Explain contributions of 
the study 
-Introduce agency theory 
and relevant frameworks     
-Provide definitions of the 
key concepts                       
-Develop the research 
model 
2. Theoretical framework 
of the study                                
3. Definitions and 
operational measures of 
key concepts                      
4. Development of the 
research model 
Phase 2: Theory and prior 
literature 
 
Main purposes Main chapters 
Phase 4: Conclusion 
 
Phase 3: Methodology and 
results 
 
7. Conclusions 
5. Methodology  and 
sample                               
6. Results 
-Discuss the connections 
between present results and 
prior literature                     
-Discuss implications of the 
results of the study                                  
-Discuss future research 
-Introduce the methodology 
and its adaptation                 
-Introduce the sample                
-Present results of the main 
analyses as well as 
additional analyses 
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the basic premises of agency theory, which explains the demand for financial 
reporting as well as corporate governance. This chapter also introduces 
frameworks related to corporate governance, audit committee effectiveness and 
audit quality. In addition the second chapter introduces the regulatory 
environment of the study. This discussion is focused on regulations related to 
audit committee effectiveness and audit quality. The third chapter introduces 
definitions as well as measures for audit committee effectiveness, audit quality 
and financial reporting quality used in prior studies. This discussion is based on 
both theoretical and empirical research. The fourth chapter formulates the 
hypotheses by reviewing studies focusing on relationships between audit 
committee effectiveness, audit quality and financial reporting quality. This 
chapter also discusses the alternative effect types which can be chosen to describe 
the relationships. Finally, the research model is introduced. The fifth chapter 
introduces the methodology for testing the mediation effect. In addition, this 
chapter introduces the operational measures for variables and explains how 
methods related to mediation effect are adopted in the present study. Chapter Six 
presents the results of the analyses. Finally Chapter Seven provides concluding 
remarks for the study. 
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2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF  
 THE STUDY 
 
A company’s corporate governance function includes five main actors: 
management, the board of directors, the audit committee, the external auditors 
and the internal auditors (Cohen et al. 2004). One of the main objectives of 
corporate governance is to ensure a company’s financial reporting quality. The 
interaction among corporate governance actors is crucial to achieve this objective 
(SOX 2002; Cohen et al. 2004). This study will focus on two of these corporate 
governance actors, namely audit committees and external auditors. In particular 
this study attempts to determine and analyse the type of relationship between 
audit committees and external auditors in ensuring financial reporting quality.  
 
The aim of this section is to introduce the underlying theoretical foundations for 
this study which form the basis for the rest of the thesis. Firstly, agency theory 
will be introduced. Agency theory is a general theory of accounting which 
explains the demand for monitoring provided by audit committees and external 
auditors. Secondly, theoretical frameworks regarding corporate governance, audit 
committee effectiveness and audit quality are introduced. In addition, the 
regulatory framework related to the research problem area is discussed. Finally, 
the positioning of the present study into agency theory and the theoretical and 
regulatory frameworks is explained.  
 
2.1 Agency theory 
 
The theoretical background of this study is based on agency theory, which 
postulates that so-called agency problems emerge due to the separation of 
ownership and control. Agency problems are further expected to have an impact 
on financial reporting quality. This creates a need for monitoring of management 
and thus produces the need for corporate governance including effective audit 
committees and high quality external auditors (Jensen et al. 1976; Healy et al. 
2001). An underlying notion behind agency theory is that the monitoring provided 
by audit committees and external auditors will actually contribute to corporate 
control, thereby increasing a company’s financial reporting quality. By contrast, 
institutional theory, for example, states that many organizational structures such 
as audit committees are merely symbolic and may be formed to conform to social 
expectations without having any actual impact on financial reporting quality 
(Kalbers & Fogarty 1998).  
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In agency theory emphasis is on rights established by contracts (Coase 1937; 
Alchian & Demsetz 1972; Jensen et al. 1976; Fama & Jensen 1983). Jensen et al. 
(1976) model the contract between the shareholder and the owner-manager, 
which is called an agency relationship. An agency relationship is defined as a 
contract under which one or more persons (the principals) engage another person 
(the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating 
some decision making authority to the agent (Jensen et al. 1976). In the manager-
shareholder contract, the owner-manager is viewed as the agent and the 
shareholder as the principal (Watts & Zimmerman 1986).  Both the principals and 
the agents are considered utility maximizers (Jensen et al. 1976). 
 
Agency relationship contains two inherent aspects which, in combination, create 
agency problems: 1) the potential conflicts of interests between owners and 
managers which may cause managers to act against shareholders’ interests, and 2) 
the imperfect observability of managerial actions by shareholders (DeFond 1992). 
Agency problems can increase management’s propensity to produce substandard 
financial information in order to conceal actions that have not been in the best 
interest of the shareholders or debt-holders (Jensen et al. 1976). The agency 
literature suggests that certain company specific characteristics increase 
management incentives to act against shareholders’ or debt-holders’ interests, 
thus increasing agency problems. The primary operational measures for agency 
problems are leverage, management ownership and free cash flow (see e.g. 
DeFond 1992).  
 
Firstly, the agency problem of leverage postulates that managers (acting on behalf 
of shareholders) have incentives to transfer wealth from debt-holders by taking 
various actions such as paying dividends to shareholders at the expense of 
profitable projects or restructuring of debt (Jensen et al. 1976; Chow 1982; 
DeFond 1992; Parkash & Venable 1993). Some of these actions can result in a 
decline in firm value because they involve suboptimal investment policies (Chow 
1982). Moreover, the literature suggests that firms with high leverage are more 
likely to face bankruptcy and such firms are more likely to engage in earnings 
management since they are closer to debt covenant violations (Gul & Tsui 2001). 
 
Secondly, agency literature recognizes that the level of management ownership 
gives rise to an asymmetric information problem. This maintains that at low 
levels of management ownership the manager may be better informed about the 
activities and payoffs of the firm than the owner (Ng 1978; Ng & Stoeckenius 
1979). Separation of ownership from management creates monitoring difficulties 
giving the potential for management to take non-value-maximizing actions. Thus, 
low management ownership creates an increased demand for accounting-based 
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contractual constraints which are used to discourage managers from non-value-
maximizing actions. Management may be motivated to mitigate these constraints 
by strategically choosing accounting policies and determining accounting accruals 
(Jensen et al. 1976). Accordingly it has been found that management ownership is 
positively associated with earnings explanatory power for returns and negatively 
related to the magnitude of discretionary accruals (Warfield, Wild & Wild 1995). 
 
Thirdly, the agency problem of free cash flow postulates that in the presence of 
high free cash flow, management has opportunities to make expenditures that 
have negative Net Present Values (NPVs) rather than paying dividends to 
shareholders or purchase stock. The free cash flow agency problem can be 
implicated by a firm’s poor financial performance and consequently poor stock 
market valuations. The free cash flow agency problem is also implicated by a 
relation between company’s free cash flow and accrual activities. Managers in 
firms with high free cash flow may have incentives to smooth earnings in order to 
shirk the full impact of wasteful expenditures on earnings. Prior research has 
documented a negative relation between free cash flow and the magnitude of 
discretionary accruals. These results can be explained by the following rationale: 
income-decreasing accruals occur if managers wish to shift profits to future years 
when the full impact of expenditures hits earnings (Chung, Firth & Kim 2005; 
Richardson 2006).  
 
Agency theory maintains that there are two main ways in which shareholders can 
mitigate agency problems. First, the shareholders can establish appropriate 
incentives for the managers in such a way that their interests coincide with those 
of the shareholders. Second, the shareholders can monitor the managements’ 
actions. Jensen et al. (1976) describe agency costs as the sum of these safeguards, 
along with the effects of those abuses which could be prevented. 
 
According to agency theory, the demand for financial reporting arises from the 
manager’s needs to provide some description of the firm’s payoff for legal and 
contractual reasons. However, financial reporting is of little use if its provision is 
not monitored and enforced (Watts et al. 1986). Corporate governance actors, 
such as audit committees and external auditors, provide monitoring whose main 
value is dependent on its ability to decrease the likelihood that company’s 
financial reports contain breaches. Agency theory predicts that as agency 
problems become more severe, management will demand higher quality 
monitoring in an effort to ensure financial reporting quality to shareholders, debt-
holders or other investors (Chow 1982; Francis & Wilson 1988; DeFond 1992; 
Kalbers et al. 1998; Lennox 2005). Prior empirical studies have addressed this 
notion and examined for example whether variables related to company’s agency 
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problems produce the need for effective audit committees (e.g. Menon & 
Williams 1994; Collier & Gregory 1999) or high quality external audit (e.g. 
Lennox 2005; Nikkinen & Sahlström 2004).  
 
2.1.1 Agency theory and audit committees 
 
Early studies focusing on the association between agency problems and audit 
committees were conducted prior to the requirement for mandatory formation of 
audit committees. Thus, studies such as Pincus, Rusbarsky and Wong (1989) and 
Bradbury (1990) examined whether a company’s agency problems affect the 
voluntary formation of audit committees. It was hypothesized that companies 
with great agency problems are more likely to employ audit committees in order 
to enhance the quality of financial reporting by management. The results of these 
studies were somewhat mixed. Pincus et al. (1989) in their study of US 
companies reported a number of significant relationships between variables 
related to agency problems (i.e. leverage, company size, ownership structure) and 
the formation of audit committee. Bradbury (1990), however, was unable to find 
significant relationships between agency problem variables (i.e. number of 
outside shareholders, leverage and assets-in-place) and formation of audit 
committees for a sample of New Zealand companies. 
 
Studies have also attempted to link agency problems with measures of audit 
committee effectiveness, such as audit committee independence and activity 
level. The results of these studies have also been mixed. For example, Menon et 
al. (1994) found significant relations between selected agency variables (i.e. 
outside directors on the board, auditor type and company size) and the existence 
of audit committees, the percentage of outside directors on audit committees, or 
the frequency of audit committee meetings using a sample of US companies. 
Collier et al. (1999) attempted to replicate and extend the study by Menon et al. 
(1994). More specifically they examined audit committee activity level in large 
companies and by employing another measure of audit committee effectiveness, 
namely the duration of audit committee meetings.  Their results, however, failed 
to support the findings of Menon et al. (1994) related to the impact of agency 
variables on the number of audit committee meetings. They did find that the 
(then) Big Six audit firms and leverage were positively related to audit committee 
activity. In addition the results revealed that audit committee activity was reduced 
in firms where the role of chairman and CEO were combined and where insiders 
were included in the audit committee. Turpin and DeZoort (1998) found a 
significant positive association between voluntary audit committee report 
disclosure in annual reports and agency variables - company size, proportion of 
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outside directors, leverage, and trade on a major stock exchange. In contrast 
Kalbers et al. (1998) investigated whether audit committee effectiveness is more 
closely aligned with agency or institutional theory. Their results did not show a 
strong link between audit committee effectiveness and agency variables, thus 
providing indirect support for the institutional theory which states that the audit 
committee is a symbolic structure formed to confirm to social pressures.  
 
Studies have also examined the relationship between boards of directors and audit 
committees. Since the audit committee is a subcommittee of the board it is 
expected to have a significant effect on audit committee composition and 
activities. Beasley and Salterio (2001) examined the effect of boards of directors 
on voluntary improvements in audit committee composition. They found that 
audit committee independence level and audit committee knowledge and 
experience were positively associated with board size, proportion of outsiders on 
the board, and the separation of board chair and CEO/president. Similarly Klein 
(2002b) found that audit committee independence was positively associated with 
board size and board independence and negatively associated with growth 
opportunities and firms with losses. Klein (2002b) found no effect of leverage, 
CEO on compensation committee and outside director holdings4 on audit 
committee independence. 
 
2.1.2 Agency theory and external auditing 
 
Agency theory has also been applied to external auditing. These studies have 
examined whether agency problems increase the demand for audit quality. Early 
studies such as Chow (1982) and Watts and Zimmerman (1983) provide evidence 
that firms voluntarily engage external auditing in situations of great agency 
problems. Later studies used auditor reputation (audit firm size or brand name) as 
a measure of audit quality and documented that companies facing agency 
problems hire auditors with better reputation (Francis et al. 1988; DeFond 1992; 
Lennox 2005; Fan & Wong 2005). More recent research has used audit fees as a 
proxy for audit quality. Gul and Tsui (1998) examined the association between 
free cash flow and audit fees. They presented evidence of a positive association 
between free cash flow and audit fees for low growth firms. In addition it was 
found that debt moderated this relationship. In a subsequent study Gul et al. 
(2001) examined the association between free cash flow and audit fees for 
different levels of management ownership. They found a positive association 
                                                 
4
 Outside director holdings was the percentage of shares held by outside directors. Outside 
directors were defined as directors having no affiliation with the firm other than serving as 
directors in the board or audit committee whereas inside directors were current employees. 
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between free cash flow and audit fees. This association was stronger for 
companies with low management ownership. In addition Nikkinen et al. (2004) 
examined the relationship between agency problems and total fees paid to 
incumbent auditors. They found a positive relation between free cash flow and 
total fees and a negative relation between management ownership and total fees. 
These results are consistent with the notion that management demands a higher 
quality audit as firm’s agency problems increase. In addition, some other control 
mechanisms such as debt holders may have an effect on the strength of this 
relationship. 
 
Prior research has also shown that audit clients distinguish between audit and 
non-audit services when considering their effect on audit quality and especially 
auditor independence. The notion behind these studies is that if auditees want to 
signal audit quality and auditor independence to outsiders they restrict the 
purchase of non-audit services from their incumbent auditor. This notion is 
supported by Beck, Frecka and Solomon (1988a), Beck, Frecka and Solomon 
(1988b), Parkash et al. (1993) and Firth (1997), who found that companies with 
agency problems reduce the purchase of non-audit services from the incumbent 
auditor. This can be explained by auditee’s wish to safeguard shareholders’ 
perceptions of auditor independence in situations where agency problems are 
present (Parkash et al. 1993).   
 
2.2 Frameworks 
 
Prior literature includes frameworks which have been developed to improve the 
understanding of the actors potentially influencing the effectiveness of corporate 
governance including audit committees and external auditors. In this study the 
frameworks are divided into three classes: 1) frameworks related to corporate 
governance, 2) frameworks related to audit committees and 3) frameworks related 
to audit quality. These frameworks are somewhat overlapping, although they 
represent alternative theoretical approaches to analyse the functioning of 
corporate governance, audit committee effectiveness and audit quality. The 
frameworks are discussed in more detail in the following sections. 
 
2.2.1 Framework for corporate governance 
 
Cohen’s et al. (2004) corporate governance mosaic aims to describe how a 
company’s corporate governance affects financial reporting quality. This mosaic 
is presented in Figure 3. Firstly, the mosaic identifies actors and mechanisms for 
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the most part external to the company, which are expected to have an effect on the 
effectiveness of the organizations corporate governance function. These actors 
include regulators, legislators, financial analysts, stock exchanges, courts and the 
legal system as well as the stockholders. Secondly, the main actors of corporate 
governance are identified. These include board of directors, audit committees, 
internal auditors, external auditors and management. These five actors are also 
expected to have a more direct impact on a company’s financial reporting quality. 
The framework maintains that there are interrelationships between the various 
mechanisms and actors in the framework. More specifically, the effectiveness of a 
company’s corporate governance function is dependent on proper communication 
and interaction between corporate governance actors. This is consistent with SOX 
(2002), which states that the effectiveness of corporate governance is dependent 
on the interaction between board of directors, audit committees, external auditors, 
internal auditors and management.  
 
 
 
 
Financial reporting quality 
Financial Analysts 
Stockholders Stock Exchanges Regulators 
Legislators Courts & Legal 
System 
Management Internal Auditors 
Board of Directors 
External Auditors 
Audit Committee 
 
 
Figure 3.  Corporate governance mosaic and financial reporting quality (Cohen 
et al. 2004). 
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2.2.2 Framework for audit committee effectiveness 
 
DeZoort et al. (2002) provided a framework for evaluating audit committee 
effectiveness. The framework is presented in Figure 4. This framework DeZoort et 
al. (2002) consists of three levels of audit committee effectiveness, namely input, 
process and output levels. The input level of audit committee effectiveness 
includes components such as composition, authority and resources of the audit 
committee. These factors create the basic premises for audit committee 
effectiveness. Audit committee composition refers to audit committee members’ 
mental attributes such as expertise, independence, integrity and objectivity. On 
the other hand authority refers to the responsibilities and influence of the audit 
committee. In addition, resources involve audit committee members’ access to 
management as well as internal and external auditors. The process level of audit 
committee effectiveness includes diligence of the audit committee. It is suggested 
that input level factors contribute to audit committee effectiveness only if audit 
committee members are active and devote adequate time and effort to the 
discharge of their duties regarding the functioning of the audit committee. The 
input and process components are expected to have a joint effect on the output of 
audit committee effectiveness. In the framework audit committee is considered 
effective if it successfully fulfils its responsibilities. 
 
Output 
 
 
Process 
           Diligence 
 
 
Input 
 
 
Composition 
(e.g. Expertise, 
Independence) 
Authority 
(e.g. Responsibilities, 
Influence) 
Resources 
(e.g.  Access to 
management, External and 
Internal Auditors) 
 
Audit committee effectiveness 
 
 
Figure 4.  Determinants of audit committee effectiveness (DeZoort et al. 2002). 
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2.2.3 Frameworks for audit quality 
 
Frameworks related to audit quality include DeAngelo’s (1981a; 1981b) seminal 
model for audit services as well as more recent description of determinants of 
audit quality by Watkins et al. (2004). DeAngelo’s (1981a; 1981b) framework 
defines determinants of perceived audit quality with a particular focus on auditor 
independence. More recently, Watkins et al. (2004) developed DeAngelo’s 
(1981a; 1981b) definition further. In comparison to DeAngelo’s (1981a; 1981b) 
definition, which is concerned with perceived audit quality, Watkins et al. (2004) 
make a distinction between actual and perceived audit quality. 
 
DeAngelo’s (1981a; 1981b) definition of perceived audit quality is depicted in 
Figure 5. DeAngelo (1981a; 1981b) defines audit quality as the market-assessed 
probability that, given that the financial statements contain material errors, they 
are discovered and reported. According to the definition the probability of 
discovery depends on the auditor’s competence, whereas the probability of 
reporting refers to the auditor’s independence from the auditee. According to the 
framework independence is compromised if the auditor allows the client to use a 
reporting policy that he or she believes would be viewed as an audit failure. 
DeAngelo (1981a; 1981b) argues that auditor’s decision to retain his or her 
independence would be impaired if the auditor fears dismissal. Losing a client 
would mean that the auditor would lose the economic revenue that otherwise 
would accrue to him or her from repeatedly auditing the same client. The 
revenues are a result of gaining client specific knowledge. The revenue serves to 
bind the auditor to the client because client specific knowledge results in audit 
costs falling while audit fees rise over time (DeAngelo 1981a; DeAngelo 1981b). 
However, potential loss of reputation from perceived non-independence is seen as 
counteracting the bonding between auditor and client. Thus, auditor’s loss of 
reputation can reduce the size of the auditors’ client portfolio. Ultimately the 
decision to remain independent results from a comparison of the gains resulting 
from choosing to lose one’s independence with those obtainable from remaining 
independent (DeAngelo 1981a; DeAngelo 1981b). In addition, DeAngelo (1981a; 
1981b) argues that large audit firms are better able to remain independent of the 
audit client because they have more audit clients than small audit firms. Therefore 
economic revenues received from one client are typically not as significant to a 
large audit firm as to a small audit firm. 
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Perceived audit quality 
Auditor competence 
-Probability that auditor 
discovers material errors in the 
financial statements 
 
Auditor independence 
-Probability that auditor will 
report discovered errors in the 
financial statements 
 
 
Figure 5.  Perceived audit quality (DeAngelo 1981a; DeAngelo 1981b). 
 
 
The framework by Watkins et al. (2004) extends the definition of audit quality 
provided by DeAngelo (1981a; 1981b). The framework discusses drivers, 
dimensions as well as products of audit quality. This framework is presented in 
Figure 6. Drivers for audit quality are divided into demand and supply drivers. 
Demand drivers include client risk strategies and agency conflicts and supply 
drivers include auditor risk management strategies and audit fees. Audit quality is 
divided into auditor reputation and auditor monitoring strength. Auditor 
reputation refers to perceptions of audit quality and auditor monitoring strength 
refers to actual audit quality. Consistent with DeAngelo (1981a; 1981b), both 
auditor monitoring strength and auditor reputation can be divided into dimensions 
of competence and independence. In other words, auditors’ monitoring strength 
(reputation) is dependent on auditors’ actual (perceived) competence and actual 
(perceived) independence. Monitoring strength and reputation are expected to be 
determinants of information credibility and information quality. Consistently 
information credibility refers to perceptions of financial reporting quality and 
information quality refers to actual financial reporting quality in the framework. 
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Figure 6.  Determinants of audit quality (Watkins et al. 2004). 
 
2.2.4 Regulatory framework 
   
Corporate failures and accounting scandals have provided US regulators with 
strong impetus to re-evaluate requirements concerning corporate governance. In 
the aftermath of these scandals the US Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
in 2002 (hereafter referred to as the SOX 2002). In addition, all major US stock 
exchanges have renewed their listing standards with regard to corporate 
governance based on SOX (2002). In general, the purpose of these requirements 
is to strengthen companies’ corporate governance including the functioning of 
audit committees and external audit. The proper functioning of these actors is 
believed to ensure a company’s financial reporting quality. The following 
sections will discuss these requirements in more detail. The aim of this section is 
to provide a description of the regulatory framework of this study. 
  
Drivers for audit quality   
               Demand drivers                                        Supply drivers  
  
  
Audit quality   
Products of audit quality 
  
Client risk 
strategies  
Agency 
conflicts  
Auditor risk 
management 
strategies  
Audit fees   
Auditor reputation  
-Perceived  competence  
-Perceived independence  
Auditor monitoring strength   
-Auditor competence  
-Auditor independence  
Information credibility  Information quality   
Financial statement  
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2.2.4.1 Requirements related to audit committees 
 
The role of the audit committee in corporate governance has been a subject of 
increasing regulatory interest. Currently, all firms listed on major US stock 
exchanges (i.e. NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ) are required to maintain audit 
committees. Regulations place audit committees in a key position to ensure a 
company’s financial reporting quality. Consistently, for example, the SOX (2002) 
states that the purpose of an audit committee is to oversee the accounting and 
financial reporting process of the company as well as the audits of the financial 
statements of the company. In order to ensure audit committees effectiveness in 
discharging its responsibilities, regulators have adopted requirements on the 
functioning of audit committees in a number of areas including audit committee 
composition and responsibilities. The main requirements contained by the SOX 
(2002) and stock exchanges’ listing standards are summarized in Appendix 1 and 
will be discussed in more detail next. 
 
Firstly, the regulations emphasize the importance of audit committee composition 
in achieving audit committee effectiveness. The objective of these requirements is 
to ensure that audit committees have adequate resources and knowledge base to 
fulfill their responsibilities. In general the regulations state that an effective audit 
committee should comprise a sufficient number of directors. NYSE (2003), 
AMEX (2003) and NASDAQ (2003) listing standards require that audit 
committees should comprise at least three members. It is further stated that all 
audit committee members must be independent of the company as well as 
financially literate. In addition, regulations state that at least one audit committee 
member must be a financial expert. For example, NYSE (2003) defines audit 
committee member independence as freedom from relationships to the company 
that may interfere with the exercise of the director’s independence of the 
management and the company. Financial literacy refers to audit committee 
members’ ability to understand fundamental financial statements, including a 
company's balance sheet, income statement, and cash flow statement (AMEX 
2003). On the other hand financial expertise refers to a director’s employment 
experience in finance or accounting or in other comparable experience which 
results in the individual’s financial sophistication (e.g. NASDAQ 2003). 
 
Secondly, the regulations recognize that proper audit committee composition does 
not necessarily ensure audit committee effectiveness. Therefore current 
regulations include requirements related to audit committee responsibilities. In 
general the regulations maintain that audit committees are responsible for 
assessing the quality of a company’s financial reporting by evaluating the 
implementation of accounting principles as well as changes in them. To fulfil this 
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responsibility the audit committee is required to communicate regularly with the 
board, management, external auditors, and internal auditors. With respect to 
external auditing, the current regulations emphasise the audit committee’s 
position as a main mechanism to ensure proper communication between auditor 
and the company. The literature has traditionally assumed that management has 
considerable influence on the audit mandate, including hiring and firing the 
auditor, as well as negotiating the audit contract, and the audit fees (O’Keefe, 
Simunic & Stein 1994; Mikol & Standish 1998; Beasley et al. 2001). The 
literature has suggested that management control over the audit mandate poses a 
potential threat to audit quality and particularly auditor independence because an 
auditor’s financial dependence on the auditee has depended heavily on 
management’s power to hire and fire the auditor (Ashbaugh 2004; Mayhew & 
Pike 2004) 5. However, after the enactment of SOX (2002) management’s 
influence on the external audit mandate has been considerably reduced. This is 
because under SOX (2002) audit committees are responsible for the appointment, 
compensation, retention and oversight of external auditors. In addition SOX 
(2002) expects communication between auditor and audit committee in several 
issues including a timely report of 1) all critical accounting policies, 2) alternative 
accounting treatments and disclosures, and 3) a management letter. In addition, 
the audit committee is required to establish procedures for handling complaints 
received by the company regarding accounting, internal controls over financial 
reporting, or auditing matters including confidential submission by company 
                                                 
5
 Empirical research on opportunistic behaviour by management has concentrated on 
management’s ability to change the auditor. There is evidence that some auditor switches are 
motivated by auditor-management disagreement over auditors’ reporting decisions. Specifically, 
auditees switch auditors more frequently after receiving a qualified audit report (Chow & Rice 
1982; Smith 1986). In addition, studies have analysed the discretionary accruals of firms that 
changed auditors. The results showed that discretionary accruals were significantly income 
decreasing during the last year of the predecessor auditor, and insignificant during the first year of 
the successor auditor. These results indicate that conservative accounting choices preferred by 
auditors give auditees an incentive to change auditor (DeFond & Subramanyam 1998). These 
findings are related to auditee management ability to “opinion shop”, that is to switch auditors in 
order to avoid unfavourable audit reports. Successful opinion shopping is harmful to audit quality 
because auditors may avoid issuing qualified audit reports in order to retain incumbency. 
However, the research evidence on auditees’ ability to opinion shop is conflicting. Some studies 
have concluded that companies can opinion shop because they would have received unfavourable 
reports more often had they not switched auditors (Lennox 2000), while others suggest that 
companies do not engage successfully in opinion shopping because post-switch opinions are not 
more favourable than pre-switch opinions (Krishnan 1994; Krishnan & Stephens 1995). Research 
on perceived independence has examined management control over audit mandate in several 
respects. These studies have shown that perceptions of auditor independence are negatively 
affected when management has: 1) control of auditors’ appointment or remuneration (Beattie et al. 
1999), 2) the ability to seek a second opinion on contentious issues (Beattie, Brandt & Fearnley 
1999) and 3) the ability to negotiate audit fees or determine the deadline for submitting the audit 
report (Emby & Davidson 1998).  
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employees of concerns regarding questionable accounting or auditing matters. 
Audit committees must also pre-approve all audit services and permitted non-
audit services provided by external auditors. In order to perform these duties 
effectively the regulations state that audit committees should meet relatively 
frequently. For example, both NYSE (2003) and AMEX (2003) require that audit 
committees must have periodic meetings. More specifically, NYSE (2003) 
requires that the audit committee must hold separate meetings with management, 
with internal auditors and with external auditors. NYSE (2003) considers that 
separate meetings between these parties are more productive than joint sessions 
for considering issues warranting committee attention. 
 
2.2.4.2 Requirements related to external auditing 
 
One of the main objectives of SOX (2002) is to strengthen audit quality, 
particularly auditor independence. Thus, the SOX (2002) includes several 
requirements regarding external auditors. The requirements which are relevant to 
this research are as follows: requirement to disclose audit and non-audit services 
fees, mandatory rotation of audit partners, and restrictions regarding non-audit 
services provided by incumbent auditors. 
 
Disclosure of audit and non-audit services fees is considered a way to enhance 
audit quality by safeguarding auditors from significant financial dependence. This 
is because the disclosure gives transparency to the auditor-auditee relationship 
and is therefore expected to be a sufficient way to inform shareholders, investors, 
and other parties of the auditor’s incentives to compromise their independence 
(Firth 1997; SEC 2000; Firth 2002). On the other hand, the disclosure may 
enhance an audit firms’ independence because they may be reluctant to provide 
the types of services or charge the level of fees that might be perceived as threats 
to independence (Hillison & Kennelley 1988; Firth 1997). Currently the SEC 
(2000; 2003) requires the disclosure of the amount of all audit and non-audit 
services fees in proxy statements. SEC (2003) states that fees paid should be 
divided into the following categories: 1) audit fees, 2) audit-related fees, 3) tax 
fees and 4) all other fees. 
 
Mandatory auditor rotation has been suggested as a solution to the independence 
threat caused by long-term audit tenures. It is argued that mandatory rotation 
gives auditors greater incentives to resist management pressure, thus increasing 
independence since the tenure period becomes limited. Proponents of rotation 
argue that it reduces audit failures, forces audit clients to adopt conservative 
accounting practices and results in more complete financial statement disclosures. 
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In addition, rotation is expected to ensure that a company’s accounting choices, 
particularly those in subjective and judgmental areas, are reviewed by different 
auditors (Catanach & Walker 1999). Currently, the SOX (2002) and SEC’s 
(2003) final rule requires a rotation of all partners on the audit engagement team 
after five years of services.  
 
The prohibition of non-audit services is expected to reduce issues related to audit 
quality and auditor independence presented by the provision of non-audit services 
to auditees (e.g. economic dependence, self-review threat to independence). 
Currently, the SOX (2002) prohibits auditors from supplying the following types 
of non-audit services: 1) bookkeeping, 2) financial information systems, 3) 
appraisal, 4) actuarial, 5) internal audit outsourcing, 6) management or human 
resources, 7) broker or dealer, 8) legal and expert and 9) any other services 
specified by the SEC. Despite these prohibitions, registrants may still purchase 
many types of non-audit services from the incumbent auditor such as tax 
compliance and consulting, employee plan audits, consulting on accounting 
matters, mergers and acquisition consulting, and consulting on new debt and 
equity issues (Raghunandan, Read & Whisenant 2003)  
 
2.3 Positioning of the study 
 
This section introduced agency theory as well as some relevant frameworks 
related to corporate governance, audit committee effectiveness and audit quality. 
In addition the regulatory framework of this study was discussed. The present 
study can be positioned into agency theory and frameworks as follows.  
 
Firstly, this study adopts one of the basic premises of agency theory, which 
maintains that corporate governance in general and audit committees and external 
auditors in particular are important in ensuring financial reporting quality. In 
addition, this study subscribes to an underlying notion that certain company 
specific characteristics which create agency problems drive the demand for 
monitoring provided by audit committees and external auditors. Accordingly 
audit committees and external auditors are expected to provide assurance to 
shareholders that a company’s financial statements are in accordance with GAAP. 
This notion is contradictory, for example, to institutional theory, which states that 
these monitoring mechanisms are developed as a response to social norms and 
regulations but do not necessarily improve financial information quality.  
 
Secondly, Cohen’s et al. (2004) corporate governance mosaic suggests that 
interrelationships between corporate governance actors are important for its 
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effectiveness. The present study does not take into consideration all the 
interrelationships suggested in Cohen’s et al. (2004) framework but focuses on 
two important corporate governance actors: audit committees and external 
auditors. In other words, this study examines what type of relationship audit 
committees and external auditors have in determining financial reporting quality. 
To achieve this objective the approach is to model the interrelationship between 
audit committees and external auditors. More specifically, it is suggested that 
audit quality mediates the relationship between audit committee effectiveness and 
financial reporting quality.    
 
Thirdly, the framework by DeZoort et al. (2002) focuses on audit committee 
effectiveness. This framework suggests that audit committee effectiveness is 
dependent on various aspects related to audit committee composition as well as 
audit committee diligence. The operational measures for audit committee 
effectiveness employed in this study are consistent with the framework of 
DeZoort et al. (2002). This is because the operational measures are related to both 
audit committee composition as well as audit committee activity level. The 
operational measures will be discussed in more detail in the subsequent sections 
of the study. 
 
Fourthly, this study adopts DeAngelo’s (1981a; 1981b) and Watkins’ et al. (2004) 
definition of audit quality, which states that audit quality consists of two 
components: auditor independence and auditor competence. In addition, this study 
adopts Watkins’ et al. (2004) view that audit quality can be divided into auditor 
reputation and auditor monitoring strength. In particular this study focuses on 
auditor monitoring strength by testing the effect of measure of audit quality on 
financial reporting quality. This study also contributes to Watkins’ et al. (2004) 
framework by considering audit committee effectiveness as an important driver 
for audit quality. 
 
Finally, in addition to the theoretical framework, the US regulatory environment 
creates a specific research setting where severe scrutiny is applied to audit 
committee effectiveness and audit quality. Regulations regarding audit committee 
effectiveness include requirements related to audit committee composition as well 
as the activities of the audit committee. Under the current regulations all audit 
committee members are required to be independent of the company and to be 
financially literate. In addition, at least one audit committee member is expected 
to possess financial expertise. According to the regulations the audit committee’s 
main objective is to ensure the company’s financial reporting quality. With 
respect to external auditing, audit committees are responsible for hiring, firing 
and compensating external auditors. The primary measures for audit committee 
26        Acta Wasaensia  
 
effectiveness can be derived from these regulations as well as from prior 
empirical research. Thus, it is suggested that audit committee effectiveness can be 
measured by audit committee size, audit committee expertise ratio and audit 
committee meeting frequency. The underlying notion behind this study is that the 
regulations provide the minimum requirements for audit committee composition 
and activities and some companies may strive to maintain quality differentiated 
audit committees. That is, companies with audit committees with stronger 
attributes than the minimum requirements are expected to be more effective. The 
next section will provide further justification for the audit committee 
effectiveness measures employed in this study. 
 
In addition to the requirements regarding audit committees the regulations related 
to audit quality are relevant for this study. This is because the regulatory 
environment is expected to affect the interaction between the companies and their 
external auditors. The discussion here is focused on SOX (2002) because one of 
its main objectives is to enhance audit quality and particularly auditor 
independence. Therefore the SOX (2002) includes several requirements regarding 
external auditors that are relevant for this study. These include requirements for 
mandatory auditor rotation, the prohibition of non-audit services and disclosure of 
audit and non-audit services fees. Mandatory auditor rotation ensures that audit 
quality is not affected by long audit mandates. In addition, prohibition of specific 
types of non-audit services ensures that auditor independence is not threatened by 
these services. The disclosure of audit and non-audit services fees provides a 
measure for audit quality employed in this study. It is suggested that audit fees 
represent audit effort and therefore higher audit fees are expected to indicate 
better audit quality. This notion is related, for example, to the GAO (2003) report, 
which documented an increase in audit fees after the enactment of SOX (2002)6. 
GAO (2003) asserted that the fee development is, at least partly, caused by 
changes in audit environment and increases in the oversight of publicly disclosed 
financial information. Thus, it is argued that enactment of SOX (2002) has 
resulted in increase in audit effort and further audit fees. In addition, prior 
empirical research has linked audit fees with increased financial reporting quality. 
                                                 
6
 Prior research reveals that audit fees stayed flat or decreased slightly from the late 1980s to the 
mid-1990s (Firth 1997; Menon & Williams 2001).  
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3 DEFINITIONS AND OPERATIONAL 
 MEASURES OF KEY CONCEPTS 
 
The purpose of this section is to introduce the definitions for audit committee 
effectiveness, audit quality and financial reporting quality provided by prior 
literature. In addition, the operational measures for these variables employed in 
prior studies will be discussed. The primary measures for audit committee 
effectiveness used in prior literature are audit committee size, audit committee 
independence, audit committee expertise and audit committee meeting frequency. 
The most commonly used measures for audit quality are audit firm size, audit 
firm industry specialization, audit tenure and audit fees. Measures for financial 
reporting quality can be divided into two groups: those related to financial 
reporting within GAAP and those related to financial reporting outside GAAP. 
The section will be concluded with a discussion regarding the definitions and the 
measures derived from the prior literature. The aim of the discussion is to explain 
which definitions and measures are regarded as adequate to be employed in the 
present study. These choices require, among other things, taking into 
consideration the regulatory environment of this study. 
 
3.1 Audit committee effectiveness 
 
An audit committee is a subcommittee of the board of directors which is 
particularly designated to oversee the company’s financial reporting process. 
According to Wolnizer (1995) and DeZoort (1997) the responsibilities of audit 
committees fall into areas of: 1) financial reporting (including internal controls), 
2) auditing, and 3) other corporate governance (e.g. facilitate communications 
between the board and the external auditors). Audit committee effectiveness is 
often associated with an audit committee’s ability to fulfil these responsibilities 
(Kalbers & Fogarty 1993; DeZoort et al. 2002). There is a common understanding 
that the mere existence of an audit committee does not guarantee that it will be 
effective. Thus, the literature determines several attributes which are needed to 
achieve audit committee effectiveness. According to DeZoort et al. (2002) audit 
committee effectiveness is dependent on its composition (the independence and 
expertise of its members), its authority (responsibilities and influence) and its 
resources (number of members and access to other governance parties). 
Moreover, audit committees need to be diligent to effectively discharge their 
responsibilities. In addition, the current US regulations recognize that audit 
committee effectiveness is dependent on proper audit committee composition and 
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diligence. Consistently, the primary operational measures employed by prior 
empirical research include audit committee size, audit committee independence, 
audit committee expertise and audit committee activity level. The first three 
measures are concerned with audit committee composition and the last is 
concerned with audit committee diligence. The following discussion will provide 
further rationalization for these measures. 
 
3.1.1 Audit committee size 
 
The literature suggests that audit committee size measured as the number of audit 
committee members will have a positive effect on audit committee effectiveness. 
This is because it is likely that audit committees with a sufficient number of 
members have better resources than smaller audit committees (DeZoort et al. 
2002). In addition, the decision-making literature has indicated that increasing the 
number of people involved in an activity substantially increases group 
performance and decreases the opportunity for wrongdoing because collusion 
becomes more difficult (e.g. Cummings, Huber & Arendt 1974; Burton, Pathak & 
Zigli 1977). Thus, it can be argued that decision-making in larger audit 
committees is of better quality than in smaller audit committees7.  
 
Audit research has also provided evidence that audit committee size is an 
important determinant of audit committee effectiveness. Vafeas et al. (2007) 
found a positive relationship between audit committee size and audit fees. This 
result indicates that the demand for audit increases as the size of the audit 
committee increases. In addition Archambeault & DeZoort (2001) examined 
suspicious auditor switches8. They found that companies with suspicious auditor 
switches had smaller audit committees than non-suspicious switching companies. 
This implies that larger audit committees are better able to safeguard auditors 
from being unfairly dismissed than smaller audit committees.  
 
 
                                                 
7
 It can also be argued that audit committee size has a nonlinear effect on audit committee 
effectiveness. Initially, adding members to the audit committee is likely to enhance audit 
committee effectiveness because it ensures that audit committee has required knowledge to make 
decisions regarding its responsibilities. However, it is likely that audit committee effectiveness 
may suffer if it becomes too large. This is because large group may create process losses and 
diffusion of responsibility. 
8
 Analysis was conducted by matching switching and non-switching companies with suspicious 
circumstances (i.e. disclosure of reportable event, qualified audit opinion or other recent auditor 
switch). 
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3.1.2 Audit committee independence 
 
Audit committee members’ independence is considered to be an essential 
determinant of audit committee effectiveness (DeZoort et al. 2002; Pomeroy et al. 
2008). For example, the SOX (2002) considers that an audit committee member is 
independent if he or she does not receive any compensation from the company or 
its affiliates except in the capacity of audit committee member. Independent audit 
committee members are expected to be better able to oppose management 
pressure in conflict situations and are therefore expected to contribute to audit 
committee effectiveness. Prior empirical research has provided evidence 
supporting this notion.  
 
Several studies have found that audit committee independence is associated with 
higher earnings quality (Klein 2002a; Bédard et al. 2004; Vafeas 2005; Bradbury 
et al. 2006). Klein (2002a) found a significant negative association between an 
audit committee with a majority of independent directors and discretionary 
accruals. In a similar vein, Bédard et al. (2004) reported a significant reduction in 
aggressive earnings management when the audit committee was 100 % 
independent. Bradbury et al. (2006) using data from Singapore and Malaysia 
found that audit committee independence is associated with lower abnormal 
working capital accruals. Vafeas (2005) found that audit committees with a higher 
percentage of insiders on the audit committee are more likely to report small 
earnings increases. These results indicate that independent audit committees have 
a constraining effect on managerial behaviour in earnings management.  
 
Several studies have also examined the association between audit committee 
independence and audit quality. For example, Mitra, Hossain and Deis (2007) and 
Vafeas et al. (2007) found a significant and positive association between  the level 
of audit committee independence and audit fees indicating that independent audit 
committees are interested in ensuring high quality service provided by external 
auditors.  Carcello and Neal (2000) examined the relationship between distressed 
firms’ audit committee independence and the likelihood of receiving going-
concern audit reports. They found that distressed firms with more independent 
audit committees were more likely to receive a going-concern audit report. This 
result may indicate that more independent audit committees provide greater 
support for auditors in their reporting decisions than less independent audit 
committees. Moreover, Archambeault et al. (2001) found that more independent 
audit committees are better able to protect auditors from being suspiciously 
switched than less independent audit committees. 
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3.1.3 Audit committee expertise 
 
Audit committee effectiveness is expected to increase as the proportion of experts 
in the audit committee increases. Expertise refers to an audit committee member’s 
knowledge and experience in the areas of accounting and financial reporting, 
internal controls and auditing (e.g. SOX 2002). In general, it is argued that audit 
committee members’ expertise in these areas enables a better understanding of 
financial statements and the audit process. This may lead to an enhancement of 
audit committee effectiveness in several respects. Firstly, experts are expected to 
provide greater oversight on the financial reporting quality than non-expert 
members. Secondly, experts are expected to understand the risks and benefits 
associated with audit quality better than their non-expert colleagues. Thirdly, 
experts are expected to be better equipped to understand auditor judgments and 
evaluate the substance of disagreements between management and the external 
auditor.  
 
Several studies have provided evidence supporting these arguments. Firstly, 
studies have found that expertise affects audit committee member’s decision-
making. DeZoort (1998) found that audit committee members’ experience related 
to audit and internal control evaluation resulted in internal control judgments 
more in line with auditors than members’ lacking such experience. McDaniel, 
Martin and Maines (2002) found that expert and financially literate audit 
committee members’ evaluation of the quality of financial reporting items differ. 
This result implies that the inclusion of financial experts in audit committees is 
likely to have an effect on audit committee’s assessment of a company’s financial 
reporting in general. Secondly, Bédard et al. (2004) focused on earnings 
management and found that audit committees with more expert members are 
better equipped to restrict earnings management. Thirdly, with regard to external 
auditors DeZoort (1998) and DeZoort & Salterio (2001) found that audit 
committee members possessing auditing knowledge provide more support for 
auditors in auditor management disagreements over an ambiguous accounting 
issue than members lacking such knowledge. Experts were also found to 
safeguard auditors from being unfairly dismissed (Archambeault et al. 2001). 
Finally, Vafeas et al. (2007) found that audit committee member expertise has a 
positive relationship with audit fees indicating that experts demand higher quality 
service by external auditors. 
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3.1.4 Audit committee meeting frequency 
 
The discussion above reveals that variables related to audit committee 
composition have a significant influence on audit committee effectiveness. In 
addition to these variables, audit committee activity level has also been 
recognized as an important process factor needed to achieve audit committee 
effectiveness (Kalbers et al. 1993; DeZoort et al. 2002). A common measure for 
audit committee activity level is the number of meetings held by the audit 
committee. More specifically, audit committee effectiveness is expected to 
improve with more frequent audit committee meetings (Menon et al. 1994; 
Abbott et al. 2000; DeZoort et al. 2002; Lee & Mande 2005; Stewart et al. 2007). 
Thus, in order for the audit committee to be effective audit committee members 
must be willing to invest a substantial amount of time and energy in the 
functioning of the audit committee (Kalbers et al. 1993; Lee, Mande & Ortman 
2004).  
 
With regard to auditing, regular meetings between the audit committee and the 
external auditor can be expected to contribute to audit committee knowledge 
about relevant accounting and auditing issues. Thus it can be argued that audit 
committees that meet frequently are more diligent in the discharge of their duties 
(Abbott et al. 2003a;  Raghunandan, Read & Rama 2001). More diligent audit 
committees can also be expected to be more concerned with audit quality. This 
notion is supported by Goodwin-Stewart et al. (2006), who found that more 
frequent audit committee meetings were associated with higher audit fees. In 
addition, Archambeault et al. (2001) reported that audit committees with frequent 
meetings are more likely to protect auditors from being switched under suspicious 
circumstances than audit committees with less frequent meetings. Prior studies 
have also documented that audit committee meeting frequency is associated with 
higher earnings quality (Xie, Davidson & Dadalt 2003; Vafeas 2005).  
 
3.2 Audit quality 
 
Practitioners often define audit quality relative to auditors’ ability to meet legal 
and professional requirements (Francis 2004; Watkins et al. 2004). In light of this 
definition audit quality can be considered dichotomous. Audit is considered to be 
of poor quality if an auditor fails to comply with legal and professional 
requirements. In other words an audit failure occurs.9 On the other hand all audits 
                                                 
9
 According to Francis (2004) audit failures can occur in two situations. Firstly, audit failure 
occurs when an auditor fails to enforce GAAP. Secondly, audit failure occurs when an auditor fails 
to issue an appropriate type of audit report: an auditor issues a qualified audit report when 
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which are legally satisfactory can be considered to be of sufficient quality 
(Francis 2004). Many audit quality studies, however, have an underlying 
assumption that most audits meet minimal legal and professional requirements. 
Thus, these studies focus on audit quality that exceeds minimal legal and 
regulatory requirements. These studies consider audit quality as a continuum 
ranging from very poor quality to very good quality. In this approach audit 
failures occur at the extreme low end of the continuum. In addition, it is 
considered that legally satisfactory audits can be quality differentiated (Francis 
2004). 
 
Researchers provide definitions for audit quality which can be applied when audit 
quality is considered to be a continuum. As discussed in Section 2.2.3 researchers 
generally link audit quality to both auditor independence and auditor competence. 
There is a widespread view in the audit literature that audit quality cannot be 
directly observed by outside parties or measured by researchers. (DeAngelo 
1981a; DeAngelo 1981b; Palmrose 1988; Willekens & Simunic 2007). Therefore, 
prior studies have used several surrogates for audit quality. The primary 
surrogates for audit quality are audit firm type (i.e. size or brand name), audit firm 
industry specialization, auditor tenure and audit fees. These measures will be 
discussed in more detail in the subsequent sections. 
 
3.2.1 Audit firm size 
 
Audit firm size is a conventional measure for audit quality.10 Audit quality is 
expected to increase with audit firm size because large audit firms are expected to 
have superior resources to conduct an audit and they are expected to be better able 
to remain independent from the auditee than smaller audit firms (Goldman & 
Barlev 1974; DeAngelo 1981a; Shockley 1981). A related stream of research 
argues that large audit firms have greater incentives to provide high-quality audits 
because they have more to lose from an audit failure in terms of their pre-
established reputations (i.e. brand name) than smaller audit firms (Francis et al. 
1988). Based on these rationalizations several lines of empirical research have 
focused on the dichotomy between large and small audit firms and reported 
supporting results for the above notions. 
                                                                                                                                     
inappropriate (false positive reporting) or auditor issues an unqualified audit report when 
inappropriate (false negative reporting) (Francis 2004). 
10
 In this study, the majority of sample companies employed a Big Four audit firm (95 %), thus 
leaving little opportunity to evaluate audit quality in terms of audit firm size. 
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Firstly, prior research has provided evidence that audit firm size is associated 
with better financial reporting quality. A majority of these studies have focused 
on discretionary accrual paradigm (Jones 1991) and examined whether large audit 
firms are better able to detect and oppose to managers’ opportunistic earnings 
management than small audit firms.  Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo and 
Subramanyam (1998) and Francis, Maydew and Sparks (1999) found supporting 
evidence and suggested that clients of the (then) Big Six auditors reported lower 
discretionary accruals than clients of non-Big Six auditors. Consistently Nelson’s 
et al. (2002) results show that large audit firms are able to detect earnings 
management attempts and will object to opportunistic earnings management by 
managers. Studies also provide evidence that the markets link audit firm size with 
better financial reporting quality. For example, Beatty’s (1989) results showed 
that the price paid by investors is higher for IPOs involving a large audit firm. 
Similarly, Teoh and Wong (1993) reported a positive association between audit 
firm size and the ERC. Contrary to these findings, Piot & Janin (2007) did not 
find evidence of Big Five audit quality differentiation with respect to earnings 
management in France. 
 
Secondly, prior studies have also addressed the relationship between audit firm 
size and auditor reporting decisions. Some studies have shown that the size of the 
audit firm does not affect the likelihood of a qualified audit report (Wines 1994; 
Sharma & Sidhu 2001; Craswell, Stokes & Laughton 2002). However Francis and 
Krishnan (1999) report that large audit firms have lower thresholds for issuing 
qualified audit reports, which indicates that large audit firms issue more 
conservative reports than small audit firms.  Lennox (1999) also provided 
evidence of a positive relationship between auditor size and auditor accuracy. 
Lennox (1999) found using UK data that large auditors issue reports that are more 
accurate and include more informative signals of financial distress than audit 
reports issued by small auditors. In a similar vein, Weber and Willenborg (2003) 
examined audit reports issued before IPO. They found that audit reports issued by 
Big Four audit firms have better predictive accuracy in terms of future stock 
returns and subsequent delistings than audit reports issued by small audit firms. 
 
Thirdly, studies focusing on legal actions as well as disciplinary actions by 
professional bodies against auditors have also provided evidence that large audit 
firms provide high quality audits. For example, Palmrose (1988) found that Big 
Four audit firms face legal actions less frequently than small audit firms. In 
addition, results by Feroz and Pastena (1991) showed that Big Four audit firms 
are sanctioned less frequently by the SEC than other audit firms. A counter-
argument for these results is that large audit firms are not really better but they 
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have better resources to oppose legislators and professional bodies (Francis 
2004). 
 
3.2.2 Auditor industry specialization 
 
In addition to audit firm size, the audit literature suggests that industry 
specialization11 of an audit firm also contributes to audit quality. It is expected 
that industry specialization increases the quality of auditor’s performance due to 
the auditor’s superior knowledge regarding the specific industry. Empirical 
studies have addressed this notion and provided supportive evidence. For example 
Solomon, Shields and Whittington (1999) and Owhoso, Messier and Lynch 
(2002) provided some evidence that industry-experienced auditors detect errors 
more effectively within their industry specialisation than outside their 
specialisation. 
 
In general research regarding audit firm industry specialization is parallel to the 
audit firm size research. Thus, prior research has investigated whether industry 
specialization of audit firms is associated with higher financial reporting quality. 
Balsam, Krishnan and Yang (2003) compared the discretionary accruals of clients 
of specialist and non-specialist auditors and found that the discretionary accruals 
of clients of industry specialist auditors were lower than those of clients of non-
specialist auditors, thereby supporting the notion that industry specialisation is 
associated with better financial reporting quality. In addition, Krishnan (2005) 
found that companies with an industry specialist auditor report more conservative 
earnings according to Basu’s (1997) framework. Research has also indicated that 
an industry specialist auditor signals higher audit quality as well as financial 
reporting quality to the markets. An early study by Shockley and Holt (1983) 
found that audit firms with the largest market share are perceived as higher 
quality suppliers by the chief financial officers of banks. Balsam et al. (2003) 
found evidence that clients of industry specialist auditors have higher ERCs 
(Earnings Response Coefficient) than clients of non-specialist auditors. Similarly, 
Krishnan (2003) found that market reactions to earnings surprises are more 
positive for companies with industry specialized auditors.  
 
 
 
                                                 
11
 Industry market share is commonly used as a proxy for audit firm industry specialization 
(Francis 2004). 
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3.2.3 Auditor tenure 
 
Auditor tenure has also been recognized as an important determinant of audit 
quality. The literature, however, does not provide a clear consensus as to how 
auditor tenure affects audit quality. On the other hand it can be suggested that 
long-term audit tenures increase audit quality due to auditee-specific knowledge 
gained by the auditors over time (Simon & Francis 1988) while the counter-
argument is that auditor’s long term association with the auditee poses a threat to 
auditor independence12 thus leading to lower level of audit quality (Mautz & 
Sharaf 1961; SOX 2002; IFAC 2005). The results of prior studies are also 
inconclusive since they provide support for both arguments. 
 
For example Myers, Myers and Omer (2003) provided evidence supporting long-
term audit tenures reporting that auditors are more likely to restrain management 
from making extreme reporting decisions concerning accruals when auditor’s 
tenure is longer. In a similar vein, Piot et al. (2007) using French data did not find 
any evidence that auditor tenure would lead to decrease in earning quality. 
Furthermore, Ghost and Moon (2005) found a positive association between audit 
tenure and investor perceptions of earnings quality using ERC as a proxy. On the 
other hand several studies indicate that long-term audit tenures lead to decline in 
audit quality. These studies have found that long-term tenures: 1) decrease the 
likelihood of the auditor to issuing a qualified audit report (Vanstraelen 2000), 
decreases compliance with GAAS (Deis & Giroux 1992) and, increase the 
likelihood of receiving a substandard audit (Copley & Doucet 1993). Moreover, 
the length of audit tenure has been found to have an impact on perceived audit 
quality. Knapp (1991) found that audit committee members perceived that audit 
quality declines as auditor tenure lengthens. Long periods of tenure have also 
been found to have a negative effect on perceived auditor independence (Beck et 
al. 1988b; Teoh & Lim 1996). 
 
Although prior research does not provide a clear understanding of the effect of 
audit tenure on audit quality, US regulators adopted a view that auditor tenure 
should be restricted with mandatory auditor rotation. The SOX (2002) 
requirements regarding auditor rotation were discussed in Section 3. Empirical 
research has provided some support for the benefits of rotation. Dopuch, King and 
Schwartz (2001) found that mandatory rotation requirements decreased auditor’s 
willingness to issue biased reports in favour of management. Additionally, the 
research evidence indicates that the requirements for auditors to be reappointed 
                                                 
12
 This is because long-term audit tenures may result in too close a relationship between the 
auditor and the management, which results in the auditor losing his or her independence (Mautz et 
al. 1961). 
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annually enhance perceptions of auditor independence (Beattie et al. 1999; 
Hussey & Lan 2001). 
 
3.2.4 Audit fees 
 
Prior studies have also used audit fees as a measure of audit quality. The notion 
behind these studies is that audit fees reflect the magnitude of audit effort: higher 
audit fees are expected to indicate more auditing work, which is expected to 
contribute to audit quality. However, the relationship between audit quality and 
audit fees is a complex one because audit fees are jointly determined by both 
demand and supply side drivers (Mitra et al. 2007). 
 
From the supply side it can be stated that audit fees reflect the economic costs of 
the efficient auditor. More specifically, auditors seek to balance their resources 
between costs arising from additional audit work and losses arising from legal 
liability. Additional audit effort decreases the probability that the auditor will face 
liability losses and thus the required audit coverage varies considerably with the 
characteristics of the company, more risky and complex clients requiring more 
audit effort. In general, the auditor provides a quantity of audit work that 
decreases to an acceptable level the probability that the auditor will suffer liability 
losses (Simunic 1980; Simunic & Stein 1996).  
 
Audit fees may also be affected by demand side drivers. The literature provides 
several complementary explanations for the demand for audit. In summary the 
following four explanations can be identified: monitoring, information, insurance, 
and organizational control (Wallace 1980; Dye 1993; Hay et al. 2004). Firstly, the 
monitoring explanation for the demand of audit is based on agency theory, which 
states that audit services are demanded to reduce agency problems arising from 
conflict of interests between owners and managers (Jensen et al. 1976; Watts et 
al. 1983; Chow 1982; Blackwell, Noland & Winters 1998; Carey, Simnett & 
Tanewski 2000). Secondly, the information explanation emphasizes that investors 
demand audited financial statements because they provide information that is 
useful in their investment decisions (Wallace 1980; DeAngelo 1981a; Beatty 
1989; Dye 1993; Willenborg 1999). Thirdly, the insurance or “deep pocket” 
explanation posits that the demand for audit arises from auditors’ extended legal 
liability, which enables the full or partial recovery of investor losses resulting 
from financial statement misrepresentations by suing auditors (Dye 1993; Hillison 
& Pacini 2004; Menon et al. 1994; Baber, Kumar & Verghese 1995; Willenborg 
1999; Lennox 1999). Finally, the organizational control explanation maintains 
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that owners regard audits as a compensatory control system for the organizational 
loss of control in hierarchical organizations (Hay et al. 2004; Abdel-Khalik 1993).  
 
Based on the discussion above it can be concluded that audit fees are affected by 
both supply side and demand side drivers. From the supply side audit fees reflect 
auditor’s assessment of required audit coverage based on client riskiness and 
complexity. On the other hand, from the demand side audit fees reflect the 
demand for audit coverage. Regardless of the viewpoint, since audit fees are 
expected to reflect audit coverage, they can be linked with audit quality. That is, 
higher fees reflect a more through audit and so also higher audit quality. Audit 
fees have commanded considerable research interest and several research streams 
provide support for this argument.  
 
Firstly, early audit pricing studies examined the association between audit fees 
and non-audit services fees in order to find evidence of  “knowledge spillovers” 
which are transfers of knowledge from non-audit to audit services and vice versa. 
Knowledge spillovers are expected to increase the quality of both services and 
therefore lead to higher fees. These arguments were supported by several studies 
reporting a significant positive association between audit services and non-audit 
services fees (Simunic 1984; Simon 1985; Palmrose 1986a; Turpen 1990; Davis, 
Ricchiute & Trompeter 1993; Butterworth & Houghton 1995; Craswell, Francis 
& Taylor 1995; Ezzamel, Gwilliam & Holland 1996; Firth 1997; Firth 2002; 
Antle, Gordon, Narayanamoorthy & Zhou 2006). These studies conclude that the 
benefits of knowledge spillovers are generally retained by the auditor as higher 
fees. By contrast, some studies find no evidence of a positive association between 
audit fees and non-audit services fees (Simon et al. 1988; Abdel-Khalik 1990; 
Barefield, Gaver & O’Keefe 1993; O’Keefe et al. 1994; Whisenant, 
Sankaraguruswamy & Raghunandan 2003).  
 
Secondly, audit pricing studies have provided evidence suggesting that auditees 
are willing to pay a price premium for expected high quality service. For 
example, Francis and Stokes (1986), Palmrose (1986b), and Simon et al. (1988) 
detected a price premium for large audit firms likely arising from a higher quality 
of audit offered by these firms. In addition prior studies have identified a fee 
premium for industry specialist audit firms. Craswell et al. (1995) found that 
industry specialist (then) Big Eight auditors charged a 34 % premium over non-
specialist Big Eight auditors. DeFond, Francis and Wong (2000) found evidence 
indicating that the three top industry leaders earn a price premium relative to 
other large audit firms in Hong Kong. A more recent study by Ferguson and 
Stokes (2002) also provided evidence that the top two industry leaders are able to 
earn price premiums over other large audit firms in Australia. Basioudis and 
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Francis (2007) also found a price premium for city-specific industry leaders 
relative to other Big Four auditors in the UK. Similarly Ferguson, Francis and 
Stokes (2003) as well as Francis, Reichelt and Wang (2005) found a price 
premium for audit firms that were joint national and city-level industry leaders. 
 
Thirdly, studies have linked higher audit fees with a greater demand for audit 
quality. These studies suggest that the demand for audit quality increases audit 
effort, which is further reflected in higher audit fees. For example, Gul et al. 
(1998), Gul et al. (2001) and Nikkinen et al. (2004) found a positive relation 
between measures of agency problems and fees paid to the incumbent auditor. 
Similarly, studies on corporate governance have documented a positive 
association between measures of board or audit committee effectiveness and audit 
fees (Abbott et al. 2003a; Lee et al. 2005; Goodwin-Stewart et al. 2006; Mitra et 
al. 2007). 
 
Finally, studies have documented a positive relation between audit fees and 
financial reporting quality. Firstly, Frankel et al. (2002), Larcker et al. (2004) and 
Srinidhi et al. (2007) linked higher audit fees with smaller discretionary accruals. 
Frankel et al. (2002) reported that audit fees are negatively related with small 
earnings surprises and discretionary accruals. In addition they found that non-
audit fees were positively associated with these measures of earnings 
management. These results indicate that audit fees and non-audit fees have an 
opposite effect on audit quality: higher audit fees are related to higher audit 
quality whereas higher non-audit services fees are associated with lower audit 
quality. In a similar vein Srinidhi et al. (2007) found that audit fees result in 
higher earnings quality whereas non-audit fees result in economic bonding and 
thus decrease earnings quality. Somewhat contradictorily Larcker et al. (2004) 
found a negative relation between both audit and non-audit fees and discretionary 
accruals after identifying clusters of firms with homogeneous regression structure. 
The strongest relation was found for firms with weak corporate governance 
structure. According to the authors these results indicate that reputation concerns 
are an important determinant of auditor behaviour and they enhance auditors’ 
incentives to restrict unusual accounting practices by clients. Secondly, Geiger et 
al. (2003) examined the association between audit and non-audit fees and auditor 
reporting decisions for financially distressed firms. They found a positive 
association between audit fees and qualified audit opinions, which implies that 
additional audit effort results in more accurate audit opinions. In addition, it was 
reported that non-audit fees did not have a statistically significant effect on audit 
opinions. 
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In contrast to the above studies, a substantial amount of audit research has 
examined the effect of financial dependence on auditor independence. This 
literature suggests that the auditor’s incentives to violate independence increase as 
the economic bond between the auditor and auditee increases (DeAngelo 
1981a)13. Studies focusing on independence in fact have investigated whether 
financial dependence generated by audit fees, non-audit services fees or total fees 
enables earnings management (e.g. Frankel et al. 2002; Ashbaugh, LaFond & 
Mayhew 2003; Chung & Kallapur 2003; Reynolds, Deis & Francis 2004; Mitra 
2007), increases the number of restated financial statements (e.g. Kinney et al. 
2004), decreases auditors’ propensity to issue qualified audit reports (e.g. 
DeFond, Raghunandan & Subramanyam 2002; Geiger et al. 2003 ), increases the 
length of audit tenure (e.g. Barkess & Simnett 1994) or exposes an auditor to 
litigation (Antle, Griffen, Teece and Williamson 1997). Overall, this body of 
research indicates that auditor independence in fact is not threatened by fees 
generated by auditees thus providing indirect support for the possible positive link 
between audit fees and audit quality.  
 
A large body of research has also examined the effect of financial dependence on 
perceived auditor independence. Firstly, studies have investigated whether the 
joint provision of audit and non-audit services causes a negative stock market 
reaction (Frankel et al. 2002; Ashbaugh et al. 2003), has an effect on the bond 
rating process (Brandon, Crabtree & Maher 2004) or has an impact of shareholder 
ratification of the auditor (Glezen & Millar 1985; Raghunandan 2003; 
Raghunandan & Rama 2003; Mishra, Raghunandan & Rama 2005). Secondly, 
research has used questionnaires to investigate a wide variety of subjects’ 
perceptions of auditor independence using several measures of financial 
dependence (e.g. Knapp 1985; McKinley, Pany & Reckers 1985; Gul 1991; Gul 
& Tsui 1992; Bartlett 1993; Teoh et al. 1996; Beattie et al. 1999). Financial 
dependence has been hypothesized to develop from audit fees, non-audit services 
fees or total fees, although some studies do not clearly articulate whether audit 
fees or total fees are under examination. In general, the results of these studies 
indicate that financial dependence causes more problems for perceived 
independence than actual independence.   
                                                 
13
 In general, regulators have not been concerned that audit fees might be too high or that the audit 
fee itself might result in financial dependence of the auditor on the auditee (Kinney, William, 
Palmrose & Scholz 2004). On the other hand, regulators in the US (SEC 2000; SEC 2003), Europe 
(European Commission 2002) and globally (IFAC 2005) have voiced their concerns that the 
provision of non-audit services to auditees can create economic dependence and thus poses a 
threat to auditor independence. In addition, regulators recognise that total fees paid by the auditee, 
regardless of their origin, may compromise independence. 
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To summarize, the results of the above studies imply that higher audit fees may 
be associated with higher audit quality, either through more audit effort (more 
hours) or through superior expertise of the auditor (higher billing rates). It can be 
argued that a higher audit fee per se does not necessarily ensure a higher quality 
audit, particularly if accounting firms have pricing power over clients (Francis 
2004). However, studies on audit outcomes also provide evidence that higher 
audit fees are related to better financial reporting quality (e.g. Frankel et al. 2002; 
Geiger et al. 2003; Larcker et al. 2004; Srinidhi et al. 2007).   
 
3.3 Financial reporting quality 
 
Corporate disclosure may assume a variety of forms: companies may provide 
disclosure through regulated financial reports and also engage in voluntary 
communication. Among these different forms of disclosures financial reporting is 
an important means for management to communicate, among other things, the 
company’s performance to external stakeholders. Financial reporting quality is a 
prerequisite for efficient capital markets because several individuals and groups 
base their resource allocation decisions on financial information (Healy et al. 
2001).  
 
The objective of regulators and standard setters is to promulgate rules and 
regulations that help ensure financial reporting quality. Financial reporting quality 
has also commanded considerable research interest. However, neither researchers 
nor current US regulations provide a clear definition of what constitutes financial 
reporting quality (Pomeroy et al. 2008). For example the SOX (2002) requires 
audit committees and auditors to discuss the quality of the financial reporting 
methods of the company. However, SOX (2002) does not define what is meant by 
financial reporting quality and therefore this requirement remains vague (Cohen 
et al. 2004)14. In addition, Watkins et al. (2004) provides a broad definition 
stating that financial reporting quality refers to how well a company’s financial 
information reflects the true economic circumstances of the company. This 
definition also highlights the unobservable nature of financial reporting quality 
(Pomeroy et al. 2008). 
 
Prior research has used several proxies for financial reporting quality (Pomeroy et 
al. 2008). Many of the studies examining financial reporting quality have focused 
on situations where there are concerns regarding financial information quality. 
These situations can be divided into two classes: misstatements outside GAAP 
                                                 
14
 See e.g. Pomeroy et al. (2008) for a discussion on this issue.  
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and misstatements within GAAP (Jiambalvo 1996). Evidence related to 
misstatements outside GAAP includes financial restatements (Raghunandan et al. 
2003; Kinney et al. 2004), litigation (Antle et al. 1997; Bonner, Palmrose & 
Young 1998), SEC enforcements (Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney 1996) and business 
failures (Palmrose 1987; Francis & Krishnan 2002). Misstatements within GAAP 
are related to the choices of accounting methods or earnings quality measures. 
Common indicators of earnings quality are accruals (e.g. Frankel et al. 2002; 
Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Chung et al. 2003), earnings informativeness (Earnings 
Response Coefficients) (Teoh et al. 1993; Balsam et al. 2003; Ghost et al. 2005; 
Wang 2006), predictability of cash flows, measures of income smoothing and 
measures of timely loss recognition (Jiambalvo 1996). Audit research has also 
used audit report accuracy as an indicator of the quality of the financial reporting 
process (DeFond et al. 2002; Geiger et al. 2003).  
 
This study focuses on US listed companies and it is fairly unlikely that they issue 
financial reports that do not meet the minimum requirements of GAAP. This 
suggests that the present study focuses on the variation of financial reporting 
quality within the boundaries of GAAP. Consistent with the literature, the present 
study focuses on earnings management as an indicator of financial reporting 
quality. 
 
3.3.1  Definition of earnings management 
 
Earnings management can be defined as a purposeful intervention in the external 
financial reporting process the purpose of which is to obtain private gain for 
shareholders or managers (Schipper 1989). Shareholders will gain from earnings 
management if it is used to signal managers’ private information (Healy & Palepu 
1995; Subramanyam 1996), to avoid costly debt re-contracting or to reduce 
political costs (Watts et al. 1986). On the other hand earnings management may 
be costly to shareholders because managers may use earnings management to 
pursue their personal gains such as increased compensation (Healy 1985; 
Holthausen, Larcker & Sloan 1995) or reduced likelihood of dismissal when 
performance is poor (Weisbach 1988; Peasnell, Pope & Young 2005). This aspect 
of earnings management may result in financial reports which mislead 
stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the firm (Healy & 
Wahlen 1999).  
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3.3.2  Types of earnings management 
 
Earnings management may be either income increasing or income decreasing. 
The literature links income increasing earnings management with situations when 
earnings fall below certain thresholds. The literature has addressed three 
thresholds: 1) avoiding reporting a loss, 2) reporting a growth in profits, and 3) 
meeting analysts’ forecasts.  Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge, Patel 
and Zeckhauser (1999)15 found using US data higher-than-expected frequency of 
firms which had slightly positive reported earnings and lower-than-expected 
frequency of firms which had slightly negative reported earnings. These results 
are consistent with managements’ attempts to beat the benchmarks in question 
(Peasnell et al. 2005).   
 
Managers may also engage in income decreasing earnings management. There are 
several plausible explanations why managers may have incentives to engage in 
income decreasing earnings management. Income decreasing earnings 
management can be driven by managers’ desires to shift abnormal positive 
earnings forward in time in order to make the benchmarks easier to cross in the 
future (Peasnell et al. 2005).  This notion is supported by Degeorge et al. (1999), 
who found that managers manipulate reported earnings downwards when pre-
managed earnings substantially exceed benchmark earnings. Alternatively 
managers may be reluctant to report large earnings because it might result in 
increased earnings-based performance targets in the future (Peasnell et al. 2005).  
Consistently, Healy (1985), Gaver, Gaver and Austin (1995), and Holthausen et 
al. (1995) found evidence of income-decreasing earnings management when 
managers’ accounting-based bonuses were at their maximum using a sample of 
US firms. 
 
Management may employ two methods for earnings manipulation: management 
can manipulate accounting numbers or change the way the firm does business 
(Peasnell et al. 2005). The former method is likely to involve discretionary 
accruals because they are regarded as an area where management will use its 
discretion to manipulate accounting numbers. Managers may prefer accruals to 
manipulate earnings because generally they do not have direct cash flow 
consequences and they are relatively difficult to detect. The latter method offers 
several options: management may, for example, boost reported profit by cutting 
back on advertising and research and development (Bushee 1998), sell assets 
(Bartov 1993; Poitras, Wilkins & Kwan 2002), or cut back on staff development 
                                                 
15
 Degeorge et al. (1999) also found that there is a hierarchy to the benchmarks reporting a profit 
being the most important one followed by reporting growth in earnings. Meeting analysts’ 
forecasts was of importance only if the other two thresholds had been met. 
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and essential equipment maintenance. These methods, however, are costly to the 
company because they are likely to have negative effects on the firm’s future cash 
flows as well as firm value. Therefore it is expected that managers would rather 
manipulate accruals than make chances in investment and operating activities 
(Peasnell et al. 2005).  
 
3.4 Application of the definitions and operational 
measures 
 
This section introduced definitions as well as empirical measures for audit 
committee effectiveness, audit quality and financial reporting quality. The aim of 
this section was to provide a broad overview of the definitions and measures 
suggested by prior literature. The objective of the present study is not to apply all 
the definitions and measures discussed but to adopt those that best represent the 
variables of interest in the study’s environment. Thus, the present study adapts the 
definitions and measures as follows.  
 
Firstly, audit committee effectiveness is generally linked to audit committee’s 
ability to fulfil its responsibilities. This study adopts this view and focuses on 
audit committees’ ability to enhance financial reporting quality and audit quality. 
Prior empirical research has used several surrogates for audit committee 
effectiveness, the most essential being audit committee size, independence, 
expertise and activity level. Following prior research as well as current US 
regulations, this study focuses on audit committee effectiveness generated by the 
size of the audit committee, the expertise of audit committee members and the 
activity level of the audit committee. In addition it is recognized that audit 
committee independence is a crucial component of audit committee effectiveness 
(e.g. Beasley et al. 2000; Abbott et al. 2003a). However, the regulations 
concerning the sample companies require that all audit committee members need 
to be independent of management (e.g. SOX 2002).  Therefore, this variable is 
constant for all sample companies and is not included in the scope of this study. 
The sample companies are expected to comply with the exchanges’ and SOX’s 
(2002) requirements concerning the maintenance, composition and 
responsibilities of the audit committee. However, this study makes a distinction 
between the form (meeting regulatory requirements) and the substance (the 
effectiveness of audit committees) of the audit committee. In other words, it is 
suggested that regulations set the primary requirements for the maintenance and 
responsibilities of an audit committee. Audit committees which exceed these 
primary requirements are expected to be more effective to a certain level. 
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Secondly, following prior audit quality research this study adopts the basic 
premise that most audits conform to the applicable legal and professional 
requirements. In other words it is expected that audits are generally legally 
satisfactory. In addition, it is suggested that audit clients may demand quality 
differentiated audits and audit committee effectiveness explains, at least partly, 
this demand. The primary measures for audit quality used in existing studies are 
audit firm size, audit firm industry specialization, audit tenure and audit fees. This 
study uses audit fees as a measure of audit quality. It is argued that audit firm 
size, industry specialization and auditor tenure do not provide sufficient measures 
for audit quality in the current US audit market. This is because the current US 
audit market is heavily concentrated and the Big Four audit firms dominate the 
market for auditing services with a market share of 78 % of all US public 
companies. In other words, the Big Four firms constitute a tight oligopoly (GAO 
2003). Due to the audit market situation, it is suggested that audit firm 
characteristics (i.e. size or industry expertise) may not be a sufficient measure of 
audit quality. In addition, the SOX (2002) issues restrictions on auditor tenure. 
The SOX (2002) requires a rotation of all audit partners after five years’ service. 
Given that audit partner tenure is restricted to five years its ability to have an 
impact on audit quality is also limited. However, it is reasonable to expect that 
some companies may still demand a differentially higher audit quality. It is 
argued that audit fees provide a sufficient measure of audit quality. This is 
because audit fees are expected to reflect additional audit effort, which leads to a 
higher level of audit quality by increasing the probability that auditors detect 
potential problems in the company’s financial reporting (DeAngelo 1981a; 
DeAngelo 1981b; Caramanis & Lennox 2008).16 Thus, higher audit fees are 
expected to be related to better financial reporting quality (Carcello et al. 2002; 
Frankel et al. 2002; Abbott et al. 2003a; Larcker et al. 2004; Srinidhi et al. 2007).  
 
Finally, following the literature this study suggests that discretionary accruals 
indicate earnings management and can be used as a measure for financial 
reporting quality. This study focuses on the negative aspect of earnings 
management and takes the perspective that earnings management is undesirable 
because it can be costly to shareholders. Consistent with Peasnell et al. (2005) this 
study adopts a view that both income increasing and income decreasing earnings 
manipulation may impose costs on shareholders and other external parties of the 
company. This is because earnings management may result in financial reports 
which are misleading to shareholders and other external parties. Thus it is 
                                                 
16
 Caramanis et al. (2008) provide direct evidence linking audit effort with audit quality. More 
specifically, they examine the effect of audit effort, measured by audit hours, on earnings 
management. Their results show that high audit effort decreases the extent to which managers 
report aggressively high earnings.  
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suggested that audit committees and external auditors should be concerned with 
both income decreasing and income increasing manipulations. In addition, it is 
suggested that managers prefer using discretionary accruals to manipulate 
earnings because they do not necessarily have direct cash flow consequences and 
are difficult for outsiders to discover. 
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4 DEVELOPMENT OF THE RESEARCH MODEL 
 
The aim of this section is to develop the research model which will be examined 
empirically in this study. This section is organized as follows. Firstly, literature 
examining relationships between audit committee effectiveness, audit quality and 
financial reporting quality will be introduced. This literature is divided into three 
lines as follows. The first line of research examines the relationship between audit 
committee effectiveness and financial reporting quality. The second line of 
research examines the relationship between audit committee effectiveness and 
audit quality. Finally, the third line of research investigates the relationship 
between audit quality and financial reporting quality. These separate lines of 
research form the basis for the model developed. The studies that are most 
significant for the development of the research model are summarized in 
Appendix 2. Secondly, the various effect types which can be used to connect the 
separate lines of research are introduced. The effect types are derived from other 
fields of social sciences and include moderated and mediated effects. Finally, a 
model combining the separate lines of research will be introduced. The 
construction of the model involves considering the compatibility between 
corporate governance and audit literature and the underlying theoretical 
perspectives surrounding the alternative effect types. 
 
4.1 Audit committee effectiveness and financial 
reporting quality 
 
As discussed in previous sections, the main purpose of the audit committee is to 
contribute to corporate control. More specifically, audit committees are expected 
to improve a company’s financial reporting quality. The effectiveness of audit 
committees in monitoring control has also commanded considerable research 
interest. Prior studies have primarily used an archival approach to assess the links 
between measures of audit committee effectiveness and financial reporting 
quality (Kalbers et al. 1998). These studies are discussed in more detail in the 
subsequent sections.  
 
Early studies examined the association between presence of an audit committee 
and fraudulent financial reporting. Some of these early studies indicate that audit 
committees do not entirely prevent fraudulent reporting by auditees (Verschoor 
1989; Verschoor 1990; Beasley 1996). For example, Beasley (1996) found that 
the presence of an audit committee does not have an effect on the likelihood of 
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financial statement fraud. However, the role of audit committees has changed 
considerably since this study and more recent studies are generally consistent in 
their findings that audit committees appear to be effective in preventing fraud. 
Accordingly Dechow et al. (1996) found that firms subject to enforcement actions 
by the SEC were less likely to have an audit committee. Similarly McMullen et 
al. (1996) found that the presence of an audit committee is associated with fewer 
SEC enforcement actions and illegal acts. In addition, Abbott et al. (2000) found 
that companies with independent and active audit committees were less likely to 
be sanctioned by the SEC for fraudulent or misleading financial reporting. 
Beasley et al. (2000) investigated fraudulent companies and their no-fraud 
benchmarks in three industries: technology, health care and financial services. 
They found that in general fraudulent companies have weaker governance 
mechanisms relative to their no-fraud benchmarks. More specifically, fraud 
companies in technology and financial services industries had fewer audit 
committees. In addition, fraudulent companies in all industries had less 
independent audit committees and boards. Audit committee effectiveness has also 
been examined in relation to financial restatements. For example Abbott et al. 
(2004) found that audit committee independence and activity level decrease the 
occurrence of restatements. In addition, audit committee expertise was found to 
have a negative association with restatements. Also consistent with the notion that 
effective corporate governance is associated with better financial reporting quality 
Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) found that companies with more effective boards 
and audit committees were more likely to make or update an earnings forecast. 
 
Several studies have investigated the relation between audit committee 
effectiveness and earnings management. Bédard et al. (2004) found that audit 
committee effectiveness measured by expertise, independence and responsibilities 
of the audit committee restrict aggressive earnings management. Similarly Klein 
(2002a), and Bradbury et al. (2006), reported a negative relation between audit 
committee independence and company’s income increasing discretionary 
accruals. Xie et al. (2003) found that audit committee activity level and its 
members’ financial sophistication constrain the propensity of managers to engage 
in earnings management. In addition, some studies have examined whether the 
presence or absence of an audit committee has an effect on financial reporting 
quality. Results of Peasnell et al. (2005) showed that the presence or absence of 
an audit committee does not have an effect on earnings management among UK 
firms. However, Jaggi and Leung (2007) using Hong Kong firms as a sample 
found that voluntarily established audit committees play a significant role in 
constraining earnings management. Piot et al. (2007) in a French setting also 
found that audit committees control for income increasing earnings management. 
Wild (1996) investigated whether audit committees have an effect on perceived 
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earnings quality. He found that market’s reaction to earnings reports increased 
after the formation of an audit committee indicating that audit committees 
improve perceptions of financial reporting quality. 
 
The above findings lead to the first hypothesis: 
 
H1: Audit committee effectiveness improves financial reporting 
quality. 
 
4.2 Audit committee effectiveness and audit quality 
 
In general the literature posits that a company’s corporate governance and 
external auditing are complements, whereas a company’s internal control and 
external auditing are considered substitutes (Hay, Kneckel & Ling 2008). The 
relationship between audit committee effectiveness and audit quality is also 
considered to be a complex one. Consistent with the more general discussion, the 
literature provides two possible rationales which may explain how audit 
committee effectiveness and external audit quality are related: audit committees 
and external auditors can be considered as either substitutes or complements for 
each other17.   
 
According to the substitute rationale audit committee effectiveness should be 
negatively associated with audit quality and vice versa. This is because the 
oversight provided by either audit committees or external auditors is expected to 
be sufficient to ensure financial reporting quality in its own right. According to 
this rationale both the demand for and supply of assurance provided by the 
auditor, for example, should be reduced when a company has an effective audit 
committee. Although the substitution rationale is initially appealing, it does not 
take into consideration the incentives of audit committee members. It can be 
argued that audit committee members may wish to invest in external auditing in 
order to protect their reputational capital (Abbott et al. 2000; Knechel & 
Willekens 2006) or mitigate the risk of financial liability arising from financial 
                                                 
17
 Previously the roles of audit committees and external auditors were viewed somewhat 
differently. Prior to the requirements for mandatory audit committee formation it was common 
that external auditors aided their clients in forming audit committees. This was because audit 
committees were viewed as a means to enhance the perceptions of auditor independence (Menon 
et al. 1994). Accordingly early studies such as Eichenseher and Shields (1985) and Menon et al. 
(1994) found that audit firm type affects the formation of audit committee. More specifically they 
reported that companies employing a big audit firm were more likely to voluntarily form an audit 
committee. In addition Collier et al. (1999) found that companies with Big Six audit firm had 
more active audit committees than companies with non-Big Six audit firm. 
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statements (Abbott et al. 2000). Thus, the complement rationale suggests a 
positive association between audit committee effectiveness and audit quality. This 
is because effective audit committees are expected to consist of directors with 
higher incentives to demand the assurance provided by external auditors (Hay et 
al.  2008).  
 
The research so far is inconclusive as to which rationale is more appropriate in 
describing the relationship between audit committee effectiveness and audit 
quality. Both rationales have been supported by prior research: studies focusing 
on the auditor’s decision-making have provided support for the substitute 
rationale, while studies regarding auditor choice and remuneration have provided 
support for the complement rationale. These studies will be discussed in more 
detail next. 
 
Research supporting the substitute rationale includes studies by Cohen and Hanno 
(2000), Bédard and Johnstone (2004), Lee et al. (2004), and Stewart et al. (2007). 
Cohen et al. (2000) examined whether audit planning judgments are affected by 
the strength of company’s corporate governance structure. They found that audit 
planning judgments were less favourable for companies with audit committees 
lacking resources and technical experience. In a similar vein, Bédard et al. (2004) 
reported that increased earnings manipulation risk is associated with increased 
planned audit hours and billing rates. In addition, an experimental study by 
Stewart et al. (2007) showed that auditors assess the level of audit risk lower for 
companies with audit committees, more frequent committee meetings and higher 
auditor’s attendance at meetings. However, the impact of these variables on audit 
testing and audit efficiency was perceived by auditors to be minimal. Lee et al. 
(2004) provided further collaborative evidence by examining auditor resignations. 
They found that auditors are less likely to resign when the company has an 
effective independent audit committee, which indicates that audit committee 
effectiveness affects auditors’ assessment of audit risk and willingness to continue 
the audit assignment.  
 
Research related to the complement rationale provides evidence indicating that 
audit committees have a critical role to play in enhancing audit quality at several 
stages in external auditing (Lee et al. 2004). Research examining the relationship 
between audit committee effectiveness and audit quality can be divided into the 
following lines of research (Abbott et al 2003a): 1) auditor selection, 2) audit 
coverage and audit fees, and 3) audit process and 4) audit opinion. In addition, 
studies have examined the association between audit committees and perceived 
audit quality. 
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The first line of research provides consistent evidence supporting the notion that 
effective audit committees demand higher level of audit quality. Abbott et al. 
(2000) focused on an association between audit committee effectiveness and audit 
firm size and found evidence that companies with independent audit committees 
that meet frequently were more likely to select a (then) Big Six audit firm when 
switching auditors. Audit committee effectiveness is also found to have an effect 
on the selection of an industry specialist auditor. Abbott et al. (2001) reported that 
audit committees which are independent and active are more likely to use an 
industry specialist audit firm. In a similar vein, Chen et al. (2005) found that the 
proportion of independent audit committee members increases the likelihood of 
employing a specialist audit firm. 
 
The second line of research examines whether audit committee effectiveness 
affects the demand for greater quantity of audit effort from the incumbent auditor 
in order to improve audit quality. These studies hypothesize that the amount of 
the audit fees reflects audit quantity and further audit quality. Thus, a positive 
association between audit committee effectiveness and audit fees is expected. 
This positive association can also be expected because the audit committee has 
the important duty to ensure that audit hours are not reduced to a level that 
compromises the quality of an audit (Stewart et al. 2007). Research results have 
generally been consistent with these views. An early study by Collier and 
Gregory (1996) found that UK companies with audit committees have higher 
audit fees. However, a later study by Goddard and Masters (2000) did not find 
this relation. Abbott et al. (2003a) examined the association between audit fees 
and audit committee independence, expertise and meeting frequency. Abbott et al. 
(2003a) found a positive association between audit committee independence as 
well as expertise and audit fees. Number of meetings was not significantly related 
to audit fees. Similarly, Lee et al. (2005) found a significant association between 
measures of audit committee effectiveness (independence, activity and expertise) 
and audit fees. Goodwin-Stewart et al. (2006) also found that the existence of an 
audit committee, more frequent committee meetings and increased use of internal 
audit were related to higher audit fees. In addition it was found that the expertise 
of audit committee members was associated with higher audit fees when meeting 
frequency and independence was low. Knechel et al. (2006) reported that audit 
fees are higher when a company has an audit committee. Mitra et al. (2007) 
demonstrated that more independent audit committees pay higher fees for 
auditors. However, other measures of audit committee effectiveness including 
audit committee meeting frequency and audit committee expertise did not have an 
effect on audit fees. In addition Vafeas et al. (2007) found that audit committee 
size, independence level and expertise were positively associated with audit fees. 
Finally Hay et al. (2008) examined the effect of internal auditing, corporate 
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governance and concentration of ownership on audit fees in a New Zealand 
setting. They reported that all variables examined, including the existence of an 
audit committee, were positively related to audit fees in a less regulated 
environment. However, it was found that these relationships did not hold in a 
highly regulated environment in which companies have relatively homogeneous 
control arrangements.  
 
A related vein of research focuses on the relationship between audit committee 
effectiveness and non-audit services fees and provides further evidence that audit 
committee effectiveness is related to audit quality. The notion behind these 
studies is that effective audit committees restrict the purchase of non-audit 
services from their incumbent auditor in order to ensure auditor independence. 
Abbott, Parker, Peters and Raghunandan (2003b) supported this notion and 
showed that non-audit services fees were lower in companies with independent 
and active audit committees. Lee et al. (2005) also suggested that effective audit 
committees seek to enhance auditor independence by reducing the non-audit 
services provided by the incumbent auditor.  
 
The third research stream focuses on the audit committee’s role in auditor-
management disputes. The underlying notion behind these studies is that an audit 
committee member’s characteristics affect his or her willingness to support the 
auditor in conflict situations with management. The results of these studies are 
somewhat inconclusive. Some studies suggest that audit committee members who 
are current managers of companies (Knapp 1987), possess financial expertise 
(DeZoort et al. 2001) or are CPAs (Certified Public Accountant) (DeZoort, 
Hermanson & Houston 2003a) are more likely to support auditors in audit-
management disagreements. However, DeZoort et al. (2001) found that audit 
committee members’ concurrent experience as a board member and as a member 
of senior management was associated with greater support for management, while 
DeZoort et al. (2003a) did not. DeZoort, Hermanson and Houston (2003b) found 
that audit committee members who were CPAs were less likely to support 
adjustments proposed by the auditor. 
 
The fourth research stream focuses on audit committees’ ability to mitigate the 
threat of management replacing the auditor. It is suggested that by mitigating the 
threat of management replacing the auditor the audit committee can affect the 
level of audit coverage and promote more truthful reporting by auditors. Carcello 
et al. (2000) as well as Carcello and Neal (2003b) examined the relation between 
audit committee effectiveness and auditor’s decision to issue a going-concern 
report. They found that audit firms are more likely to issue going-concern 
opinions to financially distressed firms with independent audit committees. In 
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addition, Carcello et al. (2003) found that auditors who issue initial going-concern 
modifications are less likely to be terminated when audit committee members are 
independent, possess governance expertise and have low stockholding. 
Archambeault et al. (2001) examined suspicious auditor switches. They found 
that companies that made suspicious auditor switches had 1) less independent 
audit committees, 2) less experienced audit committee members, 3) smaller audit 
committees, and 4) less active audit committees than matched counterparts. 
 
In addition to the above studies, a related research stream links audit committee 
effectiveness with perceived audit quality and independence. For example 
Raghunandan et al. (2003) investigated the association between audit committee 
effectiveness and shareholder ratification of auditor. The results indicated that in 
companies with high non-audit fee ratios, shareholders were less likely to vote 
against auditor ratification if the audit committee had solely independent 
directors. Raghunandan et al. (2003) concluded that audit committee composition 
is associated with shareholders’ perceptions of audit quality and independence. 
Teoh et al. (1996) investigated the perceptions of Malaysian accountants and 
found that the formation of the audit committee had a strong positive impact on 
enhancing perceived auditor independence. Beattie et al. (1999) also reported 
similar results on UK data. Goodwin and Seow (2002) investigated the 
effectiveness of audit committees in enhancing the quality of financial reporting 
and auditing perceived by auditors and directors in Singapore. A strong audit 
committee was found to have a significant impact on perceived audit 
effectiveness and the quality of financial reporting 
 
The above discussion leads to the second hypothesis: 
 
H2: Audit committee effectiveness increases the demand for audit 
quality. 
 
4.3 Audit quality and financial reporting quality 
 
The role of the external audit is to ensure financial reporting quality (Cohen et al. 
2004). Several empirical studies have examined whether external audit fulfils this 
role and contributes to financial reporting quality. These studies have used several 
measures for both audit quality and financial reporting quality. Based on 
measures of financial reporting quality these studies can be divided into two 
groups: 1) studies focusing on actual financial reporting quality and 2) studies 
focusing on perceived financial reporting quality. Overall, this line of research 
provides evidence that external audit quality contributes to both actual and 
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perceived financial reporting quality. These studies will be discussed next in more 
detail. 
 
There is an extensive body of research focusing on the relationship between audit 
quality and actual financial reporting quality. Many of these studies examine the 
association between audit quality and earnings quality. These studies suggest that 
audits of higher quality are more effective in restricting management discretion 
over accounting issues than audits of lower quality, and thus result in better 
earnings quality. These studies consider accruals as instruments which 
management prefers to use in order to manage earnings. Research has provided 
extensive evidence that audit quality measured by audit firm size (Becker et al 
1998; Francis et al. 1999), audit firm industry specialization (Balsam et al. 2003; 
Krishnan 2005), auditor tenure (Myers et al. 2003; Piot et al. 2007) or audit fees 
(Frankel et al. 2002; Larcker et al. 2004; Srinidhi et al. 2007) increases earnings 
quality (i.e. decreases discretionary accruals). In addition to accruals, audit quality 
has been linked to several other measures of financial reporting quality, such as 
restated financial statements (e.g. Kinney et al. 2004), audit reports (e.g. Geiger et 
al. 2003), and litigation (Antle et al. 1997). These studies mainly examine the 
relationship between auditor remuneration and financial reporting quality on the 
basic premise that financial dependence threatens auditor independence and thus 
decreases financial reporting quality. Overall, this line of research fails to support 
this premise and thus provides indirect support for the notion that audit fees can 
be considered an indicator of auditor’s effort to conduct a high quality audit 
 
Many studies have also examined how audit quality affects perceived financial 
reporting quality. These studies are also quite consistent in their findings, 
reporting a positive link between audit quality and perceived financial reporting 
quality. Studies focusing on ERC have found that audit firm size (Teoh et al. 
1993), industry specialization (Balsam et al. 2003) and tenure (Ghost et al. 2005) 
have an effect on perceived earnings quality. In other words, these studies have 
documented a positive association between audit quality and ERCs. Similarly 
studies focusing on IPOs (Initial Public Offering) have found that higher audit 
quality indicated by audit firm size result in more favorable firm valuations 
(Beatty 1989). In addition, a study by Krishnan (2003) focused on earnings 
surprises and reported collaborating evidence showing more positive market 
reactions to earnings surprises for companies with industry specialized auditors.  
 
The above discussion leads to the third hypothesis: 
 
H3: Audit quality improves financial reporting quality. 
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4.4 Effect types 
 
As evidenced by the foregoing discussion the relationships between audit 
committee effectiveness, audit quality and financial reporting quality have 
aroused considerable research interest. The objective of the present study is to 
place the separate relationships emerging from the literature in a more 
comprehensive model. Since corporate governance and audit research have 
traditionally focused on direct effects between variables the model is bound to 
include more complex effect types. Thus the objective of the study involves 
selection of an effect type which adequately describes the relationships between 
the variables of interest and is in accordance with the theory and results of 
empirical research.  
 
The alternative effect types are ultimately derived from other fields of social 
sciences, in which researchers have found it necessary to invoke conceptual 
models that include various effect types to describe for example human behavior 
or decision making18. The main effect types addressed in these studies are 
mediated effects and moderated effects. These effect types are also addressed by 
management accounting research, which has examined, for example, the effects 
of moderator and mediator variables on the relationships between company’s 
contingency characteristic and company performance (see e.g. Gerdin & Greve 
2004; Jokipii 2006). 
 
Before the selection of an appropriate effect type it is important to make a 
distinction between these effect types, because they have different theoretical 
starting points and they answer different research questions. In general, a variable 
can serve either function depending on the theoretical model under investigation. 
However, a variable cannot serve both functions in the same analysis. In other 
words, if a variable is tested as both a moderator and a mediator in competing 
models and both models yield significant results this should be considered to be a 
contradictory result (see e.g. Baron et al. 1986; Holmbeck 1997; Muller, Judd & 
Yzerbyt 2005; Jokipii 2006). The aim of the following sections is to define the 
concepts of moderator and mediator and provide the basis for the choice 
regarding the effect type in the model developed. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18
 See e.g. MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West and Sheets (2002) and MacKinnon, Fairchild 
and Fritz (2007) for a discussion regarding these research questions.  
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4.4.1 Moderation effect 
 
Moderated effect focuses on factors having an effect on the strength and/or 
direction of the relationship between the independent variable and the dependent 
variable. A moderation variable is often introduced in order to examine the 
conditions under which the strength of the effect of an independent variable on a 
dependent variable varies. Alternatively, a moderation variable can be introduced 
in order to examine the condition under which the direction of effect varies 
(Muller et al. 2005). Baron et al. (1986) define a moderator variable more 
specifically as follows: 
 
“a qualitative (e.g., sex, race, class) or quantitative…variable that 
affects the direction and/or strength of a relation between an 
independent or predictor variable and a dependent or criterion 
variable…a basic moderator effect can be represented as an 
interaction between a focal independent variable and a factor (the 
moderator) that specifies the appropriate conditions for its 
operation…Moderator variables are typically introduced when 
there is an unexpectedly weak or inconsistent relation between a 
predictor and a criterion variable (p. 1174, 1178).” 
 
The moderation effect is presented diagrammatically in Figure 7. In the figure X 
refers to an independent variable, Mo refers to a moderation variable and Y refers 
to a dependent variable. In the figure moderator variable Mo moderates the 
relationship between the independent variable X and the dependent variable Y 
(Baron et al. 1986; Holmbeck 1997). As is evident from the figure, the 
independent variable X and the moderator variable Mo are independent of each 
other. That is, the independent variable should not have an effect on the 
moderator variable in the moderation model (Muller et al. 2005). 
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Figure 7.  Moderation effect (Baron et al. 1986; Holmbeck 1997). 
 
4.4.2 Mediation effect 
 
The mediation effect consists of a chain of relations where an independent 
variable affects a mediator variable which then affects the dependent variable. 
The mediation effect is built on the assumption that there is a significant 
association between the independent variable and the dependent variable before 
testing for a mediated effect. The mediator variable is introduced in order to 
examine whether the effect of an independent variable on a dependent variable 
goes through a mediating variable. In other words a mediator variable specifies 
how (or the mechanism by which) a given effect occurs. Baron et al. (1986) 
describe the mediator variable as follows: 
 
“the generative mechanism through which the focal independent 
variable is able to influence the dependent variable of 
interest…(and) Mediation …is best done in the case of a strong 
relation between the predictor and the criterion variable (p. 1173, 
1178). 
 
The mediation effect is depicted diagrammatically in Figure 8. In the figure X 
refers to the independent variable, Me refers to the mediator variable and Y refers 
to the dependent variable. In the figure the mediator variable Me mediates the 
relationship between the independent variable X and the dependent variable Y 
(Baron et al. 1986; Holmbeck 1997). 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Mo 
X  Y  
Notes: 
The variables are defined as follows: 
Y= Dependent variable 
X= Independent variable 
Mo= Moderating variable 
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Figure 8.  Mediation effect (Baron et al. 1986; Holmbeck 1997). 
 
 
The mediated effect may be either full or partial. A full mediation occurs when the 
mediator eliminates the effect of the independent variable on the dependent 
variable, whereas a partial mediation occurs when the mediator significantly 
decreases the effect of independent variable on dependent variable. It should be 
noted that a partial mediation may indicate the operation of multiple mediating 
factors (Baron et al. 1986; Holmbeck 1997). 
 
It should be noted that a distinction can be made between indirect effect and 
mediated effect, although these concepts are frequently used as synonyms in the 
literature. Figure 9 depicts an indirect effect. In the figure X denotes the 
independent variable, I the intervening variable and Y the dependent variable. 
The difference between indirect and mediated effects arises from the initial 
relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable. 
Following Holmbeck (1997) it is asserted that the mediated effect is possible only 
if the independent variable has an initial effect on the dependent variable. The 
mediator variable is expected to account for the relationship between the 
independent and the dependent variable. However, an indirect effect may occur if 
significant relationships are found between the independent variable and 
intervening variable as well as the intervening variable and dependent variable. In 
the case of indirect effects it cannot be claimed that the independent variable and 
the dependent variable are significantly related and thus interpretations 
concerning such effects should be conservative (Streiner 2005; Holmbeck 1997). 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Me 
  
X  Y   
Notes: 
The variables are defined as follows: 
Y= Dependent variable 
X= Independent variable 
Me= Mediating variable 
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Figure 9.  Indirect effect (Streiner 2005). 
 
4.5 Selection of effect type 
 
The literature suggests that the relationships between corporate governance actors 
are complex (e.g. Cohen et al. 2004). Thus, a substantial amount of research has 
focused on examining relationships between audit committee effectiveness, audit 
quality and financial reporting quality. Collectively the existing research provides 
evidence for relationships between: 1) audit committee effectiveness and financial 
reporting quality, 2) audit committee effectiveness and audit quality, and 3) audit 
quality and financial reporting quality. The evidence shows that audit committee 
effectiveness is associated with better financial reporting quality as well as with 
greater demand for external audit quality. The results also indicate that audit 
quality enhances financial reporting quality. No previous research, however, has 
attempted to place these relationships in a more comprehensive model.  
 
Thus, the objective of this research is to incorporate the above relationships and 
develop a model which provides a more comprehensive understanding of the 
relationships. This objective involves selection of an effect type which 
sufficiently describes the underlying dynamics of the relationships. This study 
considers two alternative effect types, namely the moderation effect and the 
mediation effect. These effect types are derived from other fields of social 
sciences, where they are frequently examined (see e.g. Baron et al. 1986; 
Holmbeck 1997; Holmbeck 2002; Muller et al. 2005). The main focus of the 
model developed is on the role audit quality plays in the relationship between 
audit committee effectiveness and financial reporting quality.  
 
  
  
  
  
Y  X  I  
Notes: 
The variables are defined as follows: 
Y= Dependent variable 
X= Independent variable 
I= Intervening variable 
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Firstly, audit quality could be modelled as a moderator which alters the strength 
of the relationship between audit committee effectiveness and financial reporting 
quality. This effect type can be based either on the complement or the substitute 
rationale. Based on a complement rationale it can be suggested that audit quality 
strengthens the relationship between audit committee effectiveness and financial 
reporting quality. This notion maintains that external auditors contribute to the 
monitoring of financial reporting quality provided by audit committees. On the 
other hand from the substitute perspective the effect could be the opposite. This is 
because an effective audit committee would decrease the need for high quality 
audit service and vice versa. However, in the moderation model the independent 
variable and the moderator cannot be related. The literature provides evidence of 
a positive effect between audit committee effectiveness and audit quality. 
Therefore, it is suggested that the moderation effect, on a theoretical basis, cannot 
be employed to describe the role of audit quality on the relationship between audit 
committee effectiveness and financial reporting quality (Muller et al. 2005).   
 
Secondly, audit quality may function as a mediator in the relationship between 
audit committee effectiveness and financial reporting quality. This effect type is 
in accordance with the complement rationale: audit committee effectiveness can 
be expected to improve audit quality which further improves financial reporting 
quality. The mediation effect maintains that there are significant relations 
between 1) independent variable and dependent variable, 2) independent variable 
and mediator variable, and 3) mediator and dependent variable. If audit 
committee effectiveness is modelled as an independent variable, audit quality as a 
mediator variable and financial reporting quality as a dependent variable, the 
empirical studies provide evidence for all the required relationships. In other 
words, combining the relationships reported in the existing research forms a 
sequence from audit committee effectiveness to audit quality and further to 
financial reporting quality. Thus, empirical research and the theory concerning the 
mediation effect are analogous. Therefore it is suggested that audit quality 
functions as a mediator in the relationship between audit committee effectiveness 
and financial reporting quality.  
 
Based on the above propositions a fourth hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H4: Audit quality mediates the relationship between audit 
committee effectiveness and financial reporting quality. 
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5 METHODOLOGY AND SAMPLE 
 
This research focuses on the interplay between audit committees and external 
auditors in ensuring financial reporting quality. Following the literature this study 
examines the relationships between 1) audit committee effectiveness and financial 
reporting quality, 2) audit committee effectiveness and audit quality, 3) audit 
quality and financial reporting quality. In addition, as a novel approach, these 
relationships are combined into a more comprehensive model which suggests that 
audit quality mediates the relationship between audit committee effectiveness and 
financial reporting quality. The rationalization for the model developed was 
presented in the previous section. 
 
This section will introduce the methodology for examining the research model 
proposed. The section is organized as follows. Firstly, the analytic techniques for 
testing the mediation effect are explained. Secondly, operational measures for 
audit committee effectiveness, audit quality and financial reporting quality as well 
as control variables are introduced. This part also involves a restatement of the 
study’s hypotheses in terms of operational measures. Thirdly, adaption of analytic 
techniques is explained. Finally, sample selection criteria and descriptive 
statistics are presented.  
 
5.1 Statistical mediation 
 
Prior audit research has mainly tested direct effects between measures of audit 
committee effectiveness, audit quality and financial reporting quality using 
multiple regression analysis. Hence, no prior research has addressed the 
possibility of more sophisticated effect types between the variables. To bridge this 
apparent gap in the literature the present study investigates an alternative effect 
type, the mediation effect. More specifically, it is suggested that audit quality 
functions as a mediator in the relationship between audit committee effectiveness 
and financial reporting quality. The statistical methods used to test mediation 
effect are derived from other fields of social sciences, where this type of effect is 
frequently tested (see e.g. MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West & Sheets 
2002).  
 
Several methods for testing mediation can be derived from the literature. 
According to MacKinnon, Fairchild and Fritz (2007) 19 the three major statistical 
                                                 
19
 See e.g. MacKinnon et al. (2007) and Mackinnon et al. (2002) for a review of these methods. 
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approaches for testing mediation hypothesis are: 1) the Causal Steps Method, 2) 
the Difference in Coefficients Method and 3) the Product of Coefficients Method. 
The first method, the Causal Steps Method, originates from the seminal work by 
Baron et al. (1986). This method involves testing series of relationships (or paths) 
in the proposed mediation model. The second approach, the Difference in 
Coefficients Method, focuses on the difference between the regression coefficient 
before and after adjustment for the mediating variable into a regression model 
regarding a relationship between the independent variable and the dependent 
variable. The third approach, the Product of Coefficients Method, attempts to test 
the significance of the mediated effect (MacKinnon et al. 2002). 
 
The above methods are somewhat overlapping and it has been suggested that 
combining the Causal Steps Method and the Product of Coefficients Method 
provides a more thorough analysis of the mediation effect than any single method 
(see Holmbeck 1997). Thus, following Holmbeck (1997) both the Causal Steps 
Method and a significance test for the mediated effect (i.e. the Sobel Test) 
determined by the Product of Coefficients method are employed in this study. The 
next sections will discuss these methods in more detail. 
 
5.1.1 Causal Steps Method 
 
As discussed in Section 4.4.2 the mediation hypothesis suggests a series of 
relations where the independent variable affects a mediating variable, which 
affects the dependent variable (MacKinnon et al. 2007) with an initial assumption 
that the independent variable affects the dependent variable (Holmbeck 1997). 
This study employs the Causal Steps Method for examining the presence of the 
mediated effect. This method was introduced by Baron et al. (1986) and is the 
most commonly used method for testing mediation, for example, in psychological 
literature (MacKinnon et al. 2002; MacKinnon et al. 2007). The Causal Steps 
Method involves the estimation of three regression models which are presented in 
Table 1 (e.g. Baron et al. 1986; Muller et al. 2005). 
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Table 1.  Regression models required by the Causal Steps Method (Baron et al. 
1986). 
 
Condition Equation no 
Condition 1: 
 
Y=β10+β11X+ε1 
 
 
(1) 
Condition 2: 
 
Me=β20+β21X+ε2 
 
 
(2) 
Conditions 3 and 4: 
 
Y=β30+β31X+ β32Me+ε3 
 
 
(3) 
The variables are defined as follows: 
Y= Dependent variable 
X= Independent variable 
Me= Mediating variable 
 
 
 
The above regression models can also be placed in the mediation model diagram 
as presented in Figure 10. The first regression model is related to the direct effect 
between independent variable and dependent variable. The second regression 
model tests the relation between the independent variable and the mediator. The 
third regression model tests the effect of the independent variable on dependent 
variable after the mediator has been included in the regression model. In specific 
terms the Causal Steps Method requires that four conditions must be met for a 
variable to be considered a mediator. These conditions are the following (Baron et 
al. 1986): 
 
1. In Equation 1, the independent variable X must have an effect on the 
dependent variable Y (β11 is significant). 
 
2. In Equation 2, the independent variable X must have an effect on the 
mediator Me (β21 is significant). 
 
3. In Equation 3, the mediator Me must have an effect on the dependent 
variable Y controlling for the independent variable X (β32 is significant). 
 
4. In Equation 3, the effect of the independent variable X on the dependent 
variable Y (β31) should be smaller, in absolute value, than the effect in 
Equation 1 (β11). 
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Me 
X Y 
Y X 
β11 
β21 β32 
β31 
Y=β10+β11X+ε1 
Me=β20+β21X+ε2 
Y=β30+β31X+ β32Me+ε3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.  Mediation model diagrammatically and regression models to test the 
mediated effect (MacKinnon et al. 2002). 
 
 
The literature has debated whether the first condition is necessary for a mediated 
effect to occur (Muller et al. 2005). The present study adopts the view that the 
first condition must be met in order to test the mediation effect. This view is 
consistent, for example, with Shrout and Bolger (2002) who state that: 
“experimentalists who wish to elaborate the mechanism of an experimental effect 
need to first establish that the effect exists” (p. 430). In addition, the literature 
provides several alternatives as to how the fourth condition is established. In 
general, the results are interpreted as indicating full mediation (i.e. the effect of 
the independent variable is completely transmitted through the mediating 
variable) if the independent variable coefficient β31 does not differ significantly 
from zero when the mediating variable is included in the regression model. The 
literature also recognizes the possibility of partial mediation where the effect of 
the independent variable is transmitted through the mediating variable only 
partially (Baron et al. 1986). Thus, a result indicating that │ β31│<│ β11│is 
consistent with the existence of partial mediation. Following, for example, Baron 
et al. (1986) this study adopts the view that both full and partial mediation effects 
are acceptable.  
Notes: 
The variables are defined as follows: 
Y= Dependent variable 
X= Independent variable 
Me= Mediating variable 
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5.1.2 Sobel Test 
 
Holmbeck (2002) argues that a single implementation of the Causal Steps Method 
may lead to false-negative or false-positive conclusions regarding the occurrence 
of the mediation effect. False-negative conclusions refer to the rejection of the 
mediation hypothesis when it should be accepted and false-positive conclusions 
refer to acceptance of the mediation hypothesis when it should be rejected.  
According to Holmbeck (2002) false conclusions can be reduced by testing the 
significance of the mediated effect. 
 
The literature proposes several tests for the significance of the mediated effect. 
Related to these tests the mediated effect can be determined by the following 
equality relationship which exists among the parameters of the regression models 
1-3 (see e.g. MacKinnon, Warsi & Dwyer 1995; Muller et al. 2005): 
 
 
β11- β32 = β21* β32 
 
 
Thus, tests for the significance of the mediated effect involve testing whether the 
parameter difference on the left side of the above equality departs from zero or 
whether the product on the right side does so. Following Holmbeck (2002) this 
study employs the Sobel Test to examine the significance of the mediated effect 
and thus, the focus is on the latter.  
 
More specifically the Sobel Test involves calculating the coefficient for the 
mediated effect (i.e. indirect effect)20. This is achieved by multiplying coefficients 
β21β32. The coefficient of the mediated effect is further divided by its standard 
error seβ21β32. This test value is compared to the standard normal distribution. 
Thus, in terms of equations the Sobel Test can be presented as follows (Sobel 
1982; Baron et al. 1986): 
 
 
3221
3221
3221
ββ
ββ
ββ
se
z
⋅
=  (4) 
 
( ) ( )2212322322213221 ββββββ sesese ⋅+⋅=  (5) 
 
                                                 
20
 Refer to regression models 2 and 3 for the notations. 
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The variables are defined as follows: 
 
β32= Unstandardized regression coefficient for the association between the 
mediator and the dependent variable. 
 
β21= Unstandardized regression coefficient for the association between the 
independent variable and the mediator. 
 
seβ32 = Standard error of the mediator β32. 
 
seβ21= Standard error of the independent variable β21. 
 
As a summary, the mediated effect is tested as follows. Firstly, the Causal Steps 
Method is employed to test the necessary relations for the mediated effect. If the 
variables in a tested mediation model fulfill all four conditions of the Causal 
Steps Method the results are considered to support the mediation effect. In this 
study both full and partial mediation effects are considered to be an acceptable 
result. Secondly, if the Causal Steps Method supports the mediation model Sobel 
Test is applied to test the significance of the mediated effect. If Sobel Test 
statistics are greater than 1.96 the mediated effect is considered to be statistically 
significant at the 5% level.  
 
5.2 Operational measures  
 
This study develops a model in which audit quality mediates the relationship 
between audit committee effectiveness and financial reporting quality. Analysis 
of the model involves testing four hypotheses which are analogous to the 
conditions of the Causal Steps Method and must be reached in order for the 
mediation effect to occur. The hypotheses establish the predicted signs of the 
relationships. Thus, the following hypotheses are tested: 
 
H1: Audit committee effectiveness improves financial reporting quality. 
 
H2: Audit committee effectiveness increases the demand for audit quality. 
 
H3: Audit quality improves financial reporting quality. 
 
H4: Audit quality mediated the relationship between audit committee 
effectiveness and financial reporting quality. 
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Initially the model developed focuses on five variables. Firstly, there are three 
independent variables which serve as measures of audit committee effectiveness, 
namely audit committee size, audit committee expertise ratio and audit committee 
meeting frequency. Secondly, there is the dependent variable, which is a measure 
of financial reporting quality. In this study discretionary accruals are suggested to 
represent financial reporting quality in general and earnings quality in particular. 
Finally, there is a potential mediating variable which is a measure of audit 
quality. In this study audit quality is measured by audit fees paid to the external 
auditor. Further rationalization for these variables is presented in Sections 5.2.1-
5.2.3. The hypotheses discussed above can be restated as follows in terms of 
operational measures: 
 
H1: There is a negative relationship between audit committee size (audit 
committee expertise ratio and audit committee meeting frequency 
respectively) and discretionary accruals. 
 
H2: There is a positive relationship between audit committee size (audit 
committee expertise ratio and audit committee meeting frequency 
respectively) and audit fees. 
 
H3: There is a negative relationship between audit fees and discretionary 
accruals. 
 
H4: Audit fees mediate the relationship between audit committee size 
(audit committee expertise ratio and audit committee meeting 
frequency respectively) and discretionary accruals. 
 
Figure 11 summarizes the operational measures of the developed model as well as 
hypothesized relationships between variables. As can be seen from the top of the 
figure, variables measuring audit committee effectiveness (audit committee size, 
audit committee expertise ratio and audit committee meeting frequency) are 
expected to have a negative effect on discretionary accruals. This is because more 
effective audit committees are expected to decrease management discretion over 
accounting issues and thus lead to a lower level of discretionary accruals than less 
effective audit committees. These relationships are addressed by Hypothesis 1. In 
addition, as can be seen from the bottom of the figure, measures of audit 
committee effectiveness are expected to have a positive effect on audit fees. The 
notion behind this relationship is that audit committee effectiveness is expected to 
increase the demand for external audit effort, which leads to an increase in audit 
fees. In turn, increase in external audit effort is expected to be positively related to 
audit quality. This relationship is consistent with Hypothesis 2. The bottom of the 
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figure also indicates that audit fees have a negative effect on discretionary 
accruals. This is because greater audit effort and better audit quality are expected 
to constrict earnings management, and thus to be related to better financial 
reporting quality. This is the notion underlying Hypothesis 3. Finally, measures of 
audit committee effectiveness, audit quality and financial reporting quality are 
connected to form a model in which the effect of audit committee effectiveness 
on financial reporting quality goes through audit quality. The bottom of Figure 11 
illustrates this effect. The mediation effect is addressed by Hypothesis 4. 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 11. Hypothesized relationships between measures of audit committee 
effectiveness, audit quality and financial reporting quality. 
 
 
As discussed previously, the hypotheses of the study are analogous with the four 
conditions of the Causal Steps Method. Thus, in the subsequent sections the term 
condition refers to both conditions of the Causal Steps Method and these 
hypotheses. If the condition is fulfilled the related hypothesis is also supported. 
The following sections will introduce the operational measures of audit 
committee effectiveness, audit quality and financial reporting quality in more 
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detail. In addition to the variables of interest, this study employs control variables 
for both discretionary accruals and audit fees. These variables are also introduced 
in the coming sections. Appendix 3 provides a summary of the measures used in 
the empirical analyses. 
 
5.2.1 Measurement of audit committee effectiveness 
 
The operational measures for audit committee effectiveness are drawn from 
empirical research and from current US regulations concerning corporate 
governance and audit committees. In general the literature suggests that audit 
committee effectiveness is dependent on its composition as well as its activity 
level (e.g. DeZoort et al. 2002; SOX 2002; Beasley et al. 2000). Accordingly a set 
of three audit committee characteristics is suggested to have an effect on audit 
committee effectiveness namely, audit committee size, audit committee expertise 
ratio, and audit committee meeting frequency.21 The first two measures are 
related to audit committee composition and the last one is related to audit 
committee activity level.  
 
A substantial amount of research has provided evidence that these audit 
committee effectiveness measures are associated with financial reporting quality 
(e.g. Xie et al. 2003; Bédard et al. 2004). In addition prior studies provide evidence 
consistent with the notion that these audit committee effectiveness measures 
enhance the demand for external audit quality (Abbott et al. 2003a, Lee et al. 
2005, Goodwin-Stewart et al. 2006; Vafeas et al. 2007). More specifically, audit 
committee size (ACSIZE) is measured as the number of directors serving on the 
audit committee. Audit committee expertise ratio (ACEXP) is the ratio of 
financial experts on the audit committee. Audit committee meeting frequency 
(ACMEET) is measured as the number of audit committee meetings held during 
the fiscal year. Following the literature these measures are expected to have a 
negative effect on discretionary accruals and positive effect on audit fees. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21
 Although the literature regards audit committee independence as an important determinant of 
audit committee effectiveness it is not included in the scope of this study. This is because current 
US regulations (e.g. SOX 2002) require that all audit committee members must be independent of 
the company. Therefore all sample companies are expected to have independent audit committees 
and this variable would not have variance to conduct statistical analysis. 
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5.2.2 Measurement of audit quality 
 
The audit research has suggested several measures for audit quality including 
audit firm size, audit firm industry specialization, audit tenure and audit fees. 
However, this study is situated in a highly regulated as well as concentrated audit 
environment. Thus, most US listed companies are expected to employ Big Four 
audit firms as well as industry specialist audit firms.  In addition the SOX (2002) 
restricts audit partner tenure to five years. Therefore, audit firm size, industry 
specialization and tenure are expected to have a limited ability to reflect audit 
quality. However, it is suggested that companies may still require quality 
differentiated audits and audit fees are expected to provide a sufficient indicator 
of audit quality. Following the literature it is suggested that audit fees reflect audit 
effort, which further benefits auditor’s decision-making and thus improves the 
quality of services provided by the external auditor (e.g. Carcello et al. 2002; 
Frankel et al. 2002; Abbott et al. 2003a; Larcker et al. 2004; Srinidhi et al. 2007; 
Caramanis et al. 2008). In addition it is expected that certain drivers of audit 
quality, such as audit committee effectiveness, are associated with variations in 
the level of audit fees. This is because these drivers may affect audit effort during 
the planning of an audit as well as during the course of the audit (Simunic 1980; 
Hay et al. 2004; Watkins et al. 2004).  
 
The above arguments are supported by several lines of empirical research linking 
audit fees with knowledge spillovers (e.g. Firth 1997; Firth 2002), free premiums 
(e.g. Simon et al. 1988; Ferguson et al. 2002), demand for audit quality (e.g. 
Abbott et al. 2003a) and financial reporting quality (e.g. Srinidhi et al. 2007). In 
general, these studies suggest that audit fees can be associated with audit quality 
through either greater audit competence or more audit work (Francis 2004). Thus, 
according to the literature audit quality is measured by the natural logarithm of 
audit fees (AUDITFEE) paid to the incumbent auditor. It is suggested that audit 
fees are related to an improvement in financial reporting quality, and thus have a 
negative effect on discretionary accruals. 
 
5.2.3 Measurement of financial reporting quality 
 
As discussed in Section 3.3 financial reporting quality has not been 
unambiguously defined by either regulators or prior research. Due to the 
vagueness of the definition, prior research has employed a number of measures 
for financial reporting quality. In general studies have concentrated on situations 
where financial reporting quality may be impaired. These situations can be 
divided into misstatements outside GAAP and misstatements within GAAP.  
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This study focuses on US listed companies and it is expected that these 
companies rarely issue financial reports which do not meet minimum GAAP 
requirements. Therefore this study focuses on financial reporting within GAAP. 
More specifically, discretionary accruals are used as a measure of financial 
reporting quality in general and earnings quality in particular. The basic premise 
is that discretionary accruals capture earnings management and therefore provide 
an inverse measure of earnings quality. The low level of discretionary accruals is 
expected to indicate good earnings quality (e.g. Healy 1985; DeAngelo 1986; 
Jones 1991; Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney 1995).  
 
Several methods have been proposed for estimating discretionary accruals. Early 
studies use the change in total accruals as a measure of discretionary accruals 
(Healy 1985; DeAngelo 1986) whereas more recent research uses linear 
discretionary accruals models to decompose accruals into discretionary and 
nondiscretionary components (Jones 1991; Dechow et al. 1995, Dechow et al. 
2002). However, it has been argued that the conventional accruals models fail to 
recognize the nonlinear nature of the accounting accruals process (Ball & 
Shivakumar 2005). To address this issue, a modified Dechow et al. (2002) model 
employed by Srinidhi et al. (2007) and Francis, LaFond, Olsson and Schipper 
(2005) is adopted in this study. In the original Dechow et al. (2002) model current 
accruals are the dependent variable and cash flows in previous, current and 
subsequent years are independent variables. Following McNichols (2002), Francis 
et al. (2005) and Srinidhi et al. (2007) the change in sales revenues (∆Revt) and 
gross property, plant and equipment (PPEt) are included in the model as 
additional control variables. Thus, the model used to estimate discretionary 
accruals (ACC) is as follows: 
 
 
TCAt= β1+ β2OCFt-1+ β3OCFt+ β4OCFt+1+ β5∆Revt+ β6 PPEt+ εt (6) 
 
 
The variables are defined as follows: 
 
TCA= ∆CA-∆Cash-(∆CL-∆STDeb) 
 
∆CA= Change in current assets   
 
∆Cash= Change in cash balance   
 
∆CL= Change in current liabilities  
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∆STDebt= Change in short term debt included in current liabilities 
 
OCF=Operating cash flow from the cash flow statement 
 
∆Rev= Change in revenues  
 
PPE= Gross property, plant and equipment  
 
In line with Srinidhi et al. (2007) and Francis et al. (2005) all variables depicted 
above are scaled by average total assets in t and t-1. In addition, all changes 
presented above are between period t and t-1. The model is estimated separately 
for each industry (two-digit SIC code)22 with a minimum of 20 observations. 
Discretionary accruals (ACC) are then calculated as the residuals from the above 
regression model. The interpretation of the residual is as follows: a higher value 
of the residual is expected to indicate a greater level of earnings management and 
lower earnings quality. 
 
5.2.4 Control variables 
 
As discussed previously, the Causal Steps Method involves a phased analysis 
technique in which mediator variable (AUDITFEE) is a dependent variable in one 
regression and becomes an independent variable in another. In addition the 
mediation model involves independent variables (ACSIZE, ACEXP and 
ACMEET) and a dependent variable (ACC). Due to the analytic technique, 
statistical analyses employ two sets of control variables. The first set involves 
control variables related to discretionary accruals (ACC). The second set of 
variables involves control variables related to audit fees (AUDITFEE). These 
control variables are discussed separately in the following sections. 
 
5.2.4.1 Control variables related to discretionary accruals  
 
Following prior research, the analysis involves selected firm characteristics which 
are expected to have an impact on earnings management. These firm 
characteristics proxy for company size, uncertainty of operations, systematic risk 
and growth opportunities (see e.g. Becker et al. 1998; Reynolds & Francis 2000; 
Dechow et al. 2002; Cheng & Warfield 2005; Wang 2006; Srinidhi et al. 2007). 
The logarithm of total assets (TA) is a proxy for company size. Following prior 
                                                 
22
 Industries with less than twenty observations were excluded from the sample (see e.g. Francis et 
al. 2005). 
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research, large companies are expected to have systematically lower discretionary 
accruals due to operating characteristics such as greater stability and 
diversification of portfolio of activities (Becker et al. 1998; Dechow et al. 2002; 
Srinidhi et al. 2007). Thus, a negative relationship between TA and ACC is 
expected. Uncertainty of operations is measured by operating cycle (OPCYCLE) 
which is calculated as follows (see e.g. Srinidhi et al. 2007): 
 
 
 (7) 
 
 
For companies with no inventories OPCYCLE is calculated as follows: 
 
 
 (8) 
 
 
Dechow et al. (2002) and Srinidhi et al. (2007) argue that longer operating cycle 
is associated with more uncertainty and more estimation, thus leading to lower 
earnings quality. Therefore OPCYCLE is expected to have a positive effect on 
ACC. Growth rate in net sales (SALESG) is used to capture the effect of growth 
opportunities on discretionary accruals. High growth firms have high equity 
incentives and thus have greater incentives to manage earnings than low growth 
companies (Antle et al. 2006). Therefore, SALESG is expected to be positively 
associated with ACC. Occurrence of loss (LOSS) serves as a proxy for systematic 
risk. LOSS is an indicator variable which takes a value of 1 if the net income of 
the fiscal year is negative and otherwise 0. The literature suggests that riskier 
firms which are financially distressed may be more prone to use accruals to 
manage earnings upwards (Dechow et al. 2002; Antle et al. 2006 Srinidhi et al. 
2007). Thus, LOSS is expected to have a positive effect on ACC.  
 
5.2.4.2 Control variables related to audit fees 
 
According to Hay, Knechel and Wong (2006) variables related to audit fees 
involve both “supply” variables and “demand” variables. Supply variables refer to 
company characteristics which may have an effect on auditor’s planning decisions 
regarding the level of audit effort. On the other hand, demand variables refer to 
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company characteristics which may influence the demand for greater audit effort 
and audit quality.  
 
Supply variables related to audit fees serve as proxies for company size, 
complexity, inherent risk, profitability and leverage. Company size is measured as 
the natural logarithm of total assets (TA). The research has shown that company 
size has a very high power to explain audit fees (e.g. Carcello et al. 2002; Abbott 
et al. 2003a; Abbott et al. 2003b; Lee et al. 2005; Goodwin-Stewart et al. 2006; 
Knechel et al. 2006; Mitra et al. 2007). Company size controls for several 
attributes such as risk, earnings persistence, profitability, regulatory costs, 
accounting practices and information environment (see e.g. Hay et al. 2006). 
Given that larger companies have more complex systems and a wider range of 
activities, auditors are prone to devote more audit hours to large companies than 
to small companies (Palmrose 1986a; Palmrose 1986b; Barkess et al. 1994). Thus, 
TA is expected to have a positive effect on AUDITFEE. Inventory and 
receivables (INVREC) are used as proxies for inherent risk. INVREC is 
calculated as a sum of total inventories and total receivables scaled by total assets.  
Given that inventories and receivables require greater audit effort, INVREC is 
expected to be positively associated with AUDITFEE (Carcello et al. 2002; Lee et 
al. 2005; Mitra et al. 2007).  Complexity is measured as a ratio of foreign sales to 
total sales (FOROPR). Companies with foreign operations are expected to require 
greater audit effort due to more heterogeneous information and business 
complexity and therefore a positive association between FOROPR and 
AUDITFEE is expected (Lee et al. 2005; Mitra et al. 2007). Quick ratio (QR) 
serves as a measure of leverage. QR is calculated as a ratio of current assets less 
inventory to current liabilities. Firms with high leverage are expected to be more 
risky and require more audit effort (Antle et al. 2006). Thus, quick ratio (QR) is 
expected to have a negative effect on AUDITFEE. Finally, profitability is 
measured by the loss variable (LOSS), which is an indicator variable taking the 
value of 1 if the net income of the fiscal year is negative and otherwise 0. In 
addition to profitability, LOSS is also a measure of audit risk because it reflects 
the possibility of the auditor being exposed to loss in the event that a client is not 
financially viable (Simunic 1980; Hay et al. 2006). Thus, LOSS is expected to be 
positively associated with AUDITFEE (Carcello et al. 2002; Goodwin-Stewart et 
al. 2006; Mitra et al. 2007; Vafeas et al. 2007).  
 
In addition to the supply variables, the analysis involves three demand variables 
related to board effectiveness, namely board size, board independence and board 
diligence. Board size (BSIZE) is measured as the number of directors serving on 
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the board. Board independence23 (BIND) is measured as the percentage of 
independent outsiders on the board. Board diligence (BMEET) is measured as the 
number of meetings held during fiscal year. These variables are expected to 
increase board effectiveness and therefore increase the demand for audit quality. 
Measures of board effectiveness are included in the analysis as control variables 
because it is expected that the audit committee does not absolve the whole board 
from its responsibilities concerning financial reporting. The board may have 
interests in the quality of external audits because audited accounting figures are 
used in various decision making-situations. These include management 
compensation, reviews of operating issues and investment decisions (Peasnell et 
al. 2005). In addition, board members may strive to protect their reputations and 
demand greater assurance of financial reporting quality from external auditors. 
Therefore the measures of board effectiveness, BSIZE, BIND and BMEET, are 
expected to have a positive effect on AUDITFEE. 
 
5.3 Description of the analytic techniques 
 
The relationships hypothesized in the model developed are tested statistically in 
two stages. Firstly, the Causal Steps Method is used to test for the occurrence of 
the mediated effect. The three regression models required to test the conditions of 
the Causal Steps Method will be estimated separately for the three measures of 
audit committee effectiveness (ACSIZE, ACEXP and ACMEET). Thus, this part 
of the analysis involves the estimation of a total of nine regression models. 
Secondly, the significance of the potential mediated effect(s) is tested using the 
Sobel Test. This part of the analysis is conditional upon the results of the Causal 
Steps Method. That is the Sobel Test statistic is calculated only for models which 
fulfill all conditions of the Causal Steps Method. The Sobel Test is used in order 
to provide further support regarding the significance of the potential mediated 
effect. 
 
The adaptation of the above methods will be explained in more detail in the 
following subsections. In addition to the main analysis, several additional 
analyses are carried out in order to provide further evidence of the accuracy of the 
model and consistency of the results. The methods used in these analyses will be 
explained together with the results. 
 
 
                                                 
23
 The data provided by Institutional Shareholder Services classifies each director on the board as 
an 1) insider, 2) affiliated, or 3) independent outsider. 
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5.3.1 Adaptation of the Causal Steps Method 
 
According to Holmbeck (1997) there are two main statistical approaches to 
testing the mediation effect, namely the regression approach and the SEM 
approach. Although the SEM approach has some advantages compared to the 
regression approach24, its use in the present study would have resulted in a highly 
complex structural model whose results could have been difficult to interpret. 
This is because the present study’s statistical analyses involve five variables of 
main interest as well as two sets of control variables. Because the regression 
approach provides a well-established procedure for the treatment of control 
variables it is regarded as more appropriate than the SEM approach for the 
purposes of this study. Moreover, the regression approach provides the same 
information regarding the individual relationships as the SEM approach. 
 
The analysis regarding the occurrence of the mediated effect is conducted 
separately for each independent variable serving as a measure for audit committee 
effectiveness. More specifically following models are examined:  
 
1) ACSIZEAUDITFEEACC,  
 
2) ACEXPAUDITFEEACC, and  
 
3) ACMEETAUDITFEEACC. 
 
The analysis of the above models involves examination of the four conditions of 
the Causal Steps Method discussed in Chapter 5.1.1. If the variables in a 
particular model are found to satisfy all four conditions of the Causal Steps 
Method, the mediation effect is supported. This analysis is also analogous with 
the study’s hypotheses and thus, in such a situation Hypotheses 1-4 are supported.  
 
In addition to the variables of interest, the regression models include control 
variables for the dependent variable ACC and the mediator AUDITFEE. The 
regression models related to conditions 1 and 3 include four control variables for 
ACC: Company size (TA), operating cycle (OPCYCLE), growth opportunities 
(SALESG) and profitability (LOSS). TA is expected to decrease earnings 
management and therefore have a negative effect on discretionary accruals, 
whereas OPCYCLE, SALESG and LOSS are expected to increase earnings 
                                                 
24
 For example the SEM approach allows a range of relationships to be included in a single 
analysis. In addition it provides indices which provide information as to how well the structural 
model fits the data (Kline 1998; Baines et al. 2003; Jokipii 2006). 
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management, thus resulting in a positive relation. In addition, the regression 
model related to condition 2 includes control variables for AUDITFEE. 
Following prior research audit fees are expected to be positively associated with 
the log of total assets (TA), total inventories and total receivables to total assets 
(INVREC), foreign sales to total sales (FOROPR), and whether the company has 
incurred a loss during the fiscal year (LOSS). Quick ratio (QR) is expected to 
have a negative effect on audit fees. In addition, BSIZE, BIND and BMEET are 
expected to be positively related to audit fees. The variables used in the analyses 
are summarized in Appendix 3. The regression models employed to test the 
conditions of the Causal Steps Method are presented in Tables 2-425 below. 
 
Table 2.  Regression models estimated to test model ACSIZEAUDITFEE 
 ACC. 
 
Condition Equation no 
Condition 1: 
 
ACC=β0+β1TA+β2OPCYCLE+β3SALEG+β4LOSS+ β5ACSIZE+ε  
 
 
(9) 
Condition 2: 
 
AUDITFEE=β0+β1TA+β2INVREC+β3FOROPR+β4QR+β5LOSS+β6BSIZE+β7BIND+ 
β8BMEET+β9ACSIZE+ε 
 
 
(10) 
Conditions 3 and 4: 
 
ACC= β0+β1TA+β2OPCYCLE+β3SALEG+β4LOSS+β5ACSIZE+ β6AUDITFEE +ε 
 
 
(11) 
The variables are defined as follows: 
ACC= Discretionary accruals (Residual from the regression model 6 scaled by 100) 
ACSIZE= Number of audit committee members 
AUDITFEE= Natural logarithm of audit fees 
TA= Natural logarithm of total assets 
OPCYCLE= Operating cycle (Calculated as presented in Equations 7-8) 
SALEG= Growth rate in net sales 
LOSS= Indicator variable, 1 if the net income of the fiscal year is negative, otherwise 0  
INVREC= Total inventories and total receivables to total assets 
FOROPR= Foreign sales to total sales 
QR= Quick ratio 
BSIZE= Number of board members 
BIND= Board independence % 
BMEET= Number of board meetings during fiscal year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25
 The variables of main interest are marked in bold in the equations. 
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Table 3.  Regression models estimated to test model ACEXPAUDITFEE 
 ACC. 
 
Condition Equation no 
Condition 1: 
 
ACC= β0+β1TA+β2OPCYCLE+β3SALEG+β4LOSS+ β5ACEXP+ε 
 
 
(12) 
Condition 2: 
 
AUDITFEE=β0+β1TA+β2INVREC+β3FOROPR+β4QR+β5LOSS+β6BSIZE+β7BIND+ 
β8BMEET+β9ACEXP+ε 
 
 
(13) 
Conditions 3 and 4: 
 
ACC= β0+β1TA+β2OPCYCLE+β3SALEG+β4LOSS+β5ACEXP+ β6AUDITFEE+ε 
 
 
(14) 
The variables are defined as follows: 
ACC= Discretionary accruals (Residual from the regression model 6 scaled by 100) 
ACEXP= Ratio of financial experts on the audit committee 
AUDITFEE= Natural logarithm of audit fees 
TA= Natural logarithm of total assets 
OPCYCLE= Operating cycle (Calculated as presented in Equations 7-8) 
SALEG= Growth rate in net sales 
LOSS= Indicator variable, 1 if the net income of the fiscal year is negative, otherwise 0  
INVREC= Total inventories and total receivables to total assets 
FOROPR= Foreign sales to total sales 
QR= Quick ratio 
BSIZE= Number of board members 
BIND= Board independence % 
BMEET= Number of board meetings during fiscal year 
 
 
 
Table 4.  Regression models estimated to test model ACMEETAUDITFEE 
 ACC. 
 
Condition Equation no 
Condition 1: 
 
ACC= β0+β1TA+β2OPCYCLE+β3SALEG+β4LOSS+β5ACMEET+ε 
 
 
(15) 
Condition 2: 
 
AUDITFEE=β0+β1TA+β2INVREC+β3FOROPR+β4QR+β5LOSS+β6BSIZE+β7BIND+ 
β8BMEET+β9ACMEET+ε 
 
 
(16) 
Conditions 3 and 4: 
 
ACC= β0+β1TA+β2OPCYCLE+β3SALEG+β4LOSS+β5ACMEET+ β6AUDITFEE +ε 
 
 
(17) 
The variables are defined as follows: 
ACC= Discretionary accruals (Residual from the regression model 6 scaled by 100) 
ACMEET= Number of audit committee meetings during fiscal year 
AUDITFEE= Natural logarithm of audit fees 
TA= Natural logarithm of total assets 
OPCYCLE= Operating cycle (Calculated as presented in Equations 7-8) 
SALEG= Growth rate in net sales 
LOSS= Indicator variable, 1 if the net income of the fiscal year is negative, otherwise 0  
INVREC= Total inventories and total receivables to total assets 
FOROPR= Foreign sales to total sales 
QR= Quick ratio 
BSIZE= Number of board members 
BIND= Board independence % 
BMEET= Number of board meetings during fiscal year 
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5.3.2 Adaptation of the Sobel Test 
 
The Sobel Test is employed to complement and further verify the results of the 
Causal Steps Method. The Sobel Test statistics are calculated in order to rule out 
false-negative and false-positive conclusions, which are possible if only the 
Causal Steps Method is used to test the occurrence of the mediated effect (see 
Holmbeck et al. 2002). This part of the analysis is conditional upon the results of 
the Causal Steps Method. That is, the Sobel Test statistics are calculated only for 
those models (i.e. ACSIZEAUDITFEEACC, ACEXPAUDITFEEACC, 
or ACMEETAUDITFEEACC) which fulfil the four conditions of the Causal 
Steps Method. In other words, if the Causal Steps Method indicates that the 
mediated effect occurs, the significance of the mediated effect is examined further 
with the Sobel Test. Regression models 9-17 provide the necessary information to 
calculate the Sobel Test statistics. The following equations present the calculation 
of the Sobel Test statistics for the potential mediation models:
 
 
 
Calculation of Sobel Test statistics for model ACSIZEAUDITFEEACC26 
 
 
AUDITFEEACSIZE
AUDITFEEACSIZE se
z AUDITFEEACSIZE
69
69
69
ββ
ββ
ββ ⋅
=  (18) 
 
( ) ( )2926262969 ACSIZEAUDITFEEAUDITFEEACSIZE sesese AUDITFEEACSIZE ββββββ ⋅+⋅=  (19) 
 
 
The variables are defined as follows: 
 
β6AUDITFEE= Unstandardized regression coefficient for the association between 
AUDITFEE and ACC. 
 
β9ACSIZE= Unstandardized regression coefficients for the association between 
ACSIZE and AUDITFEE. 
 
seβ6AUDITFEE = Standard error of the mediator β6AUDITFEE. 
 
seβ9ACSIZE= Standard error of the independent variable β9ACSIZE. 
 
 
                                                 
26
 Refer to regression models 9-11 for the notations. 
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Calculation of Sobel Test statistics for model ACEXPAUDITFEEACC27 
 
 
AUDITFEEACEXP
AUDITFEEACEXP se
z AUDITFEEACEXP
69
69
69
ββ
ββ
ββ ⋅
=  (20) 
 
( ) ( )2926262969 ACEXPAUDITFEEAUDITFEEACEXP sesese AUDITFEEACEXP ββββββ ⋅+⋅=  (21) 
 
 
The variables are defined as follows: 
 
β6AUDITFEE= Unstandardized regression coefficient for the association between 
AUDITFEE and ACC. 
 
β9ACEXP= Unstandardized regression coefficients for the association between 
ACEXP and AUDITFEE. 
 
seβ6AUDITFEE = Standard error of the mediator β6AUDITFEE. 
 
seβ9ACEXP= Standard error of the independent variable β9ACEXP. 
 
Calculation of Sobel Test statistics for model ACMEETAUDITFEE 
ACC28 
 
 
AUDITFEEACMEET
AUDITFEEACMEET se
z AUDITFEEACMEET
69
69
69
ββ
ββ
ββ ⋅
=  (22) 
 
( ) ( )2926262969 ACMEETAUDITFEEAUDITFEEACMEET sesese AUDITFEEACMEET ββββββ ⋅+⋅=
 
(23) 
 
 
The variables are defined as follows: 
 
β6AUDITFEE= Unstandardized regression coefficient for the association between 
AUDITFEE and ACC. 
 
                                                 
27
 Refer to regression models 12-14 for the notations. 
28
 Refer to regression models 15-17 for the notations. 
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β9ACMEET= Unstandardized regression coefficients for the association between 
ACMEET and AUDITFEE. 
 
seβ6AUDITFEE = Standard error of the mediator β6AUDITFEE. 
 
seβ9ACMEET= Standard error of the independent variable β9ACMEET. 
 
5.4 Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
 
The data for this study are obtained from three sources. Firstly, data concerning 
audit fees are obtained from the Audit Analytics Database. Secondly, data related 
to audit committees are obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). 
Finally, financial data is obtained from the Thomson Financial Database. 
Appendix 4 provides the selection criteria for the sample. The initial sample 
consists of S&P 1500 firms which had fiscal years ending any time during the 
calendar year 2006. Following prior research financial institutions, (SIC codes 
6000-6999) are excluded from the sample due to their special regulatory 
environment. Firms in industries with insufficient data to estimate discretionary 
accruals (i.e. industries with less than 20 observations) are also excluded. These 
sample selection criteria yield a final sample of 1000 firms. All remaining 
missing observations in the data are replaced by variable mean in the analyses. 
 
Table 1 of Appendix 5 presents descriptive statistics for variables employed in the 
main analysis. Statistics show that ACSIZE varies from a minimum of 2 members 
to maximum of 8 members. ACEXP varies from minimum of 0 to a maximum of 
1. ACMEET has a wide range in the data distribution with a minimum of 0 
meetings and maximum of 31 meetings. The descriptive statistics regarding 
measures of audit committee effectiveness indicate that not all sample companies 
comply with the SOX’s (2002) or the stock exchanges’ rules related to audit 
committee composition and activities29. Firstly, NYSE (2003), AMEX (2003) or 
NASDAQ (2003) require that audit committees should have at least three 
members. Some sample companies have smaller audit committees than required: 
the smallest audit committee in the sample has 2 members. However, the mean 
audit committee size (3.74) complies with the requirements. Secondly, the SOX 
(2002) and all stock exchanges require that audit committees should have at least 
one member who can be considered to have expertise in accounting and related 
matters. However, some companies in the sample have not specified whether they 
                                                 
29
 An alternative explanation for these outliers is that some companies have not reported matters 
regarding audit committee composition and activities sufficiently in their SEC filings. 
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have an expert in the audit committee with an expertise ratio of 0. However, the 
mean (0.49) expertise ratio indicates that many companies have set up audit 
committees which exceed the minimum requirements. Thirdly, for example 
NYSE (2003) and AMEX (2003) require that audit committees should meet on a 
quarterly basis. Some companies in the sample do not meet this requirement, 
having no audit committee meetings. Again the mean audit committee meeting 
frequency (9.02) exceeds the minimum requirements. In addition, the AUDITFEE 
variable has a wide range in the data. The variable ranges from 12.00 to 18.27 
which in monetary terms means that audit fees range from a minimum of 
$162,750 to maximum of $85,800,000. The dependent variable ACC ranges from 
-49.04 to 48.68.  
 
Descriptive statistics regarding the initial variables imply that the data may 
contain outliers which could have an effect on the results of the analyses. The 
potential effect of outliers is addressed by winsorizing the data at 2.5 % level 
from both tails. Table 2 of Appendix 5 presents descriptive statistics for 
winsorized variables. After winsorizing the data ACSIZE ranges from a minimum 
of 3 to a maximum of 6. ACEXP ranges from 0.17 to 1.00. ACMEET ranges 
from a minimum of 4 to a maximum of 17. AUDITFEE ranges from 12.93 to 
16.74 which, in monetary terms, equals approximately $376,000 to $18,600,000. 
ACC varies from -21.31 to 26.39. After winsorization of the data all audit 
committees effectiveness measures in the sample fulfil SOX (2002) and stock 
exchanges requirements regarding audit committee composition and activities. In 
addition, the range of AUDITFEE and ACC in the data set is reduced 
considerably after winsorization. To ensure that the initial results are not driven 
by outliers in the data the main analysis is repeated using winsorized data. The 
results of this analysis are reported in the additional analysis section of the study.  
 
Appendix 6 presents a correlation matrix for the variables used in the empirical 
tests. The correlations show that ACMEET and AUDITFEE are negatively and 
significantly correlated with ACC. ACSIZE is also negatively correlated with 
ACC but this correlation is not statistically significant. In addition, all measures 
of audit committee effectiveness, ACSIZE, ACMEET and ACEXP, are positively 
and significantly correlated with AUDITFEE. These correlations provide some 
initial support for the hypothesized relationships between measures of audit 
committee effectiveness, audit quality and financial reporting quality. The 
correlations also reveal that all variables of main interest (ACSIZE, ACEXP, 
ACMEET, AUDITFEE and ACC) are significantly related to company size (TA) 
ACSIZE, ACEXP, ACMEET, AUDITFEE having a positive relation and ACC 
having a negative relation. This indicates that larger companies have more 
effective audit committees as well as higher quality external auditors. Larger 
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companies also seem to have better financial reporting quality. These correlations 
highlight the fact that company size is an important control variable which has an 
effect on the company’s control environment. In addition to the hypothesized 
relationships the review of the correlations shows significant relations between 
measures of audit committee effectiveness. More specifically ACEXP is strongly 
correlated with both ACSIZE and ACMEET, which indicates that 
multicollinearity may have an impact on the results if the three measures of audit 
committee effectiveness are introduced simultaneously into a regression model. 
This indicates that the separate analysis of the audit committee effectiveness 
measures is warranted.  
 
In addition to the correlation matrix, the main relationships of interest are 
presented as scatterplots in Appendix 7. The scatterplots are consistent with 
findings reported in the correlation matrix. The graphs related to relationships 
between measures of audit committee effectiveness (ACSIZE, ACEXP and 
ACMEET) and financial reporting quality (ACC) show that ACSIZE and ACEXP 
do not have a strong linear relationship with ACC. On the other hand, the graphs 
show a negative relation between ACMEET and ACC. The weak relationship 
between ACSIZE (ACEXP respectively) and ACC may be due to the fact that 
sample companies have fairly homogeneous audit committees in terms of their 
composition. This is likely to be a consequence of the strict US regulatory 
environment related to corporate governance within the company. Due to the 
regulatory environment of the study, audit committee meetings might be the only 
measure of audit committee effectiveness with sufficient variance in the data. In 
addition according to the graphs AUDITFEE has a negative association with 
ACC as hypothesized. Finally, the graphs related to relationships between 
ACSIZE (ACEXP and ACMEET respectively) and AUDITFEE show a positive 
association between variables. That is, the demand for audit coverage and audit 
quality seems to increase as audit committees become more effective.  
  
Appendix 8 presents sample companies grouped by industry. Business services 
(SIC 73) is the leading industry with 140 companies in the sample. Electronic and 
other electrical equipment and components, except computer equipment (SIC 36) 
is the second largest industry represented in the sample with 114 companies. 
Printing, publishing and allied industries (SIC 27) and Wholesale trade non-
durable goods (SIC 51) industries are least represented in the sample with 21 
companies. 
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6 RESULTS 
 
This section will introduce the results regarding the model developed using the 
methodology introduced in the previous section. This section is organized as 
follows. Firstly, the main results related to models ACSIZEAUDITFEE 
ACC, ACEXPAUDITFEEACC and ACMEETAUDITFEEACC are 
presented. Analysis of a single model involves estimation of three regression 
models required by the Causal Steps Method to examine the occurrence of the 
mediated effect.30 The results of the regression models are summarized in Figures 
12-14 and presented in more detail in Appendices 8-10. In addition, the results 
reported in the Appendices provide the Sobel Test statistics for models which 
fulfill the conditions of the Causal Steps Method. Secondly, the implications of 
the main results are discussed. Finally, additional analyses are conducted in order 
to test the robustness of the main results. 
 
6.1 Results related to model ACSIZEAUDITFEE 
 ACC 
 
Model ACSIZE-AUDITFEE-ACC is based on the underlying notion that audit 
committee effectiveness increases as the size of the audit committee increases. In 
addition, audit quality is expected to increase as audit fees increase. Thus the 
hypothesized relationships for the model are as follows: 1) ACSIZE has a 
negative effect on ACC, 2) ACSIZE has a positive effect on AUDITFEE, 3) 
AUDITFEE has a negative effect on ACC and 4) AUDITFEE mediates the 
relationship between ACSIZE and ACC. The regression models estimated to test 
the above relationships are presented in Table 2. 
 
Figure 12 summarizes and Appendix 9 provides detailed results for the model 
ACSIZEAUDITFEEACC. With regard to the first condition ACSIZE is 
regressed on ACC along with control variables. Contrary to the hypothesis, 
ACSIZE has a significant positive effect on ACC. In this regression control 
variables TA, OPCYCLE, SALESG and LOSS are all statistically significant and 
TA and OPCYCLE have expected signs. To test for the second condition 
ACSIZE is regressed on AUDITFEE with a set of control variables. The results 
show that the effect of ACSIZE on AUDITFEE is not statistically significant. All 
                                                 
30
 As mentioned previously, the conditions of the Causal Steps Method are analogous with the 
hypotheses of the study. Thus, in the subsequent sections the term condition refers to both these 
hypotheses and the conditions of the Causal Steps Method. 
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control variables TA, INVREC, FOROPR, QR, LOSS, BSIZE, BIND and 
BMEET are statistically significant with expected signs. To test for the third and 
fourth conditions ACSIZE, AUDITFEE and a set of control variables are 
regressed on ACC. The results reveal that AUDITFEE has a significant negative 
effect on ACC as hypothesized. ACSIZE has a significant positive effect on ACC 
which is inconsistent with the hypothesis. 
 
                                                                 (-) 1,039***                                                  
                                                               
                                            
 
 
                    (+)  -,031
                                                                     
(-)-1,329** 
 
                                                               (-) 1,040*** 
 
AUDITFEE 
ACSIZE 
ACC ACSIZE 
ACC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12.  Summarized results for model ACSIZEAUDITFEEACC. 
 
 
To conclude the model ACSIZEAUDITFEEACC does not fulfill conditions 
of the Causal Steps Method. This is because audit committee size does not have 
the hypothesized effect on either discretionary accruals or audit fees. On the 
contrary, the results show a positive association between audit committee size and 
discretionary accruals. This indicates that audit committees become less effective 
in ensuring financial reporting quality as their size increases. This result may be 
due to multicollinearity among the explanatory variables in the regression model. 
This is evidenced when audit committee size is regressed on discretionary 
accruals excluding control variables. In this case the effect is negative as 
hypothesized but statistically insignificant. Alternatively audit committee size 
may have a nonlinear effect on audit committee effectiveness. That is, audit 
committee effectiveness increases along with its size to a certain extent but starts 
Notes: 
***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively 
Expected signs of the relationships are presented in 
parentheses 
Reported numbers are coefficients 
The variables are defined as follows: 
ACSIZE= Number of audit committee members 
AUDITFEE= Natural logarithm of audit fees 
ACC= Discretionary accruals (Residual from the regression 
model 6 scaled by 100) 
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to decrease if the audit committee becomes too large. In addition audit committee 
size is found to have a positive but not statistically significant effect on audit fees. 
With regard to the third condition, audit fees are found to have a negative effect 
on discretionary accruals. To conclude, since only the third condition of the 
Causal Steps Method was verified by model ACSIZEAUDITFEEACC the 
mediated effect from audit committee size to discretionary accruals through audit 
fees is not supported. 
 
6.2 Results related to model ACEXPAUDITFEE 
 ACC 
 
The underlying notion for model ACEXPAUDITFEEACC is that audit 
committee effectiveness increases as the proportion of expert members in the 
audit committee increases. Audit quality is also expected to increase as audit fees 
increase. Therefore the following relationships are proposed: 1) ACEXP has a 
negative effect on ACC, 2) ACEXP has a positive effect on AUDITFEE, 3) 
AUDITFEE has a negative effect on ACC and 4) AUDITFEE mediates the 
relationship between ACEXP and ACC. Table 3 presents the regression models 
estimated to test the above relationships. 
 
The results for model ACEXPAUDITFEEACC are summarized in Figure 13 
and presented comprehensively in Appendix 10. To test for the first condition 
ACEXP as well as a set of control variables are regressed on ACC. It is found that 
ACEXP has a positive effect on ACC. However, this effect is not statistically 
significant. Thus, the first condition is not supported. Control variables TA, 
OPCYCLE, SALESG and LOSS are significant and TA and OPCYCLE have 
expected signs. In order to test for the second condition ACEXP is regressed on 
AUDITFEE along with a set of control variables. In this regression specification 
ACEXP is found to have a positive but insignificant effect on AUDITFEE. Thus, 
the results fail to support the second condition. The control variables in this 
regression are all significant and they have predicted signs. Finally, to test the 
third and fourth conditions AUDITFEE and ACEXP are regressed on ACC with a 
set of control variables. The results show that AUDITFEE has a negative effect 
on ACC as expected. Thus condition three is fulfilled. In this regression 
specification ACEXP has a negative and insignificant effect on ACC. Control 
variables TA, OPCYCLE, SALESG and LOSS are all significant and TA as well 
as OPCYCLE have expected signs. However, the fourth condition cannot be 
assessed because ACEXP did not initially have a statistically significant effect on 
ACC. 
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Figure 13.  Summarized results for model ACEXPAUDITFEEACC. 
 
 
In summary, model ACEXPAUDITFEEACC does not fulfill all the 
conditions of the Causal Steps Method. This is because the audit committee 
expertise ratio does not have a statistically significant effect on either 
discretionary accruals or audit fees, albeit the directions of these effects are as 
hypothesized. Thus, conditions 1 and 2 are not fulfilled. With regard to the third 
condition audit fees are found to have a negative effect on discretionary accruals 
and therefore condition 3 is fulfilled. To conclude, since the model 
AXECPAUDITFEEACC fulfills only condition 3, the mediated effect of 
audit committee expertise ratio through audit fees on discretionary accruals is not 
supported by the results.  
 
6.3 Results related to model ACMEET 
 AUDITFEEACC 
 
Model ACMEETAUDITFEEACC is based on the assumption that audit 
committee effectiveness increases along with audit committee meeting frequency. 
Moreover, audit quality is expected to increase along with audit fees. Thus, the 
Notes: 
***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively 
Expected signs of the relationships are presented in 
parentheses 
Reported numbers are coefficients 
The variables are defined as follows: 
ACEXP= Ratio of financial experts on the audit committee 
AUDITFEE= Natural logarithm of audit fees 
ACC= Discretionary accruals (Residual from the regression 
model 6 scaled by 100) 
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following relationships are proposed: 1) ACMEET has a negative effect on ACC, 
2) ACMEET has a positive effect on AUDITFEE, 3) AUDITFEE has a negative 
effect on ACC and 4) AUDITFEE mediates the relationship between ACMEET 
and ACC. The regression models estimated to test the above relationships are 
shown in Table 4. 
 
Figure 14 summarizes and Appendix 11 presents the detailed results related to 
model ACMEETAUDITFEEACC. In order to test the first condition 
ACMEET is regressed on ACC with a set of control variables. It is found that 
ACMEET has a significant negative effect on ACC, thus the first condition is 
fulfilled. In this regression all control variables are statistically significant and TA 
and OPCYCLE have the expected signs. To test for the second condition 
ACMEET and a set of control variables are regressed on AUDITFEE. The results 
show that ACMEET has a significant positive effect on AUDITFEE. Therefore 
the second condition is fulfilled. In this regression all control variables are 
statistically significant and they have expected signs. In order to test the third and 
fourth conditions both ACMEET and AUDITFEE as well as control variables are 
regressed on ACC. It is found that AUDITFEE has a significant negative effect 
on ACC and thus the third condition is fulfilled. The fourth condition is addressed 
by assessing whether AUDITFEE decreases the effect of ACMEET on ACC. It is 
found that the effect of ACMEET on ACC is smaller in the third regression than 
the first one (-.246**<-.279***). Thus, condition 4 is also met. The control 
variables are found to be statistically significant and TA as well as OPCYCLE 
have the expected signs. In addition to the results of Causal Steps Method the 
Sobel Test statistics (-1.784*) indicates that the mediated effect is statistically 
significant at the 10% level. 
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Figure 14.  Summarized results for model ACMEETAUDITFEEACC. 
 
 
As a summary, the results indicate that model ACMEETAUDITFEEACC 
fulfils all four conditions of the Causal Steps Method. That is, audit committee 
meeting frequency is found to have a negative effect on discretionary accruals and 
a positive effect on audit fees. In addition, audit fees are found to have a negative 
effect on discretionary accruals. Finally, the results show that audit fees decrease 
the effect of audit committee meeting frequency on discretionary accruals. Thus, 
the results appear to support the hypothesis that audit fees mediate the 
relationship between audit committee meeting frequency and discretionary 
accruals. The mediated effect is only partial since audit fees do not reduce the 
effect of audit committee meeting frequency on discretionary accruals to non-
significance. This result may indicate that the effect of audit committee meeting 
frequency on discretionary accruals may also be mediated by other control 
mechanisms, such as internal auditing, which are currently out of the scope of the 
model.  
 
 
 
Notes: 
***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively 
Expected signs of the relationships are presented in 
parentheses 
Reported numbers are coefficients 
The variables are defined as follows: 
ACMEET= Number of audit committee meetings during 
fiscal year 
AUDITFEE= Natural logarithm of audit fees 
ACC=Discretionary accruals (Residual from the regression 
model 6 scaled by 100) 
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6.4 Discussion of the main results 
 
The main analysis involves examination of three separate models, namely 
ACSIZEAUDITFEEACC, ACEXPAUDITFEEACC and ACMEET 
AUDITFEEACC. The underlying notion in these models is that more effective 
audit committees will increase financial reporting quality and also demand better 
audit quality. In addition, audit quality is expected to contribute to financial 
reporting quality. When these effects are combined, audit quality is modeled as a 
mediator in the relationship between audit committee effectiveness and financial 
reporting quality. The main analytic technique employed to test the models is the 
Causal Steps Method, which is accompanied by the Sobel Test when applicable. 
Table 5 provides a summary of the main results. 
 
The results regarding models ACSIZEAUDITFEEACC, and 
ACEXPAUDITFEEACC do not meet the conditions of the Causal Steps 
Method and therefore the mediation hypothesis is not supported. This is because 
neither audit committee size nor audit committee expertise ratio has the 
hypothesized effect on discretionary accruals or audit fees. These results imply 
that the audit committee composition depicted by audit committee size or 
expertise ratio may not be sufficient indicators as to how effective audit 
committees will be in discharging their responsibilities. This may be due to the 
fact that audit committee composition is strictly regulated in the USA and there is 
not enough variation in these variables. Due to these results further discussion 
will be focused on model ACMEETAUDITFEEACC. 
 
The results for the model ACMEETAUDITFEEACC indicate that audit fees 
mediate the relationship between audit committee meeting frequency and 
discretionary accruals as hypothesized. Both the findings of the Causal Steps 
Method and Sobel Test support this result. In relation to the Causal Steps Method 
the following significant relationships are found: 1) a negative relationship 
between audit committee meeting frequency and discretionary accruals, 2) a 
positive relationship between audit committee meeting frequency and audit fees, 
and 3) a negative relationship between audit fees and discretionary accruals. In 
addition, the results show that audit fees reduce the effect of audit committee 
meeting frequency on discretionary accruals, which is consistent with the 
mediation hypothesis. However, since the effect of audit committee meeting 
frequency on discretionary accruals is not reduced to non-significance, only 
partial mediation is supported. Furthermore, the Sobel Test statistic (-1.784*) 
indicates that the mediated effect of audit committee meetings on discretionary 
accruals through audit fees is statistically significant at the 10% level. Thus these 
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results in total are indicative of a partial mediated effect. 
 
The results regarding model ACMEETAUDITFEEACC have several 
implications. In general the results for the model are consistent with the 
predictions of agency theory. This is because both audit committee meeting 
frequency and audit fees are found to have a negative effect on discretionary 
accruals, which suggests that both audit committee effectiveness and external 
audit quality contribute to a company’s financial reporting quality. The results are 
also consistent with the notion that audit committees and external auditors 
complement each other. That is, audit committee meetings are found to increase 
audit fees, which are further found to decrease discretionary accruals. In addition, 
the individual relationships constituting the model have the following 
implications.   
 
Firstly, the negative relationship between audit committee meeting frequency and 
discretionary accruals suggests that more active audit committees are better able 
to restrict management discretion over accounting issues. This may be because 
more active audit committees are better informed about the state of affairs in the 
company and thus are better able to monitor its accounting practices. For 
example, regular meetings between audit committees and external auditors or 
audit committees and internal auditors may enhance information flow between 
these parties and therefore result in better decision making by audit committees. 
Active audit committees may also be staffed by individuals who are motivated to 
devote their time to the functioning of the audit committee and such individuals 
may exercise closer monitoring over management thereby restricting earnings 
management more effectively. 
 
Secondly, the positive relationship between audit committee meeting frequency 
and audit fees has several plausible explanations. The positive relationship 
between audit committee meetings and audit fees may exist because preparation 
and attendance at meetings requires additional work by auditors, causing higher 
audit fees (see Stewart et al. 2007). On the other hand more active audit 
committees may be more concerned about audit quality and therefore demand 
greater quantity of audit effort, which is again reflected in an increase in audit 
fees. Since these explanations are not mutually exclusive both of them might 
apply to the present findings.  
 
Thirdly, a negative effect between audit fees and discretionary accruals is found. 
This result implies that greater audit effort reflected in higher audit fees leads to 
closer monitoring of a company’s accounting issues, and thus decreases 
management discretion over accounting choices. These results may also be 
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related to auditor independence discussion. These results imply that higher audit 
fees do not compromise auditor independence, which would result in less rigorous 
monitoring by auditors. On the contrary, the results suggest that higher audit fees 
may indicate that sufficient audit effort and audit hours have been allocated to the 
client. The results moreover suggest that protection of reputation may lead to 
auditor reporting conservatism: auditors who are paid more allow their clients less 
discretion over discretionary accruals than auditors who are paid less. 
 
Finally, audit fees are found to function as a mediator in the relationship between 
audit committee meeting frequency and discretionary accruals. The mediation 
model consists of the relationships discussed above. The mediation model 
maintains that although audit committee meetings contribute to financial 
reporting in their own right, part of this effect goes through external auditing. The 
model is consistent with prior literature stating that audit committees are 
responsible for both ensuring a company’s financial reporting quality and 
ensuring external audit quality. Thus, some of the monitoring activities are bound 
to be transmitted from audit committees to external auditors. Since the results do 
not imply full mediation, it is likely that other monitoring mechanisms of the 
company, such as internal auditing and internal controls, may also function as 
mediators between audit committee effectiveness and financial reporting quality. 
These control mechanisms, however, are beyond the scope of the present study. 
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Table 5.  Summary of the main results. 
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6.5 Robustness of the main results 
 
This section aims at testing the robustness of the results provided by the main 
analysis. Since the main results only supported model ACMEETAUDITFEE 
ACC the additional analyses are mainly focused on this model. The additional 
analyses are organized as follows. Firstly, the main analysis regarding model 
ACMEETAUDITFEEACC is repeated using winsorized data. Secondly, the 
robustness of the main results is tested by employing two additional model 
specifications. Thirdly, an additional model specification in which the mediating 
variable AUDITFEE is replaced by industry adjusted audit fees (INDFEE) is 
tested. Thus the following model ACMEETINDFEEACC is examined. 
Fourthly, a model specification including a composite measure for audit 
committee effectiveness is tested using path analysis employing AMOS statistical 
package. Fifthly, the effect of unexpected fees on discretionary accruals is tested. 
Finally, a competing effect type, moderation effect, is examined.  
 
6.5.1 Results for model ACMEETAUDITFEEACC using winsorized data 
 
This part of the analysis examines whether the main results related to model 
ACMEETAUDITFEEACC are affected by outliers in the initial data. This is 
achieved by repeating the analysis related to the Causal Steps Method using 
winsorized data31. The descriptive statistics for the winsorized variables were 
presented in Section 5.4. The regression models employed are consistent with 
models 15-17. In addition, Sobel Test statistics are calculated as presented in 
Equations 22-23. 
 
The results for the winsorized data are summarized in Figure 15 and presented in 
full in Appendix 12. The findings of the analysis are consistent with the results 
reported in the main analysis. Thus the results reveal that ACMEET has a 
significant negative effect on ACC and thus the first condition is fulfilled. The 
results also show that ACMEET has a significant positive effect on AUDITFEE 
thereby fulfilling the second condition. AUDITFEE is also found to have a 
significant negative effect on ACC, which meets the requirements of the third 
condition. In addition, it is found that AUDITFEE reduces the effect of ACMEET 
on ACC. This result fulfils the fourth condition. These results therefore imply that 
AUDITFEE mediates the relationship between ACMEET and ACC. This result is 
further supported by the Sobel Test statistic (-2.01**) which shows that the 
mediated effect is significant at the 5% level. Based on these findings it can be 
                                                 
31
 Data is winsorized by 2.5% from both tails. 
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concluded that the results of the main analysis are not driven by outliers in the 
initial data.  
 
                                                                 (-) -,282***                                                 
                                                               
                                            
 
 
                (+)  ,027***
                                                                
(-) -1,135** 
 
                                                               (-) -,244** 
 
AUDITFEE 
ACMEET 
ACC ACMEET 
ACC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15.  Summarized results for model ACMEETAUDITFEEACC using 
winsorized data. 
 
6.5.2 Results for additional model specifications 
 
The objective of this part of the analysis is to test the robustness of the main 
results by employing two additional model specifications. In the first model 
specification the conditions of the Causal Steps Method are tested simultaneously 
for all three measures of audit committee effectiveness including control 
variables. This regression specification reveals whether the main results can be 
achieved by including all measures of audit committee effectiveness 
simultaneously into the analysis or whether multicollinearity between the 
measures has an impact on the results. The regression models required for the 
analysis are presented in Table 6. 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively 
Expected signs of the relationships are presented in 
parentheses 
Reported numbers are coefficients 
The variables are defined as follows: 
ACMEET= Number of audit committee meetings during 
fiscal year 
AUDITFEE= Natural logarithm of audit fees 
ACC= Discretionary accruals (Residual from the regression 
model 6 scaled by 100) 
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Table 6.  Regression models estimated to test measures of audit committee 
effectiveness simultaneously. 
 
Condition Equation no 
Condition 1: 
 
ACC= β0+β1TA+β2OPCYCLE+β3SALEG+β4LOSS+β5ACSIZE+β6ACEXP + 
β7ACMEET+ε 
 
 
(24) 
Condition 2: 
 
AUDITFEE=β0+β1TA+β2INVREC+β3FOROPR+β4QR+β5LOSS+β6BSIZE+β7BIND+ 
β8BMEET+β9ACSIZE+ β10ACEXP + β11ACMEET +ε 
 
 
(25) 
Conditions 3 and 4: 
 
ACC= β0+β1TA+β2OPCYCLE+β3SALEG+β4LOSS+β5ACSIZE+ β6ACEXP + β7ACMEET+ 
β8AUDITFEE +ε 
 
 
(26) 
The variables are defined as follows: 
ACC= Discretionary accruals (Residual from the regression model 6 scaled by 100) 
ACSIZE= Number of audit committee members 
ACEXP= Ratio of financial experts on the audit committee 
ACMEET= Number of audit committee meetings during fiscal year 
AUDITFEE= Natural logarithm of audit fees 
TA= Natural logarithm of total assets 
OPCYCLE= Operating cycle (Calculated as presented in Equations 7-8) 
SALEG= Growth rate in net sales 
LOSS= Indicator variable, 1 if the net income of the fiscal year is negative, otherwise 0  
INVREC= Total inventories and total receivables to total assets 
FOROPR= Foreign sales to total sales 
QR= Quick ratio 
BSIZE= Number of board members 
BIND= Board independence % 
BMEET= Number of board meetings during fiscal year 
 
 
 
The findings of the analysis are presented in Appendix 13. The results of these 
regression model specifications are consistent with the results obtained from the 
main analysis. It is found that the first condition is fulfilled by ACMEET, which 
has a significant negative effect on ACC. Consistent with the results of the main 
analysis, ACSIZE and ACEXP do not have the hypothesized effect on ACC and 
therefore the first condition is not met by these variables. In this regression all 
control variables are significant and TA as well as OPCYCLE have expected 
signs. The results also reveal that the second condition is met by ACMEET but 
not by ACSIZE and ACEXP. That is ACMEET has a positive effect on 
AUDITFEE whereas ACSIZE and ACEXP are not statistically significantly 
related to AUDITFEE. In this regression all control variables except BMEET are 
significant and the direction of their effect is as hypothesized. The results further 
show that the third condition is fulfilled since AUDITFEE has a significant 
negative effect on ACC. Due to the above results the fourth condition can be 
addressed only with regard to ACMEET. It is found that adding AUDITFEE to 
the model decreases the coefficient of ACMEET slightly, thus supporting the 
mediation hypothesis. The Sobel Test statistic (-1.818*) provides further evidence 
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that the mediated effect from ACMEET to ACC through AUDITFEE is also 
statistically significant in these regression specifications. Based on the results it 
can be concluded that multicollinearity between measures of audit committee 
effectiveness does not have an effect on the results. 
 
In the second model specification the conditions of the Causal Steps Method are 
tested simultaneously for all three measures of audit committee effectiveness 
excluding control variables. This regression specification is tested in order 
examine whether the results are affected by multicollinearity between measures of 
audit committee effectiveness and control variables. The estimated regression 
models are presented in Table 7. 
 
Table 7.  Regression models estimated to test measures of audit committee 
effectiveness excluding control variables. 
 
Condition Equation no 
Condition 1: 
 
ACC=β0 +β1ACSIZE+β2ACEXP+β3ACMEET+ε 
 
 
(27) 
Condition 2: 
 
AUDITFEE=β0+β1ACSIZE+β2ACEXP+β3ACMEET+ε 
 
 
(28) 
Conditions 3 and 4: 
 
ACC=β0+β1ACSIZE+β2ACEXP+β3ACMEET+β4AUDITFEE+ε 
 
 
(29) 
The variables are defined as follows: 
ACC= Discretionary accruals (Residual from the regression model 6 scaled by 100) 
ACSIZE= Number of audit committee members 
ACEXP= Ratio of financial experts on the audit committee 
ACMEET= Number of audit committee meetings during fiscal year 
AUDITFEE= Natural logarithm of audit fees 
 
 
 
The findings of the above models are presented in Appendix 14. The results of 
these model specifications are largely consistent with the results provided by the 
previous analyses. Testing of the first condition reveals that ACMEET has a 
statistically significant negative effect on ACC. ACSIZE and ACEXP are also 
negatively related to ACC, albeit these relations are not statistically significant. 
Thus, only ACMEET fulfils the first condition. Testing for the second condition 
shows that all ACSIZE, ACEXP and ACMEET variables have a statistically 
significant and positive effect on AUDITFEE. Therefore all measures of audit 
committee effectiveness fulfil the second condition in this model specification. 
The third condition is also met since AUDITFEE is found to have a significant 
negative effect on ACC. Due to the results for conditions 1-3 only ACMEET can 
be taken into consideration when the fourth condition is addressed. The results 
reveal that including AUDITFEE in the model reduces the effect of ACMEET on 
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ACC. Thus, the mediated effect of ACMEET on ACC through AUDITFEE is 
supported. The Sobel Test statistic (-4.694***) also indicates that AUDITFEE 
significantly mediates the relationship between ACMEET and ACC. These results 
imply that multicollinearity between measures of audit committee effectiveness, 
particularly ACSIZE and ACEXP, and control variables may have had some 
influence on the main results. This is because the second condition is met by these 
variables when control variables are excluded from the regression models. 
 
6.5.3 Results for industry adjusted audit fees 
 
This part of the analyses involves an alternative mediating variable, namely 
industry adjusted audit fees (INDFEE). Thus the model ACMEETINDFEE 
ACC is examined. The mediating variable INDFEE is calculated as a ratio of a 
company’s audit fees relative to the mean audit fees of the industry. Mean audit 
fees for the industry are calculated based on two digit SIC codes. This analysis is 
conducted in order to test whether companies with more frequent audit committee 
meetings demand better audit quality than other companies in the same industry 
on average and thus pay higher industry adjusted audit fees. In addition, this 
analysis shows whether higher industry adjusted audit fees result in better 
financial reporting quality. The regression models estimated to test model 
ACMEETINDFEEACC are presented in Table 8. 
 
The results for the model are reported in Appendix 15. The results are consistent 
with the main analysis. Firstly, the results show that ACMEET has a negative 
effect on ACC, which fulfils the first condition. Secondly, the results reveal that 
ACMEET has a positive effect on INDFEE, which is consistent with the second 
condition. Thirdly, INDFEE is found to have a negative effect on ACC, which 
satisfies the third condition. Finally, INDFEE is found to mediate the relationship 
between ACMEET and ACC. That is, the effect of ACMEET on ACC is reduced 
after INDFEE is included in the regression. The Sobel Test statistic (-1.877*) also 
indicates that the mediated effect is significant at the 10% level. These results 
imply that companies with active audit committees demand better audit quality 
than other companies in the same industry and therefore pay relatively higher 
audit fees. The results also show that industry adjusted audit fees may reflect 
audit quality: auditors who are paid more than other auditors in the same industry 
on average seem to decrease management discretion over accruals more 
effectively than auditors who are paid less. 
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Table 8.  Regression models estimated to test model ACMEETINDFEE 
 ACC. 
 
Condition Equation no 
Condition 1: 
 
ACC= β0+β1TA+β2OPCYCLE+β3SALEG+β4LOSS+β5ACMEET+ε 
 
 
(30) 
Condition 2: 
 
INDFEE=β0+β1TA+β2INVREC+β3FOROPR+β4QR+β5LOSS+β6BSIZE+β7BIND+ 
β8BMEET+β9ACMEET +ε 
 
 
(31) 
Conditions 3 and 4: 
 
ACC= β0+β1TA+β2OPCYCLE+β3SALEG+β4LOSS+ β5ACMEET + β6INDFEE +ε 
 
 
(32) 
The variables are defined as follows: 
ACC= Discretionary accruals (Residual from the regression model 6 scaled by 100) 
ACMEET= Number of audit committee meetings during fiscal year 
INDFEE = Ratio of audit fees relative to the industry mean  
TA= Natural logarithm of total assets 
OPCYCLE= Operating cycle (Calculated as presented in Equations 7-8) 
SALEG= Growth rate in net sales 
LOSS= Indicator variable, 1 if the net income of the fiscal year is negative, otherwise 0  
INVREC= Total inventories and total receivables to total assets 
FOROPR= Foreign sales to total sales 
QR= Quick ratio 
BSIZE= Number of board members 
BIND= Board independence % 
BMEET= Number of board meetings during fiscal year 
 
 
6.5.4 Results for path analysis 
 
This analysis tests a variation of the model developed using path analysis. This 
analysis is conducted using AMOS statistical package (see Holmbeck 2002). 
There are several advantages in this approach. Firstly, path analysis provides an 
opportunity to test multiple relationships simultaneously. Secondly, this approach 
provides measures for the overall goodness-of-fit statistics of the proposed model. 
This study uses the Chi-square test (χ2) to assess the goodness-of-fit of the model. 
Chi-square test statistics are interpreted as follows: a non-significant (P>0.05) 
value indicates that the model fits the data satisfactorily. Finally, path analysis 
provides information regarding the significance of the relationship between the 
variables (Kline 1998; Baines & Langfield-Smith 2003).  
 
The path model is formed as follows. In the path model, a composite measure of 
audit committee effectiveness (ACSUM) is modeled to have a path leading to 
AUDITFEE, which is further modeled to have a path leading to ACC. ACSUM is 
formed by calculating standardized values of ACSIZE, ACEXP and ACMEET. 
Calculated standardized values are then summed to form a variable ACSUM. It 
should be noted that this part of the analysis relaxes the first condition of the 
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Causal Steps Method. That is the direct effect of audit committee effectiveness on 
financial reporting quality is not tested. Therefore, the path analysis tests whether 
ACSUM has an indirect effect on ACC through AUDITFEE rather than testing 
for the mediated effect. This interpretation is consistent with Holmbeck’s (1997) 
definition of mediating and intervening effects. 
 
The model is presented in Appendix 16. The goodness-of-fit statistics [χ2(1)= 
.204 (P=.652)] indicate that the model fits the data satisfactorily. In addition it is 
found that ACSUM has a positive and significant effect on AUDITFEE, which is 
further found to have a significant negative effect on ACC. The results of this 
model also indicate that audit quality may function as an intervening variable in 
the relationship between audit committee effectiveness and financial reporting 
quality. This issue should be examined more thoroughly in future studies. 
 
6.5.5 Results for unexpected fees  
 
This analysis employs an optional approach to test the developed model by 
examining unexpected audit fees. Prior audit studies have suggested that audit 
quality may be influenced by the amount of audit fees relative to their expected 
amount rather than their realized amounts (Craswell et al. 1995; Gul et al. 1998; 
Tsui, Jaggi & Gul 2001; Srinidhi et al. 2007). The underlying notion behind this 
argument is that audit quality is associated with unexpectedly high or low audit 
fees: unexpectedly high audit fees indicating a more thorough audit performance 
and thus superior audit quality. 
 
Examining unexpected audit fees involves the following two-step procedure. 
Firstly, two alternative regression specifications are used to estimate unexpected 
audit fees (UNEXPFEE_1 and UNEXPFEE_2). These regression specifications 
include measures of audit committee effectiveness as well as other variables 
found in earlier studies to have an effect on audit fees. The difference between the 
models is as follows. The first model includes all three measures of audit 
committee effectiveness as well as a set of control variables found by prior 
studies to have an effect on audit fees whereas the second model includes only a 
measure of audit committee meeting frequency and a set of control variables. The 
latter model is estimated because the main analysis indicated that audit committee 
meeting frequency is the most important audit committee related explanatory 
variable for audit fees. More specifically, unexpected audit fees are estimated as 
residuals from the following alternative regression models:  
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AUDITFEE=β0+β1TA+β2INVREC+β3FOROPR+β4QR+β5LOSS+β6BSIZE+ 
β7BIND+β8BMEET+β9ACSIZE+β10ACEXP+β11ACMEET+ε (33) 
 
 
AUDITFEE=β0+β1TA+β2INVREC+β3FOROPR+β4QR+β5LOSS+β6BSIZE+ 
β7BIND+β8BMEET+β9ACMEET+ε (34) 
 
 
The variables are defined as follows: 
 
AUDITFEE= Natural logarithm of audit fees 
 
TA= Natural logarithm of total assets 
 
INVREC= Total inventories and total receivables to total assets 
 
FOROPR= Foreign sales to total sales 
 
QR= Quick ratio 
 
LOSS= Indicator variable, 1 if the net income of the fiscal year is negative, 
otherwise 0  
 
BSIZE= Number of board members 
 
BIND= Board independence % 
 
BMEET= Number of board meetings during fiscal year 
 
ACSIZE= Number of audit committee members 
 
ACEXP= Ratio of financial experts on the audit committee 
 
ACMEET= Number of audit committee meetings during fiscal year 
 
Secondly, in order to test whether UNEXPFEE_1 or UNEXPFEE_2 are related to 
accrual quality they are regressed on ACC. If higher unexpected audit fees 
indicate higher engagement effort and thus higher audit quality, a negative 
association between UNEXPFEE_1 or UNEXPFEE_2 and ACC should be 
observed. The results of the analysis are presented in Appendix 17. The results 
show that both UNEXPFEE_1 and UNEXPFEE_2 have a significant negative 
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effect on ACC. The results provide further support for the model proposed. This 
is because the results indicate that measures of audit committee effectiveness can 
be used to predict unexpected audit fees. In addition, unexpected audit fees are 
found to function as determinants of accrual quality. That is higher level of 
unexpected audit fees seems to result in better accrual quality and more generally 
better financial reporting quality. 
 
6.5.6 Results for the moderation effect 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, one of the core issues of this study is the selection of 
an effect type which sufficiently describes the relationships between variables of 
interest. After considering the theory related to the variables as well as effect 
types it was concluded that audit quality is likely to function as a mediator in the 
relationship between audit committee effectiveness and financial reporting 
quality. The main results provide support for this effect type for model 
ACMEETAUDITFEEACC. Although the mediation hypothesis was derived 
from the literature the possibility of the alternative effect type, moderation, cannot 
be entirely ruled out without testing it empirically.  
 
This part of the analysis therefore tests whether AUDITFEE moderates the 
relationship between ACMEET and ACC. Following Holmbeck (1997) the 
moderation effect is tested using multiple regression analysis by entering the main 
effects of AUDIFEE and ACMEET into the ACC model along with control 
variables first, following the interaction term AUDITFEE*ACMEET of 
ACMEET and AUDITFEE. A significant effect of the interaction term means that 
the moderated effect is supported. Since mediation and moderation effects cannot 
appear simultaneously (see Section 4.4.) it is expected that the interaction term 
will not be statistically significant. Thus the following regression is employed to 
test the potential moderation effect of AUDITFEE on the relationship between 
ACMEET and ACC: 
 
 
ACC= β0+β1TA+β2OPCYCLE+β3SALEG+β4LOSS+β5ACMEET+β6AUDITFEE+ 
β7AUDITFEE*ACMEET+ε (35) 
 
 
The variables are defined as follows: 
 
ACC= Discretionary accruals (Residual from the regression model 6 scaled by 
100) 
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TA= Natural logarithm of total assets 
 
OPCYCLE= Operating cycle (Calculated as presented in Equations 7-8) 
 
SALEG= Growth rate in net sales 
 
LOSS= Indicator variable, 1 if the net income of the fiscal year is negative, 
otherwise 0  
 
ACMEET= Number of audit committee meetings during fiscal year 
 
AUDITFEE= Natural logarithm of audit fees 
 
AUDITFEE*ACMEET= Interaction term of ACMEET and AUDITFEE 
 
The results of the above analysis are presented in Appendix 18. The results show 
that the interaction term AUDITFEE*ACMEET does not have a statistically 
significant effect on ACC, which is consistent with the expectations. In this 
regression specification neither ACMEET nor AUDITFEE has a statistically 
significant effect on ACC. This result indicates that moderated effect type does 
not describe the relationship of ACMEET and AUDITFEE on ACC sufficiently. 
Specifically, the results imply that AUDITFEE does not alter the strength or 
direction of the effect of ACMEET on ACC. This may be due to the fact that 
ACMEET has a significant effect on ACC whereas moderation effect is 
traditionally suggested for relationships which are unexpectedly weak (see Baron 
et al. 1986). Thus, it can be concluded that the results related to moderation effect 
provide indirect support for the mediation model analyzed in this research.  
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study focuses on two important corporate governance actors whose purpose 
is to ensure a company’s financial reporting quality, namely audit committees and 
external auditors. This study developed a model suggesting that audit quality 
functions as a mediator in the relationship between audit committee effectiveness 
and financial reporting quality. The purpose of this section is to summarize the 
study and to discuss its limitations and possibilities for future research. The 
section is organized as follows. Firstly, the underlying premises, contributions as 
well as main results of the developed model are discussed. Secondly, limitations 
of the study are reviewed. Finally, suggestions for future research are proposed. 
 
7.1 Discussion 
 
This study develops a model which suggests that audit quality mediates the 
relationship between audit committee effectiveness and financial reporting 
quality. The theoretical foundation of the model developed is based on agency 
theory, which states that monitoring mechanisms such as audit committees and 
external auditors contribute to corporate control and thus have an effect on a 
company’s financial reporting quality (e.g. Jensen et al. 1976). In addition, the 
developed model can be related to prior frameworks focusing on corporate 
governance, audit committee effectiveness and audit quality. Firstly, Cohen’s et 
al. (2004) corporate governance mosaic highlights interrelationships between 
various corporate governance actors. This study contributes both theoretically as 
well as empirically to the framework by Cohen et al. (2004) by focusing on the 
interrelationship between two crucial corporate governance actors, namely audit 
committees and external auditors. Secondly, DeZoort et al. (2002) discusses the 
determinants of audit committee effectiveness and states that it is conditional 
upon audit committee composition, authority, resources and diligence. The 
operational measures for audit committee effectiveness employed in this study are 
consistent with DeZoort’s et al. (2002) framework: audit committee size and 
expertise ratio relating to audit committee composition and audit committee 
meeting frequency relating to audit committee diligence. Finally, the framework 
by Watkins et al. (2004) presents the determinants of audit quality including 
drivers, components as well as products of audit quality. This study adds to this 
framework by proposing that audit committee effectiveness is an important 
demand side driver of audit quality. This demand is expected to be reflected in 
104        Acta Wasaensia  
 
real audit quality (i.e. auditor monitoring strength) and further in financial 
reporting quality, which is a product of audit quality. 
 
In addition to the theoretical literature, current US regulations (e.g. SOX 2002) 
regarding audit committees and external audits provide a regulatory framework 
which determines the minimum requirements for audit committee effectiveness 
and audit quality. This study focuses on companies which exceed the minimal 
regulatory requirements regarding audit committee effectiveness or audit quality. 
The regulatory framework also guides the choices of operational measures of the 
variables of interest. More particularly, the current US regulations include 
requirements regarding audit committee composition as well as its 
responsibilities. In addition, particularly the SOX (2002) objective is to ensure 
external audit quality and requirement to disclose audit fees provides a measure 
for audit quality.  
 
The elements of the model developed are derived from prior empirical studies 
focusing on the relationships between audit committee effectiveness, audit quality 
and financial reporting quality. The research model has an underlying notion that 
more effective audit committees provide better monitoring over accounting 
choices of the company (e.g. Beasley et al. 2000; Abbott et al. 2004; Bédard et al. 
2004) and also have an interest in investing more on external auditing (e.g. 
Abbott et al. 2001; Abbott et al. 2003a; Vafeas et al. 2007). In addition, external 
audit is expected to contribute to a company’s financial reporting quality (e.g. 
Carcello et al. 2002; Frankel et al. 2002; Nelson et al. 2002; Abbott et al. 2003a; 
Krishnan 2005; Larcker et al. 2004; Srinidhi et al. 2007). This study extends the 
work of the above studies both theoretically and empirically. The theoretical 
contribution arises when the separate relationships are combined into a 
comprehensive model: audit quality is modeled as a mediator in the relationship 
between audit committee effectiveness and financial reporting quality. This effect 
type has not been addressed by prior research focusing on audit committees or 
external audits. The empirical contribution arises from two sources. Firstly, the 
examination of the proposed effect type involves methodology which has not 
been addressed by prior studies. Secondly, the present study examines the 
relationships using a single set of US data. This examination reveals whether the 
results reported in prior studies hold in the present US regulatory environment.    
 
The mediation model is tested using two complementary methods. Firstly, the 
Causal Steps Method was used to test the individual relationships in the model 
and examine the occurrence of the mediated effect. The regression analyses 
required by the method were employed separately for the three measures of audit 
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committee effectiveness and thus the following models were examined: 
ACSIZEAUDITFEEACC, ACEXPAUDITFEEACC, and ACMEET 
AUDITFEEACC. Secondly, the Sobel Test statistics were calculated for 
models supported by the Causal Steps Method in order to verify the significance 
of a potential mediation effect. 
 
The main results of this study support model ACMEETAUDITFEEACC. 
However, the results regarding other two models, ACSIZEAUDITFEEACC 
and ACEXPAUDITFEEACC, are inconclusive. The latter result is due to the 
fact that that neither audit committee size nor audit committee expertise ratio have 
the hypothesized effect on discretionary accruals or audit fees. These results are 
inconsistent with prior studies, which have linked audit committee size and audit 
committee expertise with outcomes of audit committee effectiveness (e.g. 
Archambeault et al. 2001; Bédard et al. 2004; Vafeas et al. 2007). The 
inconsistency of the results can be explained by the difference in the regulatory 
environment. The present study was conducted in a highly regulated environment 
which requires companies to maintain homogeneous audit committees in terms of 
their composition. It is likely that prior studies have been conducted in less 
regulated environments in which companies’ audit committees have been less 
homogeneous32.  
 
With regard to model ACMEETAUDITFEEACC the results are consistent 
with those of prior studies. More specifically, audit committee meeting frequency 
is found to have a negative effect on discretionary accruals (e.g. Xie et al. 2003; 
Vafeas 2005) and a positive effect on audit fees (e.g. Goodwin-Stewart et al. 
2006). Consistent with prior studies audit fees are also found to have a negative 
effect on discretionary accruals (e.g. Frankel et al. 2002; Larcker et al. 2004; 
Srinidhi et al. 2007). In addition, audit fees are found to decrease the effect of 
audit committee meeting frequency on discretionary accruals, and the mediation 
hypothesis is therefore supported. The Sobel Test statistics verify this relationship 
by showing that the mediated effect is significant at the 10 % level. In addition to 
the main analysis several additional analyses provide further support for model 
ACMEETAUDITFEEACC. 
 
The results for model ACMEETAUDITFEEACC have several implications. 
Firstly, the results indicate that more active audit committees are better able to 
restrict earnings management, and thus contribute to a company’s financial 
reporting quality. This may be due to the fact that active audit committees are 
better informed about the state of affairs of the company or that active audit 
                                                 
32
 See Hay et al. (2008) for a discussion on this issue. 
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committees are staffed with individuals who are dedicated in investing their time 
and efforts into the functioning of the audit committee which results in closer 
monitoring of company’s reporting decisions by the audit committee.  
 
Secondly, the results show that more frequent audit committee meetings lead to an 
increase in audit fees. This result has several plausible explanations. The positive 
relation may be due to the fact that external auditor’s preparation and attendance 
at audit committee meetings leads to increase in audit fees. Alternatively, more 
active audit committees may require greater assurance by external auditors. In 
turn greater assurance requires more audit effort, which leads to increase in audit 
fees.  
 
Thirdly, a negative relationship between audit fees and discretionary accruals is 
reported. This result implies that audit effort reflected in audit fees leads to closer 
monitoring by auditors, thereby decreasing management’s opportunities to use 
discretionary accruals to manage earnings. The results also show that audit fees 
do not compromise auditor independence, which would decrease auditor’s 
willingness to oppose management attempts to manage earnings. On the contrary, 
the results imply that auditors’ reputation protection leads to auditor reporting 
conservatism and thus audit clients are left with less discretion with respect to 
discretionary accrual when audit fees are high. 
 
Finally, the results show that there is a sequence from audit committee meeting 
frequency to audit fees to discretionary accruals. Thus, the results support the 
research model developed which states that audit quality mediates the relationship 
between audit committee effectiveness and financial reporting quality. This result 
is satisfying for both audit committees as well as external auditors, since they 
indicate that both of these control mechanisms fulfil their role as assurers of a 
company’s financial reporting quality. The results also imply that the cooperation 
between audit committee members and external auditors is beneficial and leads to 
better financial reporting quality. In other words the results provide support for 
the notion that audit committees and external auditors are complementary 
contributors to financial reporting quality. 
 
In addition to the academic implications, the results of this study have important 
practical significance for preparers, users as well as auditors of the financial 
statements. From the preparer point of view the results of this study imply that 
companies can signal their financial reporting quality to outsiders by setting up 
audit committees which are in compliance with the regulations and by 
encouraging their audit committees to be active. Companies can moreover invest 
in external auditing by demanding a greater scope of external audit work. On the 
                             Acta Wasaensia        107 
 
other hand, the results of this study imply that users of financial statements can, to 
certain extent, use audit committee meeting frequency and audit fees as proxies 
for audit committee effectiveness and external audit quality as they attempt to 
assess financial reporting quality. The results of this study also have implications 
for auditors. The results of the study imply that higher audit fees are associated 
with better financial reporting quality: higher audit fees ensure that proper 
resources have been invested in the audit and audit quality is therefore enhanced. 
Thus, the results encourage auditors to resist possible budget pressures from 
clients.  
 
7.2 Limitations 
 
This study is concerned with aggregate and average. That is, it seeks to examine 
what type of generalized model can be established to describe the relationships 
between audit committee effectiveness, audit quality and financial reporting 
quality33. This approach involves using measures for audit committee 
effectiveness, audit quality and financial reporting quality which can be derived 
from publicly available sources using cross-sectional data.  
 
The research method applied has inherent limitations, which should be taken into 
consideration when making interpretations of the results. It can be argued that 
publicly available sources provide only crude proxies for audit committee 
effectiveness, audit quality and financial reporting quality: the measures 
employed may not capture all aspects of the variables of interest. More 
importantly, their ability to explain the interrelationships and communication 
between audit committee members and external auditors in determining financial 
reporting quality is limited. It should also be noted that the methodology and data 
used does not allow demonstrating cause-effect relationships between variables. 
Therefore it is difficult to distinguish between alternative explanations of the 
results, thus the inferences of the results must be cautious. Furthermore, as 
discussed by Francis (2004) it is possible that “good companies” with high 
financial reporting quality may also have strong incentives to invest in audit 
committee effectiveness and audit quality. Although the present study attempts to 
control for company differences and test the endogeneity of the variables, this 
rationale cannot be ruled out entirely as an alternative explanation for the results.   
 
 
                                                 
33
 See Turley et al. (2007) for a critique of this approach. 
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7.3 Future research 
 
This study opens up several alternative avenues for future research. Firstly, this 
study employs a cross-sectional data from a single country and, as discussed 
above, this creates limitations for the analysis of the model. Future research could 
examine the model developed using different types or sets of data. More 
specifically, future studies could seek to employ longitudinal data or data from 
different countries to test the model. The advantage of longitudinal data is that it 
would provide more power for the statistical analyses. In addition, studies using 
longitudinal data could examine how companies’ audit committees and external 
audits adapt to changes in regulatory and other environmental requirements. 
Future research could also examine the model developed using data from 
different countries. As discussed previously, the results did not support all the 
hypothesized relationships between variables of interest. This may be because the 
present study was conducted in a highly regulated environment which restricts 
companies’ choices regarding audit committees, external auditors as well as 
financial reporting quality. Therefore, future studies could test the model with 
data derived from a less-regulated environment in order to examine whether the 
hypothesized relationships are present in such an environment. It is also possible 
that the relationship between audit committees and external auditors is affected by 
cultural differences and therefore it would be important to test the model using 
data from different countries and different cultural settings.  
 
Secondly, in the present study the operational measures for audit committee 
effectiveness, audit quality and financial reporting quality were obtained from 
publicly available sources. It is reasonable to acknowledge that the measures 
employed may not capture all aspects of audit committee effectiveness, audit 
quality and financial reporting quality sufficiently. Thus future research could aim 
to develop and establish alternative measures for audit committee effectiveness, 
audit quality as well as financial reporting quality. This could be achieved by 
using, for example, a questionnaire. This approach would enable measures to be 
derived which are non-regulated and not publicly available. Such measures would 
enable a more thorough understanding of the relationships between the variables 
of interest. 
 
Thirdly, audit committees and external auditors are only some of the many 
potential monitoring mechanisms operating to ensure a company’s financial 
reporting quality. Some of these mechanisms, such as a company’s full board of 
directors and internal control mechanisms are within the company and 
specifically designed for this purpose. Some control mechanisms are external to 
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the company and exercise monitoring in order to safeguard their own interests. 
These parties include, for example, shareholders34 and debt holders. Thus it is 
evident that examining the relationship between audit committee effectiveness 
and audit quality in isolation provides an incomplete description of the 
determinants of financial reporting quality. It is therefore suggested that future 
research could include the various parties in the model examined in this study and 
so develop a broader understanding of the interaction between these parties35. 
 
Finally, due to the fact that audit committees and external auditors operate in a 
highly complex environment it can be argued that quantitative research methods 
may not be able to capture all aspects of the relationships between audit 
committees and external auditors. Thus, as suggested by Turley and Zaman 
(2004), Turley and Zaman (2007) and Stewart et al. (2007) there is a need for 
more qualitative research regarding the functioning of audit committees as well as 
external audits. Therefore, it is suggested that a case study methodology and 
interviews could provide a complementary means to examine the model 
developed. The main advantage of this approach is that it would enable a more 
thorough analysis of the model proposed and its underlying dynamics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34
 In general the literature suggests that institutional shareholders have sufficient power to monitor 
the company and its financial reporting process whereas individual shareholders’ ability to execute 
such monitoring is regarded as limited. 
35
 See e.g. Hay et al. (2008) for a discussion regarding the relationship between internal controls 
and external auditing. 
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APPENDIX 1. Summary of corporate governance standards36. 
 
Rule 
                    
               Regulator        
SOX (2002) NYSE (2003) AMEX (2003) NASDAQ (2003) 
Audit committee 
size 
n/a Minimum of three 
members 
At least three 
members 
At least three 
members 
Audit committee 
independence  
Audit committee 
member may not 
accept, other than 
in his or her 
capacity as a 
member of the 
audit committee,  
the board of 
directors or any 
other board 
committee, any 
consulting, 
advisory or other 
compensatory fee 
from the issuer or 
be an affiliated 
person of the 
issuer or any 
subsidiary 
thereof. 
To be 
independent, an 
audit committee 
member must 
have no material 
relationship with 
the listed 
company either 
directly or as a 
partner, 
shareholder, or 
officer of an 
organization that 
has a relationship 
with the company. 
Audit committee 
member may not 
other than in his or 
her capacity as a 
member of the 
audit committee, 
the board of 
directors, or any 
other board 
committee:1) 
accept directly or 
indirectly any 
consulting, 
advisory, or other 
compensatory fee 
from the issuer or 
any subsidiary 
thereof, or 2) be an 
affiliated person of 
the issuer or any 
subsidiary thereof. 
Consistent with 
SOX (2002) audit 
committee 
members are 
prohibited from 
receiving any 
payment other than 
payment for board 
or committee 
service. Affiliated 
persons of the 
company or  its 
subsidiaries may 
not be audit 
committee 
members. In 
addition, audit 
committee 
members may not 
own or control 20 
percent or more of 
the issuer's voting 
securities, or such 
lower number as 
established by the 
SEC. 
Audit commitee 
members’ 
experience 
Issuer must 
disclose whether 
its audit 
committee 
includes at least 
one “financial 
expert,” and if 
not, why not. To 
qualify as a 
financial expert, 
audit committee 
member must 
have: 1) an 
understanding of 
GAAP and 
financial 
statements, 2) 
experience 
applying GAAP 
in connection 
with and in 
preparing or 
auditing financial 
statements and  
All audit 
committee 
members must be 
financially 
literate, and at 
least one must 
have accounting 
or financial 
management 
expertise.  
All audit 
committee 
members must be 
able to read and 
understand 
fundamental 
financial 
statements, 
including a 
company's balance 
sheet, income 
statement, and cash 
flow statement. At 
least one member 
of the audit 
committee must be 
financially 
sophisticated, in 
that he or she has 
past employment 
experience in 
finance or 
accounting, 
requisite  
All audit 
committee 
members must be 
able to read and 
understand 
fundamental 
financial 
statements, 
including a 
company’s balance 
sheet, income 
statement, and cash 
flow statement. 
Additionally, each 
issuer must certify 
that it has, and will 
continue to have, 
at least one 
member of the 
audit committee 
who has past 
employment 
experience in 
finance or  
                                                 
36
 The above table summarizes the SOX (2002) requirements as well as the stock exchanges’ 
standards regarding corporate governance. Therefore it does not inclusively offset all the corporate 
governance requirements in these regulations. 
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Continued 
Rule 
                    
               Regulator        
SOX (2002) NYSE (2003) AMEX (2003) NASDAQ (2003) 
 applying 
accounting 
principles in 
connection with 
accounting for 
estimates, 
accruals, and 
reserves used in 
the company's 
financial 
statements,3) 
experience with 
internal 
accounting 
controls and 
procedures, and 
4) an 
understanding of 
audit committee 
functions.  
 professional 
certification in 
accounting, or any 
other comparable 
experience or 
background which 
results in the 
individual's 
financial 
sophistication, 
including but not 
limited to being or 
having been a chief 
executive officer, 
chief financial 
officer, other 
senior officer with 
financial oversight 
responsibilities. 
accounting, 
requisite 
professional 
certification in 
accounting, or any 
other comparable 
experience or 
background which 
results in the 
individual’s 
financial 
sophistication, 
including being or 
having been a chief 
executive officer, 
chief financial 
officer or other 
senior officer with 
financial oversight 
responsibilities. 
Audit committee 
responsibilities 
Oversee the 
accounting and 
financial 
reporting process 
of the company 
and the audits of 
the financial 
statements of the 
company. 
Assist board 
oversight of: 1) 
the integrity of the 
company's 
financial 
statements, 2) the 
company's 
compliance with 
legal and 
regulatory 
requirements, 3) 
the independent 
auditor's 
qualifications and 
independence, 4) 
the performance 
of the company's 
internal and 
external audit 
function and 5) 
preparation of the 
audit committee 
report for the 
company's proxy 
statement. 
The audit 
committee of each 
issuer must  have 
necessary 
procedures relating 
to: (a) registered 
public accounting 
firms, (b) 
complaints relating 
to accounting, 
internal accounting 
controls or 
auditing matters, 
(c) authority to 
engage advisors, 
and (d) funding as 
determined by the 
audit committee.  
Oversee the 
company's 
accounting and 
financial reporting 
processes and the 
audits of its 
financial 
statements, 
responsible to 
ensure the external 
auditor's 
independence and 
review and 
approve all related-
party transactions. 
In addition 
external auditor’s 
accountability to 
the Committee. 
 
Audit committee 
meetings 
n/a Separate, periodic 
meetings with 
management,  
internal auditors 
and external 
auditors. 
The audit 
committee of each 
issuer must meet at 
least on a quarterly 
basis. 
n/a 
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APPENDIX 3.  Definitions for variables used in the analyses. 
 
Variable name Description of the variable 
Audit committee effectiveness  
ACSIZE Number of audit committee members 
ACEXP Ratio of financial experts on the audit committee 
ACMEET Number of audit committee meetings during fiscal 
year 
 
Audit quality 
 
AUDITFEE Natural logarithm of audit fees paid to the incumbent 
auditor 
 
Financial reporting quality 
 
ACC Discretionary accruals (Residual from the regression 
model 6 scaled by 100) 
Control variables for financial reporting quality  
TA Natural logarithm of total assets  
OPCYCLE Operating cycle (Calculated as presented in 
Equations 7-8)  
SALEG Growth rate in net sales 
LOSS Indicator variable, 1 if the net income of the fiscal 
year is negative, otherwise 0  
Control variables for audit quality  
TA Natural logarithm of total assets 
INVREC Total inventories and total receivables to total assets 
FOROPR Foreign sales to total sales 
QR Quick ratio 
LOSS Indicator variable, 1 if the net income of the fiscal 
year is negative, otherwise 0  
BSIZE Number of board members 
BIND Board independence % 
BMEET Number of board meetings during fiscal year 
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APPENDIX 4.  Sample selection criteria. 
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APPENDIX 5.  Descriptive statistics of variables used in statistical analyses. 
 
Table 1.  Descriptive statistics for variables used in main analysis. 
 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
ACSIZE 2 8 3.74 .928 1.051 1.428 
ACEXP 0 1.00 .4871 .28409 .737 -.757 
ACMEET 0 31 9.02 3.616 1.328 4.756 
AUDITFEE 12.00 18.27 14.6051 .97259 .416 .164 
ACC -49.04 48.68 .000 11.39802 .142 2.020 
TA 17.55 27.27 21.4201 1.50657 .416 -.005 
OPCYCLE 4.58 664.33 120.7825 75.64084 2.107 7.296 
SALESG -.87 6.47 .1405 .27582 12.487 281.326 
LOSS 0 1 .1004 .30069 2.663 5.103 
INVREC 0 .89 .2483 .15784 .903 .671 
FOROPR 0 1.02 .2972 .26144 .510 -.727 
QR .077 24.470 1.74010 2.022967 4.730 35.100 
BSIZE 4 17 9.11 2.119 .357 .031 
BIND 0 100.000 72.91053 13.753116 -.810 .906 
BMEET 2 31 7.80 3.184 1.866 7.006 
Notes: 
The variables are as defined in Appendix 3 
 
 
Table 2.  Descriptive statistics of winsorized variables.  
 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
ACSIZE 3 6 3.74 .852 .905 -.038 
ACEXP .17 1.00 .4903 .27950 .812 -.787 
ACMEET 4 17 8.93 3.178 .478 -.144 
AUDITFEE 12.93 16.74 14.6043 .92984 .372 -.435 
ACC -21.31 26.39 .0603 10.30859 .267 .128 
TA 18.80 24.50 21.4099 1.44328 .298 -.617 
OPCYCLE 22.37 327.43 118.5289 65.76321 1.209 1.536 
SALESG -.19 .62 .1356 .16311 .942 1.253 
LOSS .00 1.00 .1004 .30069 2.663 5.103 
INVREC .04 .64 .2468 .15237 .728 -.090 
FOROPR .00 .82 .2945 .25536 .412 -1.007 
QR .257 7.309 1.65395 1.513498 2.168 4.637 
BSIZE 5 13 9.07 2.024 .140 -.656 
BIND 42.857 90.909 73.10669 13.020966 -.487 -.607 
BMEET 4 15 7.70 2.775 .834 .197 
Notes: 
The variables are as defined in Appendix 3 
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APPENDIX 6.  Correlation matrix. 
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APPENDIX 7.  Main relationships as scatterplots. 
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APPENDIX 8.  Companies grouped by industries. 
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APPENDIX 9.  Results for model ACSIZEAUDITFEEACC. 
 
Variable Condition 1 
ACC 
Variable Condition 2 
AUDITFEE 
Variable Conditions 3 
and 4 
ACC 
Intercept 
t 
se 
 
TA 
t 
se 
 
OPCYCLE 
t 
se 
 
SALESG 
t 
se 
 
LOSS 
t 
se 
 
Audit committee 
 effectiveness 
 
ACSIZE 
t 
se 
 
 
 
34.307*** 
7.046 
4.869 
 
-1.987*** 
-8.358 
.238 
 
.045*** 
9.822 
.005 
 
-2.423** 
-1.987 
1.219 
 
-6.766*** 
-5.949 
1.137 
 
 
 
 
1.039*** 
2.609 
.398 
 
Intercept 
t 
se 
 
TA 
t 
se 
 
INVREC 
t 
se 
 
FOROPR 
t 
se 
 
QR 
t 
se 
 
LOSS 
t 
se 
 
BSIZE 
t 
se 
 
BIND 
t 
se 
 
BMEET 
t 
se 
 
Audit committee 
 effectiveness 
 
ACSIZE 
t 
se 
3.619*** 
12.111 
.299 
 
.468*** 
31.263 
.015 
 
.812*** 
7.016 
.116 
 
.914*** 
12.728 
.072 
 
-.029*** 
-3.143 
.009 
 
.217*** 
3.775 
.058 
 
.028*** 
2.634 
.011 
 
.004*** 
2.883 
.001 
 
.014** 
2.519 
.006 
 
 
 
 
-.031 
-1.423 
.022 
Intercept 
t 
se 
 
TA 
t 
se 
 
OPCYCLE 
t 
se 
 
SALESG 
t 
se 
 
LOSS 
t 
se 
 
Audit committee 
 effectiveness 
 
ACSIZE 
t 
se 
 
Audit quality  
 
AUDITFEE 
t 
se 
39.347*** 
7.431 
5.295 
 
-1.321*** 
-3.613 
.366 
 
.045*** 
10.007 
.005 
 
-2.611** 
-2.142 
1.219 
 
-6.447*** 
-5.643 
1.142 
 
 
 
 
1.040*** 
2.617 
.397 
 
 
 
-1.329** 
-2.392 
.556 
R2 .157  .695  .162 
Sobel Test  -     
Notes: 
***, **, *denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
The variables are as defined in Appendix 3 
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APPENDIX 10.  Results for model ACEXPAUDITFEEACC. 
 
Variable Condition 1 
ACC 
Variable Condition 2 
AUDITFEE 
Variable Conditions 3 
and 4 
ACC 
Intercept 
t 
se 
 
TA 
t 
se 
 
OPCYCLE 
t 
se 
 
SALESG 
t 
se 
 
LOSS 
t 
se 
 
Audit committee 
 effectiveness 
 
ACEXP 
t 
se 
 
 
 
33.805*** 
6.926 
4.881 
 
-1.793*** 
-7.939 
.226 
 
.044*** 
9.584 
.005 
 
-2.582** 
-2.113 
1.222 
 
-6.858*** 
-6.014 
1.140 
 
 
 
 
.793 
.645 
1.230 
Intercept 
t 
se 
 
TA 
t 
se 
 
INVREC 
t 
se 
 
FOROPR 
t 
se 
 
QR 
t 
se 
 
LOSS 
t 
se 
 
BSIZE 
t 
se 
 
BIND 
t 
se 
 
BMEET 
t 
se 
 
Audit committee 
effectiveness 
 
ACEXP 
t 
se 
3.623*** 
12.112 
.299 
 
.464*** 
31.088 
.015 
 
.801*** 
6.926 
.116 
 
.920*** 
12.821 
.072 
 
-.029*** 
-3.080 
.009 
 
.221*** 
3.845 
.058 
 
.023** 
2.314 
.010 
 
.003*** 
2.649 
.001 
 
.014** 
2.480 
.006 
 
 
 
 
.041 
.655 
.062 
Intercept 
t 
se 
 
TA 
t 
se 
 
OPCYCLE 
t 
se 
 
SALESG 
t 
se 
 
LOSS 
t 
se 
 
Audit committee 
 effectiveness 
 
ACEXP 
t 
se 
 
Audit quality 
 
AUDITFEE 
t 
se 
38.874*** 
7.323 
5.308 
 
-1.125*** 
-3.139 
.358 
 
.045*** 
9.767 
.005 
 
-2.770** 
-2.268 
1.221 
 
-6.537*** 
-5.707 
1.146 
 
 
 
 
.860 
.701 
1.228 
 
 
 
-1.337** 
-2.398 
.558 
R2 .151  .694  .156 
Sobel Test  -     
Notes: 
***, **, *denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
The variables are as defined in Appendix 3 
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APPENDIX 11.  Results for model ACMEETAUDITFEEACC. 
 
Variable Condition 1 
ACC 
Variable Condition 2 
AUDITFEE 
Variable Conditions 
3 and 4 
ACC 
Intercept 
t 
se 
 
TA 
t 
se 
 
OPCYCLE 
t 
se 
 
SALESG 
t 
se 
 
LOSS 
t 
se 
 
Audit committee 
 effectiveness 
 
ACMEET 
t 
se 
 
 
 
 
34.758*** 
7.133 
4.873 
 
-1.705*** 
-7.584 
.225 
 
.044** 
9.741 
.005 
 
-2.746*** 
-2.255 
1.217 
 
-6.650*** 
-5.843 
1.138 
 
 
 
 
-.279*** 
-2.901 
.096 
Intercept 
t 
se 
 
TA 
t 
se 
 
INVREC 
t 
se 
 
FOROPR 
t 
se 
 
QR 
t 
se 
 
LOSS 
t 
se 
 
BSIZE 
t 
se 
 
BIND 
t 
se 
 
BMEET 
t 
se 
 
Audit committee 
effectiveness 
 
ACMEET 
t 
se 
3.557*** 
12.043 
.295 
 
.461*** 
31.382 
.015 
 
.774*** 
6.776 
.114 
 
.906*** 
12.801 
.071 
 
-.026*** 
-2.867 
.009 
 
.209*** 
3.680 
.057 
 
.023** 
2.363 
.010 
 
.003** 
2.474 
.001 
 
.007 
1.143 
.006 
 
 
 
 
.026*** 
5.208 
.005 
Intercept 
t 
se 
 
TA 
t 
se 
 
OPCYCLE 
t 
se 
 
SALESG 
t 
se 
 
LOSS 
t 
se 
 
Audit committee 
 effectiveness 
 
ACMEET 
t 
se 
 
Audit quality 
 
AUDITFEE 
t 
se 
38.711*** 
7.314 
5.293 
 
-1.176*** 
-3.286 
.358 
 
.045*** 
9.872 
.005 
 
-2.880** 
-2.365 
1.218 
 
-6.419*** 
-5.615 
1.143 
 
 
 
 
-.246** 
-2.517 
.098 
 
 
 
-1.073* 
-1.899 
.565 
R2 .158  .702  .161 
Sobel Test  
 
-1.784*     
Notes: 
***, **, *denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
The variables are as defined in Appendix 3 
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APPENDIX 12.  Results for model ACMEETAUDITFEEACC (winsorized 
data). 
 
Variable Condition 1 
ACC 
Variable Condition 2 
AUDITFEE 
Variable Conditions 
3 and 4 
ACC 
Intercept 
t 
se 
 
TA 
t 
se 
 
OPCYCLE 
t 
se 
 
SALESG 
t 
se 
 
LOSS 
t 
se 
 
Audit committee 
 effectiveness 
 
ACMEET 
t 
se 
 
 
 
 
36.085*** 
7.788 
4.633 
 
-1.755*** 
-8.271 
.212 
 
.047*** 
10.065 
.005 
 
-6.262*** 
-3.367 
1.859 
 
-6.420*** 
-6.282 
1.022 
 
 
 
 
-.282*** 
-2.865 
.098 
Intercept 
t 
se 
 
TA 
t 
se 
 
INVREC 
t 
se 
 
FOROPR 
t 
se 
 
QR 
t 
se 
 
LOSS 
t 
se 
 
BSIZE 
t 
se 
 
BIND 
t 
se 
 
BMEET 
t 
se 
 
Audit committee 
effectiveness 
 
ACMEET 
t 
se 
3.718*** 
12.070 
.308 
 
.454*** 
30.224 
.015 
 
.779*** 
6.821 
.114 
 
.947*** 
13.499 
.070 
 
-.033*** 
-2.649 
.012 
 
.162*** 
2.973 
.054 
 
.022** 
2.210 
.010 
 
.003** 
2.372 
.001 
 
.008 
1.293 
.006 
 
 
 
 
.027*** 
4.999 
.005 
Intercept 
t 
se 
 
TA 
t 
se 
 
OPCYCLE 
t 
se 
 
SALESG 
t 
se 
 
LOSS 
t 
se 
 
Audit committee 
 effectiveness 
 
ACMEET 
t 
se 
 
Audit quality 
 
AUDITFEE 
t 
se 
40.304*** 
8.028 
5.021 
 
-1.201*** 
-3.608 
.333 
 
.048*** 
10.261 
.005 
 
-6.354*** 
-3.422 
1.857 
 
-6.229*** 
-6.083 
1.024 
 
 
 
 
-.244** 
-2.445 
.100 
 
 
 
-1.135** 
-2.160 
.525 
R2 .175  .702  .179 
Sobel Test  -2.01**     
Notes: 
Data is winsorized by 2.5% from both tails. 
***, **, *denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
The variables are as defined in Appendix 3 
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APPENDIX 13.  All measures for audit committee effectiveness included. 
 
 
 
Variable 
Condition 1 
ACC 
Variable Condition 2 
AUDITFEE 
Variable Conditions 3 
and 4 
ACC 
Intercept 
t 
se 
 
TA 
t 
se 
 
OPCYCLE 
t 
se 
 
SALESG 
t 
se 
 
LOSS 
t 
se 
 
Audit committee 
 effectiveness 
 
ACSIZE 
t 
se 
 
ACEXP 
t 
se 
 
ACMEET 
t 
se 
 
35.225*** 
7.244 
4.863 
 
-1.949*** 
-8.065 
.242 
 
.045*** 
9.817 
.005 
 
-2.525** 
-2.075 
1.217 
 
-6.545*** 
-5.762 
1.136 
 
 
 
 
1.033*** 
2.570 
.402 
 
1.507 
1.217 
1.238 
 
-.270*** 
-2.798 
.096 
Intercept 
t 
se 
 
TA 
t 
se 
 
INVREC 
t 
se 
 
FOROPR 
t 
se 
 
QR 
t 
se 
 
LOSS 
t 
se 
 
BSIZE 
t 
se 
 
BIND 
t 
se 
 
BMEET 
t 
se 
 
Audit committee 
 effectiveness 
 
ACSIZE 
t 
se 
 
ACEXP 
t 
se 
 
ACMEET 
t 
se 
3.557*** 
12.033 
.296 
 
.463*** 
31.080 
.015 
 
.782*** 
6.821 
.115 
 
.902*** 
12.708 
.071 
 
-.027*** 
-2.906 
.009 
 
.207*** 
3.634 
.057 
 
.026** 
2.528 
.010 
 
.003*** 
2.601 
.001 
 
.007 
1.183 
.006 
 
 
 
 
-.020 
-.907 
.022 
 
.010 
.156 
.062 
 
.025*** 
5.074 
.005 
Intercept 
t 
se 
 
TA 
t 
se 
 
OPCYCLE 
t 
se 
 
SALESG 
t 
se 
 
LOSS 
t 
se 
 
Audit committee 
 effectiveness 
 
ACSIZE 
t 
se 
 
ACEXP 
t 
se 
 
ACMEET 
t 
se 
 
Audit quality 
 
AUDITFEE 
t 
se 
39.288*** 
7.437 
5.282 
 
-1.410*** 
-3.843 
.367 
 
.045*** 
9.954 
.005 
 
-2.660** 
-2.186 
1.217 
 
-6.306*** 
-5.528 
1.141 
 
 
 
 
1.046*** 
2.604 
.402 
 
1.538 
1.244 
1.237 
 
-.236** 
-2.407 
.098 
 
 
 
-1.101* 
-1.953 
.564 
R2 .164  .702  .168 
Sobel Test  
ACMEETAUDITFEEACC 
 
-1,818* 
    
Notes: 
***, **, *denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
The variables are as defined in Appendix 3 
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APPENDIX 14. All measures for audit committee effectiveness included and 
control variables excluded. 
 
Variable Condition 1 
ACC 
Variable Condition 2 
AUDITFEE 
Variable Conditions 3 
and 4 
ACC 
Intercept 
t 
se 
 
Audit committee 
 effectiveness 
 
ACSIZE 
t 
se 
 
ACEXP 
t 
se 
 
ACMEET 
t 
se 
 
 
3.574* 
1.819 
1.965 
 
 
 
 
-.201 
-.496 
.404 
 
.826 
.624 
1.325 
 
-.358*** 
-3.454 
.104 
Intercept 
t 
se 
 
Audit committee 
effectiveness 
 
ACSIZE 
t 
se 
 
ACEXP 
t 
se 
 
ACMEET 
t 
se 
12.772*** 
82.487 
.155 
 
 
 
 
.303*** 
9.516 
.032 
 
.426*** 
4.083 
.104 
 
.055*** 
6.692 
.008 
Intercept 
t 
se 
 
Audit committee 
 effectiveness 
 
ACSIZE 
t 
se 
 
ACEXP 
t 
se 
 
ACMEET 
t 
se 
 
Audit quality 
 
AUDITFEE 
t 
se 
35.912*** 
6.661 
5.391 
 
 
 
 
.567 
1.370 
.414 
 
1.905 
1.455 
1.310 
 
-.219** 
-2.114 
.104 
 
 
 
-2.532*** 
-6.422 
.394 
R2 .012  .128  .051 
Sobel Test  
ACMEETAUDITFEEACC 
 
-4.694*** 
 
 
 
 
  
Notes: 
***, **, *denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
The variables are as defined in Appendix 3 
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APPENDIX 15.  Results for model ACMEETINDFEEACC. 
 
Variable Condition 1 
ACC 
Variable Condition 2 
INDFEE 
Variable Conditions 3 
and 4 
ACC 
Intercept 
t 
se 
 
TA 
t 
se 
 
OPCYCLE 
t 
se 
 
SALESG 
t 
se 
 
LOSS 
t 
se 
 
Audit committee 
 effectiveness 
 
ACMEET 
t 
se 
 
 
 
34.758*** 
7.133 
4.873 
 
-1.705*** 
-7.584 
.225 
 
.044*** 
9.741 
.005 
 
-2.746** 
-2.255 
1.217 
 
-6.650*** 
-5.843 
1.138 
 
 
 
 
-.279*** 
-2.901 
.096 
Intercept 
t 
se 
 
TA 
t 
se 
 
INVREC 
t 
se 
 
FOROPR 
t 
se 
 
QR 
t 
se 
 
LOSS 
t 
se 
 
BSIZE 
t 
se 
 
BIND 
t 
se 
 
BMEET 
t 
se 
 
Audit committee 
effectiveness 
 
ACMEET 
t 
se 
-11.005*** 
-21.130 
.521 
 
.496*** 
19.152 
.026 
 
.863*** 
4.285 
.201 
 
.643*** 
5.147 
.125 
 
.020 
1.243 
.016 
 
.303*** 
3.023 
.100 
 
.025 
1.406 
.018 
 
.003 
1.306 
.002 
 
.011 
1.121 
.010 
 
 
 
 
.041*** 
4.715 
.009 
Intercept 
t 
se 
 
TA 
t 
se 
 
OPCYCLE 
t 
se 
 
SALESG 
t 
se 
 
LOSS 
t 
se 
 
Audit committee 
 effectiveness 
 
ACMEET 
t 
se 
 
Audit quality 
 
INDFEE 
t 
se 
27.394*** 
4.539 
6.036 
 
-1.342*** 
-4.706 
.285 
 
.044*** 
9.760 
.005 
 
-2.834** 
-2.330 
1.216 
 
-6.409*** 
-5.611 
1.142 
 
 
 
 
-.246** 
-2.521 
.097 
 
 
 
-.721** 
-2.061 
.350 
 
R2 .158  .440  .162 
Sobel Test  -1.877*     
Notes: 
***, **, *denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
The variables are defined as follows: 
INDFEE = Ratio of audit fees relative to the industry mean 
Other variables are as defined in Appendix 3 
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APPENDIX 16.  Results for path analysis. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. AMOS results χ2(1)= 0.204 (P=.652) 
 
 
Paths Standardized 
estimates 
Unstandardized 
estimates 
Standard 
error 
Sig. 
ACSUM  AUDITFEE .365 .208 .018 *** 
AUDITFEE  ACC -.209 -2.450 .367 *** 
Notes: 
***, **, *denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
The variables are defined as follows: 
ACSUM=Composite measure of audit committee effectiveness 
Other variables are as defined in Appendix 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ACSUM AUDITFEE ACC 
-.21
e1 e2 
.36 
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APPENDIX 17.  Results for unexpected fees. 
 
 
Variable 
Model 1 
ACC 
 
Variable 
Model 2 
ACC 
Intercept 
t 
 
Control variables 
 
TA 
t 
 
OPCYCLE 
t 
 
SALESG 
t 
 
LOSS 
t 
 
Audit quality 
 
UNEXPFEE_1 
t 
33.938*** 
7.001 
 
 
 
-1.778*** 
-7.983 
 
.043*** 
9.620 
 
-2.873** 
-2.364 
 
-6.872*** 
-6.068 
 
 
 
-2.392*** 
-3.767 
Intercept 
t 
 
Control variables 
 
TA 
t 
 
OPCYCLE 
t 
 
SALESG 
t 
 
LOSS 
t 
 
Audit quality 
 
UNEXPFEE_2 
t 
33.942*** 
7.001 
 
 
 
-1.778*** 
-7.982 
 
.043*** 
9.612 
 
-2.874** 
-2.365 
 
-6.871*** 
-6.066 
 
 
 
-2.367*** 
-3.724 
R2 .163  .163 
Notes: 
***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
The variables are defined as follows: 
UNEXPFEE_1=Unexpected audit fees (Residual from regression model 33) 
UNEXPFEE_2=Unexpected audit fees (Residual from regression model 34)  
Other variables are as defined in Appendix 3 
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APPENDIX 18.  Results for moderation effect.  
  
 
Variable 
 
ACC 
Intercept 
t 
 
Control variables 
 
TA 
t 
 
OPCYCLE 
t 
 
SALESG 
t 
 
LOSS 
t 
 
Audit committee effectiveness 
 
ACMEET 
t 
 
Audit quality 
 
AUDITFEE 
t 
 
Interaction term 
 
AUDITFEE*ACMEET 
t 
35.485*** 
5.601 
 
 
 
-1.178*** 
-3.293 
 
.045*** 
9.886 
 
-2.834** 
-2.325 
 
-6.385*** 
-5.582 
 
 
 
.113 
.283 
 
 
 
-.839 
-1.355 
 
 
 
-.026 
-.927 
R2 .162 
Notes: 
***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
The variables are defined as follows: 
AUDITFEE*ACMEET= Interaction term of ACMEET and AUDITFEE 
Other variables are as defined in Appendix 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
